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iAbstract
The focus of traditional model checking has been on the verification problem where coun-
terexamples play a secondary role. In many potential uses of model checkers, however,
counterexamples play a primary role. For example, in safety analysis, achieving perfect
safety in the system being analysed is often impossible or too expensive. In such a case,
the analyst is interested in discovering all of the situations that can lead to unsafe con-
ditions in order to assess their likelihood. These situations appear as counterexamples
to a system safety property expressed as a temporal logic formula in model checking.
This thesis proposes an approach to model checking when counterexample generation is
the primary goal. Model checking is viewed as a search for counterexamples rather than
simply ensuring that a specification is satisfied by a model. The temporal logic used is
Linear Temporal Logic (LTL).
Most existing model checkers stop after the first counterexample is found. The few
that can generate multiple counterexample paths typically generate too many counterex-
ample paths that are slight variations of each other. For LTL, a counterexample path
is an infinite sequence of states, and the number of counterexample paths for a model
checking problem can be infinite. Typically, the analyst is interested in a finite number of
classes of counterexample, with each class represented by a single counterexample path.
However, the classes of interest are often specific to the problem domain. An approach
explored in this thesis is to control the generation of counterexample paths by allowing
the analyst to direct the search for a counterexample path to rule in or rule out certain
classes of counterexamples. The counterexample paths generated are of the so-called
lasso form, each consisting of a prefix part (a possibly empty finite sequence of states)
and a cycle part (a non-empty finite sequence of states that is repeated forever).
The main technique proposed for controlled generation of counterexamples within a
symbolic framework is called directed counterexample generation. The search for a coun-
terexample path is directed using two kinds of constraints: a global constraint which is a
state property that must be satisfied by all states in the counterexample path, and a cycle
constraint which is a state property that must be satisfied by at least one state in the cy-
cle part of a counterexample path. While global constraints can be easily integrated with
existing techniques for counterexample path generation, cycle constraints entail a search
technique different from the existing techniques. As well as controlling the generation of
multiple counterexample paths, the use of constraints can greatly reduce the search space
in generating individual counterexample paths. The framework together with directed
counterexample generation provide an infrastructure for exploring the counterexample
space in a model checking problem.
ii
Model checking, and thus counterexample generation, suffers from the state explosion
problem. Although many techniques have been developed to mitigate the state explosion
problem in model checking, including symbolic model checking, no best single combi-
nation of techniques for model checking and counterexample generation has been found
and it is unlikely that one will be found, since the state explosion problem cannot in
general be eliminated. The approach in this thesis is to develop a framework for LTL
model checking and counterexample generation where different techniques and strategies
can be mixed and matched, including fixpoint and on-the-fly techniques. The proposed
framework is intended to support the analysis of finite-state asynchronous systems with
interleaving semantics.
The framework is independent of the modelling notation, but the Behavior Tree (BT)
notation is used as a concrete example notation for modelling finite-state asynchronous
systems. A method for translating models in a substantial subset of the BT notation
into objects in the framework is provided. As a proof of concept, a prototype that
incorporates the proposed techniques within the framework has been developed. The
prototype includes a translator from the BT notation. Experiments with the prototype
were performed to demonstrate the advantages of the proposed approach and assess the
effects of model checking strategies on directed counterexample generation.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
In real life, there may be several different ways for something to go wrong. As an example,
the failure of an ATM to dispense 500 dollars requested by a person A may be caused by
one of the following:
• An automatic payment was made from A’s account to a utility company the day
before, causing insufficient funds for the requested withdrawal.
• The ATM’s keypad malfunctioned, causing the PIN number entered by A to be
garbled and not recognised.
• A withdrawal was made by A earlier that day, and withdrawing 500 dollars would
exceed A’s daily withdrawal limit.
In general, an undesired outcome in real life is caused by a sequence of events (i.e., a
behaviour). Suppose we have a model that includes the ATM and A, and allows the
above behaviours. The behaviours that lead to an undesired outcome may be viewed
as a counterexample to the conjecture that a desired outcome is always achieved in the
model. The different causes of an undesired outcome are represented by multiple coun-
terexamples. Often, one would like to know the different behaviours — each represented
by a counterexample — that can lead to an undesired outcome.
Similar to the above real life situation where one wants to know the different possible
behaviours that can lead to an undesired outcome, in many applications of Linear Tempo-
ral Logic (LTL) [Pnu77] model checking [CE81,QS82], the analyst may want to generate
multiple counterexamples. For example, in safety analysis, achieving complete safety in
the system being analysed is impossible or too expensive [Per84], but one would like to
know all of the cases that can lead to unsafe situations, where the sequence of events
1
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that leads to an unsafe situation is represented by a counterexample to a safety property
expressed in LTL. Another example application is in the area of coverage-based test case
generation [GH99,RH01] where test sequences are derived from counterexamples to trap
properties: each trap property is an LTL formula asserting that the negation of some
condition of interest holds forever (in this case, a counterexample path leads to a desired
outcome whereby the condition of interest is reached). In these and many other types
of applications, the interest is in counterexamples that are linear paths (representing
sequences of events), thus the focus on LTL.
Most existing model checkers, including NuSMV [CCGR99] and SAL [dMOR+04],
stop after finding the first counterexample. The few that can generate multiple coun-
terexamples (e.g., SPIN [Hol04]) often generate too many counterexamples that are slight
variations of each other [JD03].
With a model checker that stops after finding the first counterexample, to make the
model checker find other counterexamples, one must modify either the temporal logic
formula or the model so that the counterexample found is eliminated from the set of
behaviours analysed, and then rerun the model checker. This is a time-consuming and
error-prone process, and in the case where an LTL formula is modified, the required model
checking time can grow exponentially with the size of the modified formula. Having the
model checker find other counterexamples without needing to modify the temporal logic
formula or the model is preferable.
This thesis proposes a capability to direct the search for a counterexample away
from certain parts of the model or towards certain parts of the model. Counterexample
paths can then be classified based on parts of the model that are excluded and parts
of the model that are included. This provides some control over generation of multiple
counterexample paths, with the granularity of the control as coarse or as fine as the
parts excluded and/or the parts included. The proposed capability is not to be tied to a
specific modelling notation to enable it to be used with various modelling notations for
finite-state asynchronous systems.
In addition to being independent of the modelling notation, the proposed capability is
to be compatible with as many model checking approaches as possible. This is important
because many techniques and strategies have been developed to mitigate the state explo-
sion problem in model checking, but no single combination of techniques and strategies
has been found to be best for all model checking problems. Still, symbolic techniques
operating on sets of states have been found to be more efficient than techniques that
operate on explicit states (see for example, [RV07], in the context of LTL satisfiability
checking). Thus the proposed capability is to be symbolic-oriented.
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1.2 Research Questions
This thesis addresses the following research questions:
1. Can the search for an LTL counterexample path be directed away from certain parts
of a model or towards certain parts of a model?
2. Can a method for such a directed counterexample path generation be made inde-
pendent of the modelling notation?
3. Can a method for directed counterexample path generation be incorporated into a
symbolic framework?
4. How do model checking strategies, such as when reachability is determined, affect
directed counterexample path generation?
5. Can directed counterexample path generation be mixed and matched with existing
techniques?
1.3 Approach
To answer the research questions, a general symbolic framework for LTL model checking
and counterexample generation is first developed. Within the framework, a method for
directed counterexample path generation is proposed.
The proposed symbolic framework is intended to support the analysis of asynchronous
finite state systems with interleaving semantics. The framework proposed consists of two
levels:
• a state machine modelling level that is not specific to any modelling notation, and
• an LTL level that can accommodate various LTL encoding schemes.
The Behavior Tree (BT) notation [Dro03,Dro06] is used as an example modelling notation
for asynchronous systems, and examples involving Behavior Trees are used throughout
this thesis. Two example LTL encoding schemes are used in this thesis: the classic LTL
encoding scheme developed by Lichtenstein and Pnueli [LP85] and the Transition-based
Generalised Bu¨chi Automaton (TGBA) encoding scheme of Rozier and Vardi [RV11].
A state machine model in the proposed framework is essentially a Kripke structure
plus “elementary blocks,” which are intended to represent structures inherited from the
modelling notation. By maintaining structures from the modelling notation in elementary
blocks, analyses can take advantage of the extra structures and counterexample paths
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can be easily mapped back to the modelling notation. Elementary blocks and the use of
transfer functions to compute images and pre-images under transition relations for the
elementary blocks are concepts borrowed from the field of program analysis.
The LTL level provides a unified framework for encoding an LTL formula ϕ into a
tableau for checking the satisfiability of ϕ, using any of the well-known LTL encoding
schemes (including the classic and TGBA encoding schemes). The framework does not
confine symbolic model checking to the traditional fixpoint approach [McM92]. It is
intended to allow approaches, techniques and strategies for LTL model checking and
counterexample generation to be mixed and matched.
Several novel techniques are developed within the framework, including
• An algorithm for computing reachable states that mimics Kildall’s algorithm for
program flow analysis [Kil73].
• A novel adaptation into the symbolic framework, of on-the-fly LTL model checking
[GPVW95] that is usually associated with an explicit approach.
However, the main technique developed for the controlled generation of multiple coun-
terexamples is:
• A novel technique called directed counterexample path generation, in which the cycle
part of a counterexample path is searched before the prefix part (the counterexample
paths considered are of the so-called lasso type consisting of a prefix followed by a
cycle that is repeated forever). Direction for the search for a counterexample path
is provided through a global constraint (a constraint that must be satisfied by all
states in the path) and a cycle constraint (a constraint that must be satisfied by at
least one of the states in the cycle part of the path).
A prototype symbolic LTL model checker that incorporates the proposed techniques
has been developed. The prototype includes a translator from a significant subset the
BT notation into elementary blocks. Experiments with the prototype were conducted to
assess the effectiveness of the techniques proposed in this thesis and to investigate the
effects of different model checking strategies on the proposed directed counterexample
path generation.
1.4 Thesis Contributions
The main contributions of this thesis are as follows:
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• The symbolic framework for LTL model checking and counterexample generation.
The unified framework captures essential concepts common to many existing ap-
proaches to LTL model checking, allowing different approaches, strategies and tech-
niques to be mixed and matched.
• Generic proof plans for showing the soundness of an LTL encoding scheme within
the framework. The proof plans are instantiated for the classic LTL encoding
scheme and the TGBA encoding scheme.
• The formulation of transitions as collections of guarded updates, allowing images
and pre-images under transition relations to be computed without performing re-
lational products using transition relations represented as entire propositions. In-
stead, images and pre-images are computed using updates, existential quantification
in the logic of quantified boolean formulas [AHU74] and propositional operations.
• An algorithm for computing reachable states that mimics Kildall’s algorithm for
program flow analysis [Kil73]. The algorithm can be used in cases where comput-
ing reachability of states and using the reachability information in model checking
is a good strategy. The algorithm provides an alternative to a naive fixpoint com-
putation and in some cases is significantly more efficient than the naive fixpoint
computation.
• A novel adaptation of the on-the-fly explicit automata approach to LTL model
checking into a symbolic framework. This provides an alternative to the fixpoint
approach for symbolic LTL model checking.
• A novel approach for generating symbolic LTL counterexample paths called di-
rected counterexample generation whereby the cycle part of a counterexample path
is searched before the prefix part (the counterexample paths considered are of the
lasso type consisting of a possibly empty finite sequence of states called the pre-
fix part, followed by a non-empty finite sequence of states that is repeated forever
called the cycle part). The resulting mechanism facilitates the controlled generation
of multiple counterexamples.
1.5 Thesis Structure
• Chapter 2 Background and Literature Review — This chapter provides
essential background material on temporal logic and Behavior Trees and provides
a literature review on model checking and LTL counterexample generation.
6 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
• Chapter 3 The State Machine Framework — This chapter describes the
state machine level of the proposed framework. A state machine in the framework
is essentially a Kripke structure with additional structure in the form of elementary
blocks.
• Chapter 4 Translating Behavior Trees — This chapter describes a method to
translate Behavior Trees to objects in the framework. It is intended to illustrate
how objects of a source notation can be translated into elementary blocks.
• Chapter 5 Reachability — This chapter discusses the concept of reachability in
symbolic LTL model checking within the framework. An algorithm for computing
reachable states is proposed in this chapter.
• Chapter 6 Foundation for LTL Model Checking — This chapter identifies
essential concepts in LTL model checking that are common to many LTL model
checking approaches and are independent of the LTL encoding scheme. Theorems
that need to be proved to demonstrate the soundness of an encoding scheme are
presented in a manner independent of the encoding scheme. Proof plans for the the-
orems are presented (their applications to the classic LTL encoding scheme and the
Transition-based Generalised Bu¨chi Automaton (TGBA) encoding scheme appear
in Appendix A).
• Chapter 7 LTL Model Checking within the Framework — This chapter
describes the application of the concepts in Chapter 6 to the state machine frame-
work of Chapter 3, resulting in a symbolic framework for LTL model checking and
counterexample generation. The chapter also discusses how various approaches
and strategies for LTL model checking and counterexample generation might be
implemented within the symbolic framework.
• Chapter 8 Directed Counterexample Path Generation — This chapter pro-
poses a novel approach to LTL counterexample path generation. The search for a
counterexample path is directed by a cycle constraint — a state formula that must
be satisfied by a state in the cycle — and the search can be constrained using a
global constraint — a state formula that must be satisfied by all states in the coun-
terexample path. The cycle part of a counterexample path is searched first, based
on the cycle constraint, and a prefix to the cycle is searched after a cycle is found.
• Chapter 9 Experiments with a Prototype — This chapter presents results
of experiments with a prototype LTL model checker that incorporates the tech-
niques for directed counterexample path generation proposed. The purpose of the
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experiments is twofold: to demonstrate the need for multiple strategies and to
demonstrate the advantages of directed counterexample path generation when gen-
erating multiple counterexample paths. The prototype is a proof of concept rather
than a production model checker, and the timing comparisons are mostly between
different strategies for model checking and counterexample path generation in the
prototype. Nevertheless, some timing comparisons with SAL (Symbolic Analysis
Laboratory) [dMOS03] are provided to demonstrate the practicality of the proposed
approach.
• Chapter 10 Conclusion — This chapter explains how the research questions
in Section 1.2 are answered, summarises the main contributions of the thesis, and
discusses possible future work.
8 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
Chapter 2
Background and Literature Review
This chapter provides background material on temporal logic and Behavior Trees and
provides a literature review on model checking and LTL counterexample generation. The
Behavior Tree notation is a notation for asynchronous multi-threaded systems used in
this thesis to illustrate the concepts that are used in the proposed approach.
2.1 Temporal Logic
The full propositional temporal logic, called CTL* [EH86], adds path quantifiers and
temporal operators to propositional logic. A path in temporal logic is an infinite sequence
of states and a temporal operation describes a property on a path. The path quantifiers
are A (for all paths) and E (for some path). The temporal operators are X (“next time”),
F (“eventually”), G (“always”), U (“strong until”) and R (“release”).
There are two types of formulas in CTL*: state formulas (to be interpreted as propo-
sitions about states) and path formulas (to be interpreted as propositions about paths).
Definition 2.1. Given a set AP of atomic propositions, the syntax of CTL* is inductively
defined as follows:
• If p ∈ AP then p is a state formula.
• If f and g are state formulas, then ¬f , f ∨ g and f ∧ g are state formulas.
• If f is a path formula, then E f and A f are state formulas.
• If f is a state formula, then f is also a path formula.
• If f and g are path formulas, then ¬f , f ∨ g , f ∧ g, X f , F f , G f , f U g and f R g
are path formulas.
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The propositional operators ¬, ∨ and ∧ are inherited from standard propositional logic.
Since a state formula is also a path formula, all CTL* formulas can be interpreted
as path formulas. But some CTL* formulas cannot be interpreted as state formulas. A
temporal operation or a propositional operation with a temporal operation appearing as
a factor (e.g., f ∨ (g ∧ Fh)) can only be interpreted as a path formula.
The semantics of temporal logic is described in terms of a Kripke structure M =
(S,R, L).
Definition 2.2. A Kripke structure M is a triple (S,R, L) where S is a finite set of
states, R is a relation on S × S called the transition relation, L is a labelling on S
(L : S → P(AP )) and L determines the atomic propositions that hold in each state
(p ∈ L(s) means the atomic proposition p holds in state s). S together with R determine
the set of paths in M . To ensure that all paths are infinite, it is often required that
the transition relation R be total on the left argument (there is a transition from every
state). Without loss of generality, to simplify the proposed framework, L is required to
be injective so that a state is completely determined by its label.
A path pi is an infinite sequence of states. The notation pii is used to denote the
(i+ 1)th state in path pi (i starts at 0). The notation pii is used to denote the suffix of pi
starting from the ith state, e.g., pi2 = 〈pi2, pi3, ...〉. For each path pi in a Kripke structure
M = (S,R, L), the following holds:
∀n ≥ 0 : (pin, pin+1) ∈ R.
The notation M, s |= f is used to indicate that the state formula f holds in state s in
Kripke structure M . The notation M,pi |= f is used to indicate that the path formula f
holds for path pi in Kripke structure M .
Definition 2.3. The semantics of CTL* is determined by the |= relation, inductively
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defined as follows:
M, s |= p ⇔ p ∈ L(s), if p is an atomic proposition,
M, s |= ¬p ⇔ M, s 6|= p,
M, s |= p ∨ q ⇔ (M, s |= p) ∨ (M, s |= q),
M, s |= p ∧ q ⇔ (M, s |= p) ∧ (M, s |= q),
M, s |= E p ⇔ ∃pi : pi0 = s ∧ (M,pi |= p),
M, s |= A p ⇔ ∀pi : pi0 = s⇒ (M,pi |= p),
M, pi |= p ⇔ M,pi0 |= p, if p is an atomic proposition,
M, pi |= ¬p ⇔ M,pi 6|= p,
M, pi |= p ∨ q ⇔ (M,pi |= p) ∨ (M,pi |= q),
M, pi |= p ∧ q ⇔ (M,pi |= p) ∧ (M,pi |= q),
M, pi |= X p ⇔ M,pi1 |= p,
M, pi |= F p ⇔ ∃i ≥ 0 : (M,pii |= p),
M, pi |= G p ⇔ ∀i ≥ 0 : (M,pii |= p),
M, pi |= pU q ⇔ ∃i ≥ 0 : (M,pii |= q) ∧ ∀0 ≤ j < i : (M,pij |= p),
M, pi |= pR q ⇔ ∀j ≥ 0 : (∀i < j : (M,pii 6|= p))⇒ (M,pij |= q).
Computation tree logic (CTL) [Eme81] is a fragment of CTL* in which all temporal
operations must be immediately quantified thus producing state formulas. As a result,
one can work entirely with state formulas in CTL model checking. However, strong
fairness assumptions cannot be expressed in CTL (the GFp in (¬GFp) ∨ q is a strong
fairness assumption asserting that p is satisfied infinitely often in an infinite path).
Linear temporal logic (LTL) [Pnu77] is the path quantifier free fragment of CTL*.
Strong fairness assumptions can be expressed in LTL, but the CTL formula AG EFp
(always able to go from any state to a state satisfying p) cannot be expressed in LTL.
Because LTL is a fragment of the full propositional temporal logic, the semantics of LTL
can be inferred from the semantics of the full propositional temporal logic. An LTL
specification is implicitly quantified over all paths.
2.2 Model Checking
This section provides a quick survey on model checking. For an in-depth treatment of
model checking, the reader can consult a textbook on model checking such as [CGP99]
or [BK08].
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Model checking is a process whereby the satisfiability of a specification expressed in
a modal logic is checked against a model that can be translated into a Kripke structure.
Although parts of the specification may be interpreted over infinite paths, model checking
does not operate on infinite paths directly. Instead, model checking operates on states
and transitions.
2.2.1 CTL Model Checking
The field of model checking started in the early 1980s with pioneering work by Clarke and
Emerson [CE81] on CTL model checking. At around the same time, and independently,
Queille and Sifakis [QS82] developed a CTL model checking algorithm operating on Petri
nets. CTL is simple to model check because one can work entirely with state formulas and
a bottom up processing of subformulas of the formula being checked can be performed.
CTL model checking is based on computing states that satisfy each of the state
subformulas of the formula being checked. The states that satisfy a state subformula p
are completely determined by states that satisfy each of p’s immediate state subformulas
and the transition relation R of the model. For example, if p ≡ EGq, then the states that
satisfy p are completely determined by states that satisfy q and the transition relation R.
States that satisfy a subformula that is an atomic proposition can be determined from
the labelling function L of the Kripke structure. In an explicit CTL model checker such
as [CE81], the computation of states satisfying p may involve the construction of strongly
connected components (SCCs). For example, if p ≡ EGq and S ′ = {s ∈ S | M, s |= q},
then one can form M ′ = (S ′, R′, L′) where R′ = R|S′×S′ and L′ = L|S′ and construct the
SCCs in the graph of states and transition in M ′. The states that satisfy EGq are those
that belong to a non-trivial SCC plus states in S ′, each of which has a path (via R′) to
a non-trivial SCC.
2.2.2 Fairness Constraints
A fairness constraint is a state formula that must be satisfied infinitely often in an infinite
path. To enable the checking of properties under strong fairness assumptions, many CTL
model checkers allow the addition of a set C of fairness constraints to the model. A path
pi is fair with respect to C if each fairness constraint in C is satisfied infinitely often in pi.
In CTL model checking with fairness constraints C, only paths that are fair with respect
to C are considered.
In the explicit CTL model checker of [CE81], determining fairness involves the con-
struction of strongly connected components (SCCs) in the graph of states (nodes) and
transitions (edges), where each fairness constraint is fulfilled by a state in each of the
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SCCs. In the symbolic CTL model checker of [McM92], in the presence of fairness con-
straints, computations of states satisfying certain temporal operations involve nested
fixpoint operations, e.g.,
EGp , νZ.p ∧
∧
c∈C
EX(µY.(Z ∧ c) ∨ (p ∧ EXY ))
where the outer greatest fixpoint operation (νZ) interacts with the inner least fixpoint
operations (µY ), and C is the set of fairness constraints.
Fairness constraints add complexity to CTL model checking. Whereas the complexity
of pure CTL model checking isO(|f |·(|S|+|R|)) where |f | is the size of the formula f being
checked (the number of symbols in f), |S| is the number of states in the model and |R| is
the size of the transition relation in the model (as a set of ordered pairs), the complexity
of CTL model checking with a set of fairness constraints C is O(|f | · (|S|+ |R|) · |C|) (see,
e.g., [CGP99]).
2.2.3 LTL Model Checking
Unlike CTL which is state oriented, LTL is very much path oriented. An LTL specification
f is implicitly quantified over all paths, and thus is taken to be the CTL* formula Af .
Model checking is performed by checking the satisfiability of ϕ where ϕ ≡ ¬f . Since ϕ is
a path formula, satisfiability checking amounts to finding a path pi such that M,pi |= ϕ.
Usually it is understood that pi0 ∈ S0 where S0 ⊆ S is a designated set of initial states.
To check path formulas in a states-and-transitions setting, the states are augmented with
path commitments, and transition constraints are added based on the path commitments,
producing an augmented model M ′. A path commitment to a path formula p in an
augmented state s′ may be viewed as a commitment for s′ to start only suffix paths that
satisfy p. We will denote the commitment to satisfy p, Sϕ(p). Thus an augmented state
in which Sϕ(p) holds is commited to start suffix paths that satisfy p.
Path commitments and transition constraints determine a tableau, which is a decision
graph for checking the satisfiability of ϕ (the use of tableaux to decide satisfiability of
formulas was first proposed by Beth [Bet55]). The tableau guarantees that the paths in
M ′, when projected to M , cover all the paths that need to be considered. However, it
does not guarantee that a considered path that starts at an augmented state committed
to ϕ satisfies ϕ. A subformula may require that some condition eventually holds. As an
example, if Fg holds in a suffix pii where i ≥ 0, then g needs to hold in some suffix pij
where j ≥ i. The formula g is called an eventual condition. To guarantee that a path
that starts at a state committed to ϕ does in fact satisfy ϕ, eventual conditions in the
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path must be checked. An LTL encoding scheme determines how the tableau for ϕ is
generated and how eventual conditions can be checked.
The first LTL model checking algorithm was developed by Lichtenstein and Pnueli
[LP85]. Their algorithm operates on explicit states and they call their augmented states
atoms. Their check for eventual conditions involves constructing strongly connected com-
ponents (SCCs) which are self-fulfilling in terms of the eventual conditions: if a node (an
atom) in an SCC is committed to a suffix path in which an eventual condition q is re-
quired, e.g., if Sϕ(p U q) holds in the atom, then there is an atom in the SCC in which
Sϕ(q) holds. The SCCs are constructed in a reachability graph involving atoms (instead
of unaugmented states) where the transitions are constrained by the tableau for ϕ as well
as the transition relation R. However, instead of keeping track of when Sϕ(p U q) holds
and when Sϕ(q) is fulfilled, Lichtenstein and Pnueli introduced
¬Sϕ(p U q) ∨ Sϕ(q) (2.1)
as a fairness constraint. For each subformula of ϕ of the form p U q, a fairness constraint
as in 2.1 is constructed. Lichtenstein and Pnueli showed that an SCC is self-fulfilling if
and only if each fairness constraint holds in at least one atom in the SCC. ϕ is satisfiable
if and only if there is a prefix path starting at an initial atom in which Sϕ(ϕ) holds
to a self-fulfilling SCC. The complexity of the algorithm of Lichtenstein and Pnueli is
O((|S|+ |R|) · 2O(|ϕ|)), i.e., it is exponential in the size of ϕ.
An alternative approach for LTL model checking is the automata approach, typically
performed on-the-fly [CVWY92,GPVW95]. As with the original approach for LTL model
checking, the on-the-fly explicit automata approach uses fairness constraints to track the
fulfillment of eventual conditions. Each fairness constraint must be fulfilled infinitely
often in a path that satisfies ϕ. The tableau for ϕ (equivalent to ¬f) imposed on the
model together with the fairness constraints for ϕ may be viewed as forming a generalised
Bu¨chi automaton (GBA) which can be transformed into a Bu¨chi automaton (BA). To
avoid the exponential complexity of precise tracking of fairness constraints, in many
implementations, the BA essentially uses imprecise tracking of fairness constraints, thus
some paths that are accepted by the GBA are not accepted by the BA. However, if there
is a path that is accepted by the GBA, then there is a path that is accepted by the BA.
A depth first search is performed to find a path that is accepted by the BA. If a path
is found, then it satisfies ϕ and represents a counterexample for f in the model. If the
search properly terminates without finding a path, then f holds in the model.
2.2.4 Symbolic Model Checking
Symbolic model checking was first advocated by McMillan [McM92]. Symbolic model
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checking operates on sets of states rather than individual states. Typically, a set is
constructed for states that satisfy a state subformula. A set of states is characterised
using a proposition, and ordered binary decision diagrams (OBDDs) [Bry86] are used
to represent propositions. Set operations are performed using OBDD operations. In
symbolic model checking as advocated by [McM92], computation of strongly connected
components in explicit model checking is replaced by fixpoint computation based on the
approach of Emerson and Lei [EL86], using the fixpoint operations of µ-calculus [Koz83].
As an example,
EGq , νZ.q ∧ EXZ.
As with explicit CTL model checking, symbolic CTL model checking proceeds bottom
up on the state subformulas of the formula being checked.
Symbolic model checking was the first breakthrough in mitigating the state explosion
problem. Burch et al [BCM+92] were able to apply symbolic model checking on a system
with 1020 states. However, the performance of OBDDs can be highly sensitive to the vari-
able ordering, where an OBDD variable represents an uninterpreted atomic proposition
(not necessarily an atomic proposition of the Kripke structure) and in a direct traversal
from an OBDD “root” to any leaf, the variable nodes in the traversal must be ordered
according to the variable ordering. In some cases there is no variable ordering that can
prevent an explosion in the size of the OBDD.
The first symbolic LTL model checking algorithm was proposed in [BCM+92]. It is
based on encoding atomic path commitments as extra state variables, adding transition
constraints based on the atomic path commitments, and using fairness constraints to track
the fulfillment of eventual conditions, in a CTL model checker with fairness constraints.
Although in practice the algorithm is often much faster than the explicit algorithm of
[LP85], the complexity of the algorithm is the same as [LP85].
2.2.5 State Space Reduction Techniques
In addition to symbolic model checking, state space reduction techniques have been de-
veloped to mitigate the state explosion problem. These techniques include partial order
reduction, compositional reasoning and abstraction. Partial order reduction is used in
the case of parallel programs with an interleaving model where some interleavings are
eliminated from the model because they are already represented by other interleavings
that have the same effects [PWW96]. In compositional reasoning, a system is decomposed
into smaller parts and the assume-guarantee paradigm is used [MC81]. Abstraction tech-
niques include those that do not change the meaning of the analysis such as removing
variables that do not affect the properties being checked (often called variables outside the
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cone of influence [CGP99]), and those that potentially change the meaning of the anal-
ysis such as data abstraction [CGL94] and predicate abstraction [GS97]. An approach
called counterexample-guided abstraction refinement [CGJ+00] performs refinements to
an abstracted model to remove “spurious” counterexamples (a “spurious” counterexam-
ple is a counterexample found for an abstracted model that is not a counterexample
for the original unabstracted model), to automatically arrive at an appropriate level of
abstraction.
Most of the state space reduction techniques are orthogonal to “core model checking,”
and can be applied in conjunction with the techniques and strategies proposed in this
thesis. A notable exception is partial order reduction. To be effective, partial order
reduction must be applied in an on-the-fly approach to model checking.
2.3 Counterexample Generation
Although there has been much work on state space reduction and efficient LTL model
checking, there has been little work on LTL counterexample generation. Traditionally,
the focus of model checking has been on the verification problem with counterexamples
playing a secondary role.
2.3.1 Basic LTL Counterexample Path Generation
The two main techniques for LTL counterexample path generation in use are:
• The technique of Clarke et al [CGMZ95] for symbolic CTL model checking with
fairness constraints. The technique searches for a counterexample path guided by
states that satisfy fairness constraints. The technique is efficient and tends to
generate counterexample paths with relatively short prefixes and cycles.
• On-the-fly LTL model checking using explicit automata [GPVW95]. Because the
technique used to generate a Bu¨chi automaton from a generalised Bu¨chi automaton
uses imprecise tracking of fairness constraints (thus the BA accepts a subset of
the counterexamples paths accepted by the GBA) and the search is a depth-first
search, on-the-fly LTL model checking as proposed by [GPVW95] tends to produce
counterexample paths with unnecessarily long prefixes and cycles.
Additionally, there is the technique of [SB05] that generates the shortest counterexample
paths for LTL with past operators. None of the cited techniques for generating LTL
counterexample paths address the issue of controlling the generation of multiple coun-
terexamples.
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2.3.2 Generating Multiple Counterexamples
Most model checkers stop after finding the first counterexample. SPIN [Hol04] can gen-
erate multiple counterexamples, but the multiple counterexamples tend to contain too
many that are slight variations of each other. In fact, the difficult part of generating
multiple counterexamples is how to generate “meaningful” variations. In general, what
constitutes a meaningful variation is domain-specific. Nevertheless, a model checker ought
to support the generation of meaningful variations by providing appropriate mechanisms.
Without the appropriate mechanisms, the generation of meaningful multiple coun-
terexamples requires multiple runs of the model checker. After each run, if the run
produced a counterexample, the counterexample is examined and either the model or
the temporal logic formula is modified for the next run, based on the examination. For
some applications, the process can be automated (see e.g., [JD03]). Rerunning the model
checker is expensive, and in the case of LTL, the modification to the temporal formula can
increase the running time significantly. The problem is compounded if the modification
is manual, since it is error-prone.
In contrast, with the appropriate mechanisms, only the counterexample path genera-
tor is rerun, and no modification to the temporal formula nor the model is required. This
can significantly reduce the running time compared to rerunning the model checker, and
it avoids potential errors associated with modifying the temporal formula or the model.
Chechik and Gurfinkel [CG05] developed a framework for counterexample generation
and exploration, but only for pure CTL without fairness constraints. There are other
frameworks for counterexamples/witnesses1 but most of them are for certifying the results
of model checking. They include a proof system for certifying counterexamples/witnesses
for CTL* developed by Namjoshi [Nam01], and a framework for generating certifiable
symbolic counterexamples/witnesses for pure CTL (without fairness constraints) devel-
oped by Shankar and Sorea [SS04]. Except for the framework of Chechik and Gurfinkel,
which does not apply to LTL, none of the frameworks address the issue of generating
multiple counterexamples.
Techniques that may provide some control when generating multiple counterexamples
are those for counterexample generation in probabilistic model checking for discrete-time
Markov chains [HKD09, SVV09]. Some measure of control is provided by the proba-
bilistic techniques, e.g., by generating only counterexamples that exceed some threshold
probability. However, the techniques only apply in a probabilistic model, specifically a
discrete-time Markov chain model. Applications in safety analysis often treat likelihood
more qualitatively than probabilities in a discrete-time Markov chain model. In addition,
1in CTL/CTL* model checking, a witness proves the validity of an existential specification.
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the control (filtering effect) obtained by using a probabilistic technique does not address
coverage issues in safety analysis and test case generation.
2.4 Behavior Trees
The Behavior Tree (BT) notation is a graphical notation for specifying system behaviours,
originally developed by Dromey to support the process of capturing requirements and
transforming them into designs [Dro03, Dro06]. Dromey adopted the tree structure no-
tation to help cope with complexity because humans have more difficulty coping with
an arbitrary graph structure. Other issues that strongly influenced the design of the
Behavior Tree notation include:
• traceability to requirements, and
• integrating several trees (from several requirements) into a single tree.
Figure 2.1 shows an example BT that specifies the operation of a simple, perhaps
unrealistic, vending machine. The system starts with the vending machine in a ready
state, and waits for a customer to insert a coin. After a customer inserts a coin, the
system waits for the customer to select either candy or chips. Once the customer selects
either candy or chips, the vending machine dispenses the appropriate selection, and the
cycle is repeated.
A BT consists of nodes (drawn as boxes) representing actions and arrows between
nodes representing control flow. The tree structure of a BT represents the basic con-
trol flow structure, which consists of sequencing and branching. In the example, there
is an alternative branching after a customer inserts a coin. The branch taken depends
on whether the customer selects candy or chips. In the BT notation, the selection of
alternatives is based on guards. There is another kind of branching in the BT notation
called parallel branching. Unlike alternative branching, all branches in a parallel branch-
ing are taken and each branch starts a new subthread. Sequential nodes may be merged
to form an atomic composition whereby the execution of the sequence of nodes becomes
indivisible and uninterruptible.
In addition to the basic control flow structure, there are other control flows in the
BT notation, specified using control flow directives. In the example, there are nodes
with the reversion (∧) directive. The reversion directive is the most important of all BT
directives, as it is the directive for constructing a loop. It kills and restarts the execution
of a subtree rooted at its “matching” node. Killing the execution of a subtree causes all
threads activated in the subtree to be killed as well. Since the kill and restart are intended
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Figure 2.1: Simple Vending Machine BT
to produce a loop, the subtree must include the node with the reversion directive, thus
the matching node must be an ancestor of the node with the reversion directive. In the
example, the matching node for both reversions is the root of the entire BT. Other BT
directives include the reference (=>) directive (similar to “go to”), the kill (−−) directive
for killing the execution of a subtree, and the synchronise (=) directive for synchronising
threads.
The BT notation allows a sequence of nodes to be composed into an atomic compo-
sition, drawn as a contiguous sequence of boxes without arrows. The nodes in an atomic
composition is executed atomically with the effect of the execution the same as though
the nodes are executed in sequence.
Each BT node refers to a component (VM or CUST in the example), and has a be-
haviour that is either a state realisation (e.g., [Ready]), a guard (e.g., ???Ready???), a
selection (e.g., ?Ready?), an event (e.g., ??Coin??), an internal output (e.g., <Coin>),
an internal input (e.g., >Coin<), an external output (<<Coin>>), or an external input
(e.g., >>Coin<<). A state realisation node indicates that a component enters a particu-
lar state or that an attribute of a component gets a particular value. In the example, we
have state realisation nodes where VM enters the “ready,” “candy” and “chips” states,
modelling the corresponding behaviours abstractly. A guard node waits until its guard
expression holds before proceeding. A selection node is like a guard node except it does
not wait until its guard holds, instead its thread is killed if the guard does not hold. An
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event node is also like a guard node, except it waits for an event. Inputs and outputs are
similar to events, however, an internal input can only occur simultaneously with the cor-
responding internal output (e.g., >Coin< waits for <Coin> and proceeds simultaneously
with <Coin>), but internal output does not have to wait for the corresponding input to
be ready. The example BT has three external input events modelling the cases where
the system waits for a customer (CUST) to insert a coin, select candy and select chips
respectively.
Each BT node can have a requirement tag, which provides traceability to require-
ments. The example BT has all of the nodes tagged R1 since it is assumed that there
is only a single requirement named R1. For a large BT that models a large set of re-
quirements, each node can be tagged according to which requirements are relevant. Since
requirements traceability is not relevant for this thesis, we will instead use the tags as
node identifiers by tagging each node differently.
A BT node may be viewed as a guarded command [Dij75] that is executed atomically.
For an atomic composition of nodes, guards of all the nodes in the composition must
be enabled for the atomic composition to be executed. The execution of BT nodes
from parallel threads are interleaved, unless they are synchronised. BT nodes that are
synchronised with each other are executed simultaneously. The BT notation allows for
non-deterministic choice between internal behaviours in an alternative branching. In
addition, when a BT is not coupled with an environment, events and external I/O may
be viewed as occurring non-deterministically.
The graphical nature of the BT notation makes it natural to have tools for BTs
with visual effects. An execution path of a BT (e.g., a counterexample path) may be
animated by highlighting the BT nodes as the “execution” steps through the nodes. The
status of active threads may also be shown in the animation, e.g., by highlighting (in a
different fashion) “active” nodes. Some of the structural constraints of BTs may ease
the comprehension of animations, e.g., we need not worry about a node and its ancestor
being active at the same time.
The full syntax of the BT notation is described in [Beh07] and a formal semantics for
the BT notation is described in [CH11]. Although the BT notation is part of a larger
methodology called Behavior Engineering [BE], it is a useful in its own right as a notation
for modelling behaviour.
Several tools are available for BTs. They include BESE [PLTP08], Integrare [WLC+07]
and TextBE [tex]. However, none of the tools support model checking directly, instead,
the tools generate code for the Symbolic Analysis Laboratory (SAL) [dMOS03], where
model checking can be performed.
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BTs have been used by Raytheon Australia on large systems [Bos08]. In the applica-
tion area of failure modes and effects analysis, BTs have been used on several case studies
including analysis of the Airbus A320 hydraulic system [LWY10].
2.5 Summary
The necessary background material for the thesis has been presented in this chapter. Sec-
tion 2.1 described temporal logic, essentially as defined in [CGP99]. Section 2.2 provided
a brief literature survey on model checking. Section 2.3 on counterexample generation
provided context for the main contribution of the thesis: directed counterexample path
generation. Finally, Section 2.4 briefly introduced Behavior Trees: the modelling notation
used as an example in this thesis.
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Chapter 3
The State Machine Framework
This chapter describes the state machine level of the proposed framework. Although
in theory Kripke structures already provide a sufficient framework for model checking,
in practice it is convenient and beneficial to have additional structures in the frame-
work based on the structures in the modelling notation. Potential benefits of having the
additional structures include:
• The mapping of a model in some modelling notation into the framework and the
mapping back of the result of model checking into the modelling notation can both
be made straightforward.
• Model checking and other analyses can take advantage of the additional structures.
The proposed framework is intended to support symbolic analyses of asynchronous
finite-state systems with interleaving semantics, but is otherwise a general framework.
The framework includes basic concepts that are present in modelling notations for asyn-
chronous finite-state transition systems, without the excess baggage of a modelling nota-
tion. Elements of the framework include:
• guarded updates: restricted forms of Dijkstra’s guarded commands [Dij75],
• transfer functions: functions to compute images and pre-images under transition
relations,
• elementary blocks: components of a model, each of which is executed atomically
with the effect of its execution being deterministic, and
• program counters: state variables that represent execution states of threads.
Although transfer functions are derived from models, they are included in the framework
because of their important role in the proposed approach for symbolic analyses.
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Section 3.1 on states and guarded updates and Section 3.2 on elementary blocks
describe the concepts in an explicit setting. Section 3.3 describes how the concepts map
to a symbolic domain where sets are characterised by propositions, and how transfer
functions in the symbolic domain can be implemented efficiently using ordered binary
decision diagrams (OBDDs) [Bry86].
3.1 States and Guarded Updates
Since the system being modelled is a finite state transition system, there is a finite set V
of state variables:
V = {v1, v2, ..., vn}, (3.1)
where type(vi) is a non-empty finite enumeration for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. A state assigns each
state variable with a value from its type (vi ← di with di ∈ type(vi) for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n):
i.e., a state is a set of assignments where each state variable is assigned exactly once.
Thus, a state can be viewed as a set of pairs {(v1, d1), (v2, d2), ..., (vn, dn)} (a relation and
a function) or simply an n-tuple (d1, d2, .., dn), with di ∈ type(vi) for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and
the set S of possible states is
S , type(v1)× type(v2)× ...× type(vn). (3.2)
The atomic propositions of the system being modelled are simple equalities of the
form l = r where l is vi and r ∈ type(vi) for some 1 ≤ i ≤ n. From a Kripke structure
point of view, if S is to become part of a Kripke structure (S,R, L), then the truth value
of an atomic proposition in a state must be able to be determined from the labelling
function L of the Kripke structure i.e., we have ∀s ∈ S : (l = r) ∈ L(s)⇔ (l← r) ∈ s.
In addition to states, a finite state transition system also has a finite set of transitions
between states. The set of transitions can be viewed as forming a single monolithic
transition relation. However, operationally, it is often convenient to view transitions as
updates to states. To that end, we add to the framework guarded updates which are
restricted forms of guarded commands [Dij75]. A guarded update is a pair (g, u) where
guard g is a propositional formula and u is a simple update. The idea is that a state s in
which guard g holds can transition to a state t that is the result of updating s with u.
Thus a guarded update may be viewed as representing a set of transitions.
A guard g holds in a state s (denoted s |= g) if, by replacing occurrences of state
variables in g with their assigned values in s, g evaluates to true. The evaluation is
performed using simple equality checks and propositional calculus. As an example, the
following is the evaluation of g ≡ v1 = a1 ∨ v2 = b3 in the state s = {v1 ← a2, v2 ←
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b3, v3 ← c1} where type(v1) = {a1, a2}, type(v2) = {b1, b2, b3, b4}, and type(v3) = {c1, c2}:
g ≡ v1 = a1 ∨ v2 = b3
≡ a2 = a1 ∨ b3 = b3 (substituting variables with values assigned in s)
≡ false ∨ true (evaluating equalities)
≡ true (propositional calculus).
A simple update u assigns a subset of the state variables with values in their types,
i.e., each state variable is assigned at most once. Like a state, an update can be viewed
as a relation or a function. Unlike a state, however, not all state variables need to be
assigned, i.e., the relation or function need not be total. The state variables that are not
assigned retain their values from before the update (they are unchanged by the update).
The result of an update u on a state s is written s⊕ u and is defined as follows:
s⊕ u , {v ← d ∣∣ (v ← d) ∈ u ∨ (v ← d) ∈ s ∧ ¬(∃e : (v ← e) ∈ u)} (3.3)
i.e., ⊕ is the override operator if we treat s and u as functions. As an example, if
s = {v1 ← a, v2 ← b, v3 ← c} and u = {v1 ← d, v3 ← e}, then s ⊕ u = {v1 ← d, v2 ←
b, v3 ← e}.
A guarded update represents a set of transitions, i.e., there is a transition relation
associated with a guarded update. For a guarded update (g, u), its transition relation,
denoted R(g,u), is defined as follows:
R(g,u) , {(s, t) | (s |= g) ∧ t = s⊕ u}. (3.4)
Because the framework is intended for symbolic analyses, operations in the framework
use transfer functions for computing images and pre-images under transition relations
rather than the transition relations themselves. For a guarded update (g, u), the transfer
functions for computing the image and pre-image under its transition relation are denoted
f(g,u) and r(g,u) respectively:
f(g,u)(I) , {t | (s, t) ∈ R(g,u) ∧ s ∈ I} = {s⊕ u | s ∈ I ∧ (s |= g)}. (3.5)
r(g,u)(O) , {s | (s, t) ∈ R(g,u) ∧ t ∈ O} = {s | (s⊕ u) ∈ O ∧ (s |= g)}. (3.6)
Although guarded updates seem overly restrictive, for a finite-state transition system,
an arbitrary atomic guarded command can always be encoded as a finite collection of
guarded updates. The use of guarded updates simply makes the cases of an atomic
guarded command more explicit. Arbitrary atomic guarded commands are to be modelled
as elementary blocks, described in the next section.
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3.2 Elementary Blocks
The concept of elementary blocks — taken from the field of program flow analysis [NNH99]
— plays a central role in the framework. The use of elementary blocks in the framework
provides a way of maintaining structures from the source notation. In addition to pro-
viding a straightforward bidirectional mapping between objects in the source notation
and objects in the framework, elementary blocks allow analyses to take advantage of the
structures inherited from the source notation (some of which may have been lost had the
source notation been translated into a “flat” Kripke structure). The use of elementary
blocks and image and pre-image transfer functions reflects the view that model checking
is a special case of program analysis.
Elementary blocks provide a mechanism for “abstract transitions”: sets of transitions,
each of which is a grouping of transitions. The set of transitions for an elementary
block may be viewed as a partition of the transition relation for the system. In the
framework, elementary blocks are required to be deterministic (i.e., if (s1, s2) and (s1, s3)
are possible transitions through a particular elementary block, then s2 = s3). The reasons
for requiring elementary blocks to be deterministic are:
• It simplifies the concept of symbolic (abstract) counterexample path, defined in
Section 7.1.3.
• It allows partial order reduction [PWW96] — which uses the concept of an abstract
transition as a deterministic set of transitions — to use elementary blocks as the
abstract transitions.
Although each elementary block is deterministic, the overall system is in general non-
deterministic.
An elementary block is constructed from a finite collection of guarded updates. A
transition through an elementary block means one of the guarded updates is chosen. The
guards of the guarded updates must be mutually exclusive (their pairwise conjunctions
are false), which ensures that they give rise to a deterministic choice, and thus ensures
that the elementary block is deterministic.
Because each guarded update represents a choice, the image transfer function fb for
an elementary block b is defined as follows:
fb(I) ,
⋃
(g,u)∈GU(b)
f(g,u)(I) (3.7)
where GU(b) is the set of guarded updates for block b. Similarly, the pre-image transfer
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function rb is defined as follows:
rb(O) ,
⋃
(g,u)∈GU(b)
r(g,u)(O). (3.8)
A system is modelled as a finite collection of elementary blocks where each elementary
block represents a transition choice. Whereas the collection of guarded updates for an
elementary block gives rise to a deterministic choice, the collection of elementary blocks
for a system may give rise to a non-deterministic choice. In addition, multiple elementary
blocks may be synchronised to “execute” in parallel (i.e., multiple elementary blocks are
chosen), in which case the elementary blocks must update the system state identically.
The image transfer function for a system modelled as a set of elementary blocks B is
defined as follows:
fB(I) ,
⋃
b∈B
fb(I). (3.9)
Similarly, the pre-image transfer function for the system is defined as follows:
rB(O) ,
⋃
b∈B
rb(O). (3.10)
Although the framework adopts the concept of elementary blocks from program anal-
ysis, it does not also adopt the static control flow graph of program analysis, since a finer
concept of flows possibly involving multiple threads is needed. Instead, the framework
uses program counters (PCs) to represent states of thread executions, with each thread
having its own PC.
Each elementary block belongs to a specific thread, and thus has a specific PC-value
pair specifying the value of the thread’s PC at the entrance to the elementary block. For
each elementary block b, its PC is denoted PC(b) and its PC value is denoted PCval(b).
The PC-value pair must be satisfied by each guard:
∀b ∈ B : ∀(g, u) ∈ GU(b) : g ⇒ PC(b) = PCval(b). (3.11)
Figure 3.1 shows an example in the form of a Behavior Tree (BT) [Dro03,Dro06], that
is used to illustrate the concepts. Each BT node that is not in an atomic composition
becomes an individual elementary block. An atomic composition (e.g., that involving BT
nodes tagged N3 and N4) becomes a single elementary block.
There are 3 threads in the BT example, thus 3 PCs are used. The choice of PC names
(PC1, PC2 and PC3) and the assignment of PC values (e.g., PC1=1 at the entrance of
the elementary block for N1) are somewhat arbitrary. What is important is that different
points in a thread execution path are assigned different values. However, a PC value of
0 is reserved for indicating that a thread is inactive. The use of PCs in encoding parallel
processes is common and dates as far back as 1978 in a paper by Flon and Suzuki [FS78].
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PC1=1
N1 Lock
[unset]
?PC1=2
N2 Light
[amber]
9
XXXXXzPC2=1
N3 Lock
???unset???
N4 Lock
[set]
PC1=3
PC3=1 spawns two subthreads
N8 Lock
???unset???
N9 Lock
[set]
? ?PC2=2
N5 Light
[green]
PC3=2
N10 Light
[red]
? ?PC2=3
N6 Lock
[unset]
PC3=3
N11 Lock
[unset]
? ?PC2=4
N7 Light
∧
[amber]
PC3=4
N12 Light
∧
[amber] revert to N2
Figure 3.1: A BT Example
In the rest of this thesis, M and M ′ refer to models in the framework or their corres-
ponding Kripke structures. A model in the framework easily maps to its Kripke structure
as follows:
• S of the model becomes S in the Kripke structure.
• RB ,
⋃
b∈B
⋃
(g,u)∈GU(b)R(g,u) becomes R in the Kripke structure.
• Since atomic propositions are simple equalities, the labelling L in the Kripke struc-
ture can be defined such that for each state s, each state variable v, and each
d ∈ type(v), (v = d) ∈ L(s)⇔ (v ← d) ∈ s.
Note that although temporal logic is defined only for non-terminating systems (i.e., R
in the Kripke structure is left-total), the framework is neutral with respect to how to
handle termination. Model checking as described in Chapter 7 will work in the presence
of termination in M , although some care must be taken in interpreting the result: a
terminating run which violates a safety property might not produce a counterexample
path.
3.3 Symbolic Approach to Model Checking
Instead of operating on individual states, symbolic model checking operates on sets of
states, characterised using propositions. Propositional operations are used to implement
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Equality Equality Encoding Assignment Assignment Encoding
v1 = a1 ¬v10 v1 ← a1 〈v10 ← false〉
v1 = a2 v10 v1 ← a2 〈v10 ← true〉
v2 = b1 ¬v20 ∧ ¬v21 v2 ← b1 〈v20 ← false, v21 ← false〉
v2 = b2 v20 ∧ ¬v21 v2 ← b2 〈v20 ← true, v21 ← false〉
v2 = b3 ¬v20 ∧ v21 v2 ← b3 〈v20 ← false, v21 ← true〉
v2 = b4 v20 ∧ v21 v2 ← b4 〈v20 ← true, v21 ← true〉
v3 = c1 ¬v30 v3 ← c1 〈v30 ← false〉
v3 = c2 v30 v3 ← c2 〈v30 ← true〉
Table 3.1: Encoding equalities and assignments using OBDD variables
set operations: logical disjunctions for set unions and logical conjunctions for set in-
tersections. Image and pre-image transfer functions become functions that operate on
propositions.
The main purpose of a symbolic approach is to delay the enumeration of cases until
necessary, to avoid, if possible, enumerating some of the cases. Thus, symbolic model
checking does not need to imply that a transition system must be represented as a single
proposition describing the transition relation for the system. Nor does it need to imply
that a fixpoint approach such as that of Emerson and Lei [EL86] is used. It simply means
operations are performed on propositions representing sets of states (sets of transitions
are not necessarily represented entirely using propositions). Using this generalised notion
of a symbolic approach allows strategies commonly associated with the explicit automata
approach to be used.
The use of ordered binary decision diagrams (OBDDs) [Bry86] to represent propo-
sitions and speed up propositional operations is common in symbolic model checking
(see, e.g., [BCM+92]). If no inference mechanism (e.g., equational reasoning) other than
propositional reasoning is used for non-temporal reasoning, then equalities and assign-
ments in guarded updates must be encoded using OBDD variables. The equalities and
assignments in the example in Section 3.1 might be encoded as in Table 3.1. The encoding
for g ≡ v1 = a1 ∨ v2 = b3 would be
g ≡ v1 = a1 ∨ v2 = b3 ≡ ¬v10 ∨ ¬v20 ∧ v21.
For convenience, an update is represented as a sequence (since in the context of OBDD
variable ordering, an update may be viewed as a totally ordered set). Since several
OBDD variables may be required to encode a single state variable, a single assignment
of a state variable is represented as a sequence of assignments of OBDD variables. To
get the encoding for an update, the sequences for the assignments must be merged. The
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corresponding equality encodings represent post conditions that hold after the updates.
For example, if u = {v2 ← b2} then, assuming the OBDD variables are ordered as
v10, v20, v21, ..., u is represented as the sequence u = 〈v20 ← true, v21 ← false〉 and
v20 ∧ ¬v21 holds immediately after the update u is applied. The function post that
produces the post condition for an update is defined as follows:
post(〈v ← true〉_ u) ≡ v ∧ post(u),
post(〈v ← false〉_ u) ≡ ¬v ∧ post(u),
post(〈〉) ≡ true
where _ is the sequence append operation.
A cautionary implementation note: some combinations of values for OBDD variables
may correspond to undefined values for state variables. Depending on the intended
semantics of the model, uninitialised state variables may or may not be assumed to have
defined values. If they are assumed to have defined values, then undefined values can
be precluded by excluding them from the set of initial states. On the other hand, if
uninitialised state variables are not assumed to have defined values, the type of each
state variable must include an undefined value.
Transfer functions operate on propositions rather than sets. Thus, the definition of
the image transfer function for a guarded update (g, u) in (3.5) is replaced by:
f(g,u)(I) , (I ∧ g)⊕ u (3.12)
where I is a proposition that characterises a set of states and ⊕ is now a symbolic
override operation. The correctness of (3.12) is easy to see: (I ∧ g) characterises the set
{s | s ∈ I ∧ s |= g}.
The post condition holds after a transition through the guarded update, thus
f(g,u)(I)⇒ post(u)
for any I. The symbolic version of the override function ⊕ is defined as follows:
P ⊕ (〈v ← true〉_ u) ≡ v ∧ ((∃v : P )⊕ u),
P ⊕ (〈v ← false〉_ u) ≡ ¬v ∧ ((∃v : P )⊕ u),
P ⊕ (〈〉) ≡ P
where ∃v : P is existential quantification in the logic of quantified boolean formula
(QBF) [AHU74]:
∃v : P , P |v←true ∨ P |v←false
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where P |v←true is a restriction operation: restricting v to true in P (i.e., replacing v with
true in P ). In effect, ∃v : P ignores v in the proposition P . The symbolic override
operation can have an efficient OBDD implementation with the assignments performed
in a single traversal (assuming u is ordered according to the OBDD ordering).
The symbolic version of the pre-image transfer function for a guarded update uses the
ignore function defined using following rules:
ignore(〈〉, P ) ≡ P,
ignore(〈v〉_ V,P ) ≡ ignore(V, (∃v : P ))
where the first argument is a sequence of OBDD variables and the second argument is a
proposition. For an update u represented as a sequence of OBDD variable assignments,
the OBDD variables assigned in u, represented as a sequence (ordered according to the
OBDD variable ordering), is denoted variables(u), and can be constructed as follows:
variables(〈v ← d〉_ u) = 〈v〉_ variables(u),
variables(〈〉) = 〈〉.
The definition of the pre-image transfer function in (3.6) is replaced by:
r(g,u)(O) , ignore(variables(u), O ∧ post(u)) ∧ g. (3.13)
The correctness of (3.13) is slightly more difficult to see than that of (3.12). O ∧ post(u)
characterises the biggest subset of O such that each element of the subset is a state
that can be the result of applying the update u ({t ∈ O | ∃s : t = (s ⊕ u)}). The
set of states that can be updated by u to states in the subset is characterised by
ignore(variables(u), O ∧ post(u)). Finally, of the states that can be updated by u to
states in O, only those satisfying the guard g can transition, thus the conjunction with
g.
For an elementary block b, the symbolic version of the image transfer function is as
follows:
fb(I) ,
∨
(g,u)∈GU(b)
f(g,u)(I) (3.14)
where GU(b) is the set of guarded updates for block b. Similarly, the symbolic version of
the pre-image transfer function for b is as follows:
rb(O) ,
∨
(g,u)∈GU(b)
r(g,u)(O). (3.15)
Note that although the transfer functions for an elementary block are defined in terms of
transfer functions for guarded updates, they can be implemented directly using relational
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products, where the transition relation for each elementary block is represented by a
proposition (see [McM92]).
For the overall system defined by a set of elementary blocks B, the symbolic version
of the image transfer function is defined as follows:
fB(I) ,
∨
b∈B
fb(I). (3.16)
Similarly, the symbolic version of the pre-image transfer function for the system is defined
as follows:
rB(O) ,
∨
b∈B
rb(O). (3.17)
All symbolic image and pre-image transfer functions are functions from propositions to
propositions (they are not functions from Boolean to Boolean). It is not difficult to show
that they distribute over disjunctions (∨) and conjunctions (∧).
Symbolic model checking was initially developed with a fixpoint approach, first pro-
posed by Emerson and Lei [EL86], and made practical by McMillan [McM92] using
an OBDD implementation. The fixpoint approach uses the fixpoint operations of µ-
calculus [Koz83]. The fixpoint operations may be viewed as operating on a finite com-
plete lattice that is the powerset of a set of states S where the ordering relation is the
subset relation (⊆), the join and meet operations are ∪ and ∩ respectively, the bottom
element is the empty set, and the top element is S. The least fixpoint operator is µ and
the greatest fixpoint operator is ν. In both
µZ.f(Z) and νZ.f(Z),
f(Z) is a proposition characterising a set of states, and the result of the operation is also a
proposition characterising a set of states. The function f is a function from propositions
to propositions that is monotonic with respect to the lattice. As an example, if S0
characterises the set of initial states, then
µZ.S0 ∨ fB(Z)
characterises the set of reachable states. Since fB distributes over ∨, the function f
defined as
f(Z) = S0 ∨ fB(Z)
is monotonic with respect to the appropriate lattice. Since the lattice is finite, fixpoints
can be computed based on Kleene’s fixpoint theorem.
The framework does not restrict symbolic analysis to a fixpoint approach. Elementary
blocks and their transfer functions support search strategies normally associated with
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explicit model checking. Paths can be searched symbolically without first computing
fixpoints. However, there are differences between a search for a path with explicit states
and a search with symbolic states.
In a search with explicit states, e.g., using a depth-first strategy, one starts at an
initial state and at each choice point chooses a transition that determines the next state.
The next state is then checked to see if it has been “visited” to determine if the search
has reached a dead end or a “fulfilling” cycle has been found. If a dead end is reached,
then the search backtracks to a previous choice point that still has an alternative and
the search continues from there. If a fulfilling cycle is found then the search terminates
successfully. Otherwise the search continues forward by choosing the next transition. The
sequence of states chosen that “terminates” in a fulfilling cycle corresponds to a path in
the sense of temporal logic (it is an infinite path when the cycle is repeated forever).
In a forward search with symbolic states, the search starts at an initial symbolic state,
say SS0. At each step i, an elementary block bi is chosen and the next symbolic state
SSi is computed using bi’s image transfer function:
SSi ≡ fbi(SSi−1).
One needs to ensure that SSi 6≡ false. Note that since a transition through an ele-
mentary block is deterministic, |SSi| ≤ |SSi−1|, where |SSi| is the cardinality of the set
characterised by SSi.
Checking if a symbolic state has been visited can be performed naively by checking
whether the exact symbolic state has been visited (using equality). However, dead-ends
can be detected sooner if subsumption testing is used instead. Using subsumption testing,
a symbolic state SSi is said to have been visited if there is a j such that 0 ≤ j < i and
(SSi ∧SSj) ≡ SSi. Subsumption testing can also be used to detect a fulfilling cycle, but
the cycle found needs to be verified.
In a search with explicit states, it is guaranteed that a state in the path found can
transition to the next state in the path. The corresponding guarantee in a symbolic
path is each explicit state in a symbolic state SSi−1 must be able to transition through
elementary block bi to an explicit state in SSi, and each state in SSi must be the result
of transitioning from a state in SSi−1 through bi. Thus we require that
∀j : 0 ≤ j < i⇒ (SSj+1 ≡ fbj+1(SSj)) ∧ (SSj ≡ rbj+1(SSj+1)). (3.18)
However, during a symbolic search, (3.18) can be violated, i.e.,
∃j : 0 ≤ j < i ∧ (SSj 6≡ rbj+1(SSj+1)).
Such a violation occurs when some states in SSj cannot transition through elementary
block bj+1. To ensure that a symbolic path found satisfies (3.18) for all i ≥ 0, the symbolic
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states may need to be narrowed. Suppose a cycle is found that starts at SSk and ends
at SSi. Then the following operation needs to be performed iteratively with j from i− 1
to k:
SSj ← SSj ∧ rbj+1(SSj+1). (3.19)
The resulting cycle is verified by ensuring that SSk ≡ SSi. Once the cycle is verified,
the rest of the symbolic states are narrowed by iteratively performing (3.19) with j from
k − 1 to 0.
3.4 Summary
A state machine framework for symbolic model checking and counterexample generation
has been presented that adds additional structure to the standard Kripke structure. The
concept of guarded update was introduced to simplify the exposition and lead to simple
implementations. The main structuring mechanism beyond the Kripke structure is that
of elementary blocks. The purpose of elementary blocks is to enable analyses to take
advantage of the structures from the modelling notation and simplify the mapping of
analysis results back to the modelling notation. A salient feature of the framework is the
use of image and pre-image functions under transition relations rather than the transition
relations themselves, thus avoiding the use of relational products. Examples of how the
concepts can be implemented with the use of OBDDs were provided, but the framework
does not preclude the use of other techniques for propositional reasoning.
Chapter 4
Translating Behavior Trees
This chapter describes a method for translating BTs into objects in the proposed frame-
work. A substantial subset of the BT notation [Beh07] is handled by the translation,
based on the formal semantics defined in [CH11]. The purpose of this chapter is to show
how objects in a modelling notation can be translated into objects in the framework.
4.1 Overview
Some features of the BT notation result in BT models that cannot be model-checked
without abstraction or inductive reasoning. For example, the semantics of arithmetic
expressions in the BT notation requires Presburger arithmetic extended (with negation)
to integers. In addition, there are features of the BT notation in [Beh07] that do not
have formal semantics in [CH11]. As a result, the following features of the BT notation
are not handled by the translation:
• the use of operators in expressions (they may involve infinite domains),
• the may and start new directives (no formal semantics),
• condition operations on nodes (no formal semantics), and
• multiple component instances (no formal semantics).
The omission of the above features allows the translation to focus on behavioural aspects
of BTs. The translation assumes that each component or attribute is of an enumerated
type, whose values can be finitely enumerated.
A translator from the BT notation to the SAL notation [dMOS03] that uses translation
rules described in [GWY08] already exists. There are important differences, in addition
to having different targets, between the translation here and the translation used in the
BT-to-SAL translator. They are:
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• The translation of reference BT nodes. The BT-to-SAL translator restricts a refer-
ence BT node to reference only a BT node in the same thread, and uses a “goto”
semantics for references. The translation here allows references to BT nodes in
other threads, and uses the “copy” semantics as specified in [CH11]. As an option
in the translation here, references to BT nodes in the same thread can use the goto
semantics. Note that in general the goto semantics produces a set of behaviours
that can be different from that produced by the copy semantics, even for a reference
to a BT node in the same thread (the latter was pointed out by Peter Lindsay in a
private communication).
• The translation of external input/output event BT nodes. The BT-to-SAL trans-
lator defines a Boolean SAL input variable for an external input event and requires
the variable to have the value true to enable a transition through a BT node with
the event, and defines a Boolean SAL output variable for an external output event
and sets the variable to true upon transition through a BT node with the event. The
translation here does not associate a state variable with an external input/output
event.
• The translation of internal input/output event BT nodes. The BT-to-SAL trans-
lator provides many options for the semantics of internal input/output, including
whether to buffer and whether output waits for a corresponding input to be ready.
The translation here simply uses the non-blocking semantics specified in [CH11].
The translation of BTs to elementary blocks with their collections of guarded updates
is performed in stages in the following order.
1. Expansion of references. This is needed because of the copy semantics of refer-
ences as specified in [CH11]. However there is an option to not expand references
to BT nodes in the same thread and treating them as gotos.
2. Assigning PCs. The main requirements are that each thread must have a unique
PC and the value of a thread’s PC must be different at different execution points
in the thread (see Section 3.2).
3. BT node level mapping. The guarded updates are constructed incrementally.
The “behaviour” part of a BT node determines a default guarded update for the
node. Because of branches, directives, atomic compositions, internal I/Os, syn-
chronisations and selections, the collections of guarded updates may need to be
modified. The modifications are performed incrementally. The effects of branching
4.2. EXPANSION OF REFERENCES 37
and directives (except the synchronisation directive) are processed at the BT node
level. The rest must be processed after the processing of atomic compositions.
4. Creating elementary blocks. The execution model for an atomic composition
is that it is really atomic: not only is it uninterruptible, but we can never see the
intermediate states. As a result, BT nodes in an atomic composition are merged
into a single elementary block. For optimisation purposes, PC values are reassigned
after the elementary blocks have been created, so that the range of values for each
PC is contiguous (since atomic compositions may cause some PC values to become
unused).
5. Elementary block level mapping. BT nodes that are synchronised with each
other can only “execute” if they are all “ready.” Because of the atomicity of atomic
compositions, “readiness” applies at the elementary block level, thus synchroni-
sations and internal I/Os are processed after the elementary blocks are created.
Note that the synchronisation for internal I/O is only partial synchronisation, but
“readiness” applies at the elementary block level here as well. Finally, because of
the peculiarity of the semantics of selections, they must be processed last.
Sections 4.2 through 4.6 describe the stages of the translation in detail.
4.2 Expansion of References
The first stage in a BT translation is the expansion of references (BT nodes with the =>
directive). The semantics of BTs described in [CH11] specifies that a reference is to be
replaced by a copy of the subtree rooted at the referenced node. This process is called
expansion since it is similar to macro expansion in some programming languages.
The semantics of BTs described in [CH11] actually restricts references to be to BT
nodes in sibling alternative branches. If the goto semantics is used, such cases can be
handled as in Section 4.4.3. The well-formedness requirements of references can be relaxed
to allow a reference to a BT node in another thread (i.e., a BT node in a different parallel
branch), since the copy semantics correctly handles such a case. This necessitates the
“expansion” of a reference.
Without loss of generality, references are restricted so that a target is strictly on the
left of the reference, i.e., the target node occurs earlier in a depth-first preorder traversal
than the source node and the target node must not be an ancestor of the source node. The
target of a reference is also restricted to be a non-leaf node. The expansion of references
is performed in a left-to-right fashion (one may use a depth-first left-to-right traversal to
find and replace the references, since references must be from leaf nodes).
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Figure 4.1: Expansion of a reference
The target of a reference must match the source in that the component and “be-
haviour” parts of the target node must be the same as the corresponding parts of the
source node. Additionally, the source and target must either both be unlabelled or be
labelled identically. There may be multiple BT nodes that qualify as a target for a ref-
erence (i.e., the BT nodes match the source and satisfy the restrictions above). In such
a case, we apply the tie-breaking rules in Section 4.4.3 to choose the target. Figure 4.1
shows the expansion of a reference to a BT node labelled L1, with the expanded BT on
the right.
If the goto semantics is used for references whose targets are in the same thread, such
references are not expanded. (Two nodes are in the same thread if their nearest common
ancestor is not a parallel branching node and there is no parallel branching node in the
paths — excluding the ends — from the nearest common ancestor to the nodes.) Instead,
they are treated as a gotos and handled as in Section 4.4.3.
4.3 Assigning PCs
The second stage in the translation of a BT is assigning PCs. The main role of a PC is to
indicate the state of a thread in an execution in terms of where it is. Each thread in a BT
is assigned a PC unique to that thread. The value of the thread’s PC indicates the status
of the thread. A PC value of 0 indicates that the thread is inactive. A non-zero natural
number value indicates that the thread is either active or suspended (after it spawned
4.3. ASSIGNING PCS 39
subthreads) and indicates where in the BT the thread is active or suspended.
When a thread is about to make a choice among alternative branches, it is simulta-
neously at the entry points of the alternative branches. In such a case, a single execution
point for the thread (indicated by the thread’s PC value) corresponds to multiple BT
points that are entrances to BT nodes, each of which is the start of an alternative branch.
Associated with a node is an entry point and an exit point. The exit point is connected
to the entry points of the node’s children (if any). The connection is reflected in the
consistency between the value of the node’s PC at the node’s exit and the value at the
entrances to the node’s children. However, if the node is a parallel branching node, each
of the children will have its own PC to reflect the fact that it starts a new thread.
The method of assignment here is simply one of many possible ways of of assigning
PCs that satisfy the requirements that each thread must have a unique PC and the value
of a thread’s PC must be different at different execution points in the thread. Each node
is assigned with a PC and values for the PC at the entry and exit points of the node.
A PC identifier is completely determined by its index: a strictly positive integer. A PC
identifier is constructed by concatenating the string "PC" with the string representing the
index. For example, the identifier for a PC with index 11 is "PC11". For a node n:
• the PC index is denoted PCidx(n),
• the PC entry value is denoted PCval(n), and
• the PC exit value is denoted xPC(n).
For convenience in describing the rules for assigning PCs and PC values, a next PC index
is assigned for each node and is denoted xidx(n) for node n. The rules for assigning the
4-tuple 〈PCidx, PCval, xPC, xidx〉 are as follows:
1. For r the root node of the BT:
• PCidx(r)← 1,
• PCval(r)← 1,
• xPC(r)← 2, and
• xidx(r)← 2.
2. If a non-leaf node n0 that is not a branching node has been assigned a 4-tuple, then
its child n1 is assigned a 4-tuple as follows:
• PCidx(n1)← PCidx(n0),
• PCval(n1)← xPC(n0),
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• xPC(n1)← xPC(n0) + 1, and
• xidx(n1)← xidx(n0).
3. If an alternative branching node n0 with i branches (to nodes n1...ni) has been
assigned a 4-tuple, then n1 is assigned a 4-tuple as per rule 2. For j = 2, ..., i, if
nj−1 and its descendants have been assigned 4-tuples, then nj is assigned assigned
a 4-tuple as follows:
• PCidx(nj)← PCidx(n0),
• PCval(nj)← xPC(n0),
• xPC(nj)← xPC(m1) + 1, and
• xidx(nj)← xidx(m2),
where m1 is the last descendant of nj−1 in the same thread to be assigned a 4-tuple
and m2 is the last descendant of nj−1 (not necessarily in the same thread) to be
assigned a 4-tuple (m1 = m2 = nj−1 if nj−1 does not have a descendant, m1 = nj−1
if nj−1 is a parallel branching node).
4. If a parallel branching node n0 with i branches (to nodes n1...ni) has been assigned
a 4-tuple, then n1 is assigned a 4-tuple as follows:
• PCidx(n1)← xidx(n0),
• PCval(n1)← 1,
• xPC(n1)← 2, and
• xidx(n1)← xidx(n0) + i.
For j = 2, ..., i, if nj−1 and its descendants have been assigned 4-tuples, then nj is
assigned a 4-tuple as follows:
• PCidx(nj)← xidx(n0) + j − 1,
• PCval(nj)← 1,
• xPC(nj)← 2, and
• xidx(nj) = xidx(m),
where m is the last descendant of nj−1 to be assigned a 4-tuple (m = nj−1 if nj−1
does not have a descendant).
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Rules 2, 3 and 4 are repeated until all nodes have been assigned 4-tuples.
Once all BT nodes have been assigned 4-tuples, for each node n the PC identifier
PC(n) can be assigned the appropriate string based on PCidx(n). Thereafter, only
PC(n), PCval(n) and xPC(n) are needed for each node n. Figure 4.2 shows PC values
assigned to entry points of BT nodes.
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Figure 4.2: Assigned PC Values
4.4 BT Node Level Mapping
The third stage in the BT translation is BT node level mapping. The stage consists of
three steps:
1. assigning default guarded updates to BT nodes,
2. processing the effects of branching, and
3. processing control flow directives.
4.4.1 Default Guarded Updates
The first step in the third stage of a BT translation is assigning default guarded updates
to BT nodes. To help describe the construction of elementary blocks, a guarded update
is broken into the following parts:
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Class(n) PCGuard MGuard PCUpdate MUpdate
update PC(n) = PCval(n) true {PC(n)← xPC(n)} {ca(n)← val(n)}
guard PC(n) = PCval(n) ex(n) {PC(n)← xPC(n)} {}
event PC(n) = PCval(n) true {PC(n)← xPC(n)} {}
Table 4.1: Default Guarded Update Parts
• PCGuard: part of the guard about the relevant PC (usually of the form PC(n) =
PCval(n)).
• MGuard: the “main” guard (usually not about the relevant PC).
• PCUpdate: update of PC variables.
• MUpdate: update of BT components and component attributes.
A guarded update is constructed from the parts as follows:(
PCGuard ∧MGuard,PCUpdate ∪MUpdate).
The default values for the guarded update parts are based on the class of the node
and are shown in Table 4.1. The three classes of BT nodes are:
• update: consisting of state realisation nodes;
• guard: consisting of selection nodes and guard nodes;
• event: consisting of event nodes, input nodes and output nodes.
Note that for the purpose of this translation, external input and output nodes can be
treated as event nodes, thus input and output nodes here are internal I/O nodes.
For a node n in the update class, ca(n) is the component or component attribute
specified in node n and val(n) is the component state or attribute value specified in n.
For a node n in the guard class, ex(n) is the boolean expression representing the guard.
Note that PC(n), PCval(n), xPC(n), ca(n), val(n) and ex(n) are all placeholders.
The guarded update parts can be further modified at later stages of the translation. In
addition, the translation of internal I/O causes single guarded updates to be partitioned
into multiple guarded updates, causing the parts to be partitioned.
4.4.2 Branching
The second step in the third stage in a BT translation is translating the effects of branch-
ing. BTs have alternative branching and parallel branching. Nothing needs to be done
4.4. BT NODE LEVEL MAPPING 43
for nodes that start alternative branching. For a node that starts parallel branching,
however, the effects of activating the subthreads need to be modified. If node n starts
parallel branching to n1, ..., nm, then the PCUpdate for n needs to be modified as follows:
PCUpdate(n) ← PCUpdate(n) ∪
m⋃
i=1
{(
PC(ni), PCval(ni)
)}
.
4.4.3 Control Flow Directives
The third step in the third stage in a BT translation is translating the effects of control
flow directives kill (−−), revert (∧) and, optionally, reference (=>).
A BT node with a kill control directive (−−), when executed, causes the thread of
the target BT node to be killed (deactivated). The “behavior” specified in the BT node
must be cleared and replaced by the killing action. Thus if n is a BT node with a kill
flag, then parts of n are modified as follows:
MGuard(n) ← true,
PCUpdate(n) ← PCUpdate(n)⊕Kill(target),
MUpdate(n) ← {},
where ⊕ is the override operator, target is the BT node that is the target of the kill, and
Kill(target) represents killing the target thread:
Kill(target) =
⋃
PC∈threadPCs(target)
{
PC ← 0},
where threadPCs(target) gives the PCs of the target thread and all its subthreads.
A BT node with a reversion control directive (∧), when executed, causes the target
thread to be killed and restarted immediately after the target node. The PC update part
of a BT node n with a reversion directive is modified as follows:
PCUpdate(n)← PCUpdate(n)⊕Kill(target)⊕ PCUpdate(target).
PCUpdate(target) will restart the target thread immediately after the target node. The
BT node already has much of the “behavior” of the target node1, thus only the “PC
effects” need to be inherited from the target node.
If the goto semantics is used, a BT node with a reference control directive (=>),
when executed, causes control to jump to the target BT node. This is restricted to cases
where the referencing node and the target node are in the same thread. The handling
of references when the copy semantics is used is already covered in Section 4.2. As with
1The “behavior” of the target node is executed at the node with the directive.
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reversion, it is assumed that the “behavior” of the target node is executed at the node
with the reference directive. Again, the “PC effects” are inherited from the target node.
The PC update component of the referencing node is modified as follows:
PCUpdate(n)← PCUpdate(n)⊕ PCUpdate(target).
The translation of a BT with control flow directives requires the following well-
formedness conditions to be met:
• A BT node with a reversion or reference directive cannot have a descendant.
• The target of a kill/reversion/reference cannot be an atomic composition.
• To use the goto semantics, a reference must be to a non-leaf node in the same
thread/subthread (the source and target nodes must have the same PC).
• Reversion must be to an ancestor node.
The target of a kill/reversion/reference must match the source in that the component
and “behaviour” parts of the source node must be the same as the corresponding parts
of the target node. Additionally, the source and target must either both be unlabelled
or be labelled identically. There may be multiple BT nodes that qualify as a target for
a source (i.e., the BT nodes match and satisfy the constraints above), thus there are
“tie-breaking” rules for choosing the target in such a case. The tie-breaking rules are:
1. The target node with the nearest common ancestor with the source wins.
2. If there is still a tie after 1, the target in the leftmost path from the nearest common
ancestor wins.
3. If there is still a tie after 2, then one is an ancestor of the others still in contention,
and the ancestor wins.
Note that a node and an ancestor of the node have the ancestor as the nearest common
ancestor. For a reversion, since the target must be an ancestor, the first rule will break
a tie.
4.5 Creating Elementary Blocks
The fourth stage in a BT translation is creating elementary blocks. An elementary block
is created for each BT node that is not in an atomic composition. BT nodes in an
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atomic composition are merged into a single elementary block. An atomic composition
is restricted to contain at most one event node (internal I/O or external event).
To create an elementary block b from the atomic composition of BT nodes n1, ..., nm,
b’s parts are set as follows:
PC(b) ← PC(n1),
PCval(b) ← PCval(n1),
PCGuard(b) ← (PC(n1) = PCval(n1)),
MGuard(b) ←
m∧
i=1
MGuard(ni)[θi],
PCUpdate(b) ← PCUpdate(nm),
MUpdate(b) ← MUpdate(n1)⊕ ...⊕MUpdate(nm),
where [θi] is a substitution operation based on updates:
[θi] = MUpdate(n1)⊕ ...⊕MUpdate(ni−1).
Because atomic composition can be combined with alternative branching, a BT node
can be the head of more than one block. A BT node n with atomic alternative branching
with m branches produces at least m blocks, each constructed as above with n as the first
node of each block. If any of the branches in turn is atomically linked to another atomic
alternative branching, then it produces more than m branches. In general, a BT node
does not have to be one with atomic alternative branching to be the head of multiple
blocks because branches are propagated up the tree along atomic compositions.
The combination of atomic composition with parallel branching is disallowed. In
addition, an atomic composition is restricted to have at most one synchronised BT node
and at most one BT node of the event class.
Each node n that is not in an atomic composition is turned into an elementary block
b with
PC(b) ← PC(n),
PCval(b) ← PCval(n),
PCGuard(b) ← PCGuard(n),
MGuard(b) ← MGuard(n),
PCUpdate(b) ← PCUpdate(n),
MUpdate(b) ← MUpdate(n).
Atomic compositions may cause some values of PCs to become unused. As an opti-
misation, PC values can be reassigned so that the range of values for a PC is contiguous.
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Figure 4.3: Reassigned PC Values
For a PC that has its values reassigned, all updates to the PC and all comparisons in-
volving the PC’s values must be adjusted accordingly. Figure 4.3 shows the PC values
after reassignment.
4.6 Elementary Block Level Mapping
The fifth stage in a BT translation is elementary block level mapping. It consists of the
following steps:
1. processing synchronisation,
2. processing internal input/output,
3. processing selection, and
4. processing prioritisation (optional).
4.6.1 Synchronisation
The first step in the fifth stage of a BT translation is translating the effects of the
synchronise control directive (=). Since a synchronised BT node can be part of an atomic
composition, the synchronisation is on elementary blocks. If S is a set of elementary
4.6. ELEMENTARY BLOCK LEVEL MAPPING 47
blocks that are to be synchronised, then the parts for S are formed as follows:
MGuard(S) ←
∧
b∈S
PCGuard(b) ∧MGuard(b),
PCUpdate(S) ←
⋃
b∈S
PCUpdate(b),
MUpdate(S) ←
⋃
b∈S
MUpdate(b),
where the parts are assigned to each b ∈ S. If there is a conflict in the update, i.e.,
∃v, a, b : {v ← a, v ← b} ⊆ (PCUpdate(S) ∪MUpdate(S)) ∧ a 6= b,
then the BT is considered erroneous. For each b ∈ S, the following parts are set:
MGuard(b) ← MGuard(S),
PCUpdate(b) ← PCUpdate(S),
MUpdate(b) ← MUpdate(S).
The synchronised blocks are restricted to not only be in different threads (i.e., have
different PCs), but the closest common ancestor of any two of the synchronised blocks
must be a parallel branching node. The matching of nodes for full synchronisation is
similar to the matching of source and target nodes for kill, reversion and reference (see
Section 4.4.3). However, for synchronisation there is no source and target: all of the syn-
chronised nodes must have the synchronisation flag. More than two nodes can participate
in a synchronisation, thus no tie-breaking rules are necessary.
4.6.2 Internal I/O
The second step in the fifth stage of a BT translation is translating the effects of internal
I/O. Internal output does not have to wait for input to be ready, but all ready inputs
must receive the output. Since an atomic composition can have at most one event node,
an elementary block is restricted to have at most one I/O node.
An output block can have any finite number of corresponding input blocks, including
none. If b is an output block and I is the set of corresponding input blocks for b then
the transition for b is partitioned into 2|I| guarded updates. The partitions are indexed
by ri ∈ P(I), representing the input blocks that are ready (an input block i is ready
if the condition PCGuard(i) ∧MGuard(i) is satisfied). The partitioned parts for b are
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constructed as follows (PCGuard(b) is not partitioned):
MGuard(b)(ri) ← MGuard(b) ∧
( ∧
i∈ri
PCGuard(i) ∧MGuard(i)
)
∧( ∧
i∈I\ri
¬(PCGuard(i) ∧MGuard(i))),
PCUpdate(b)(ri) ← PCUpdate(b) ∪
( ⋃
i∈ri
PCUpdate(i)
)
,
MUpdate(b)(ri) ← MUpdate(b) ∪
( ⋃
i∈ri
MUpdate(i)
)
.
An input block can only transition with a corresponding output block. All other
matching input blocks that are ready must also transition. Let I be the set of other
matching input blocks and O be the set of matching output blocks. The partitions for
an input block use two indices: o ∈ O and ri ∈ P(I). The partitioned parts for an input
block b are constructed as follows:
MGuard(b)(o)(ri) ← MGuard(b) ∧ PCGuard(o) ∧MGuard(o) ∧( ∧
i∈ri
PCGuard(i) ∧MGuard(i)
)
∧( ∧
i∈I\ri
¬(PCGuard(i) ∧MGuard(i))),
PCUpdate(b)(o)(ri) ← PCUpdate(b) ∪ PCUpdate(o) ∪
( ⋃
i∈ri
PCUpdate(i)
)
,
MUpdate(b)(o)(ri) ← MUpdate(b) ∪MUpdate(o) ∪
( ⋃
i∈ri
MUpdate(i)
)
.
Note that the above allows for non-deterministic choice in the case where several matching
output blocks are ready.
4.6.3 Selection
The third step in the fifth stage of a BT translation is translating the effects of selection.
A selection node in a BT is similar to a guard node, except it must not cause its thread
to be blocked, thus it does not wait until its guard becomes true. A selection node can
be used to determine which alternative branch to take, in which case all branches must
be guarded by selection. If a thread is at a selection point and none of the selections are
ready2 then the thread terminates. A selection node does not need to guard an alternative
branch: its parent can be BT node without branching, in which case the thread of the
selection node is killed when the node is reached and the selection is not ready (there are
no other alternative selections).
2A selection is ready if its guard expression evaluates to true.
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Selections are handled through blocks rather than individual BT nodes. A block is
a selection block if it contains a selection node. At any point where there is a selection,
an “else” block is synthesized which kills the thread when encountered and none of
the selections are ready at that point. Note that parallel branches are different thread
points (unlike alternative branches), thus selection at a parallel branch must be handled
individually.
If A is the set of selection blocks at a selection point, an “else” block e is added at the
same point. This means PC(e)← PC(b) and PCval(e)← PCval(b) for b ∈ A (any b in
A would do since all have the same PC(b) and PCval(b) values). Because an elementary
block may have multiple guarded updates, we define CMGuard(b) as follows:
CMGuard(b) ,

∨
ri∈P(I) MGuard(b)(ri) if b is an output block∨
o∈O
∨
ri∈P(I) MGuard(b)(o)(ri) if b is an input block
MGuard(b) otherwise.
The “else” block e is constructed with the following parts:
PCGuard(e) ← (PC(e) = PCval(e)),
MGuard(e) ←
∧
b∈A
¬CMGuard(b),
PCUpdate(e) ← {PC(e)← 0},
MUpdate(e) ← {}.
Note that the above construction also works in the case where the selection block does
not start an alternative branch (|A| = 1).
4.6.4 Prioritisation
There is an option in the translation for prioritising system transitions over external
events (including external input and output). With the prioritisation option, the guard
of each elementary block e that contains an external event BT node is modified as follows:
MGuard(e)← MGuard(e) ∧
∧
b∈A
¬(PCGuard(b) ∧ CMGuard(b)),
where A is the set of elementary blocks that do not contain external event BT nodes.
4.7 Collecting Guarded Update Parts
After all the stages of the translation have been completed, each guarded update is formed
from its parts.
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• If (g, u) represents the guarded command for an elementary block b that is neither
an input block nor an output block, then it is formed as follows:
g ← PCGuard(b) ∧MGuard(b),
u ← PCUpdate(b) ∪MUpdate(b).
• An input block b has its transition partitioned into into multiple guarded updates.
If (g, u) represents the guarded update for the partition indexed by (o)(ri), then it
is formed as follows:
g ← PCGuard(b) ∧MGuard(b)(o)(ri),
u ← PCUpdate(b)(o)(ri) ∪MUpdate(b)(o)(ri).
• An output block b has its transition partitioned into into multiple guarded updates.
If (g, u) represents the guarded update for the partition indexed by (ri), then it is
formed as follows:
g ← PCGuard(b) ∧MGuard(b)(ri),
u ← PCUpdate(b)(ri) ∪MUpdate(b)(ri).
4.8 Summary and Possible Future Work
A method for translating a substantial subset of the BT notation into objects in the
proposed framework has been described in this chapter. Operators in expressions are
omitted from the translation because they are problematic:
• integer arithmetic operates on an infinite domain, and
• both [Beh07] and [CH11] are unclear on whether set operations can be performed
on arbitrary (untyped) sets.
Perhaps if BT components and attributes are typed (either using a typing mechanism or
using assertions) such that they have finite domains, then the translation can be extended
to handle operators in expressions.
Chapter 5
Reachability
This chapter discusses the computation of reachability in model checking. The main
contribution in this chapter is an algorithm for computing reachability that in some cases
is significantly more efficient than a naive reachability computation. Although computing
reachability and then using the reachability information in further analysis is not always
the best strategy, there are cases where it is a good strategy. The algorithm can be
used for such cases. Other uses of reachability information include discovering deadlock
situations and finding violations of safety properties.
The process of model checking involves the concept of reachable states. In checking
that a temporal logic formula is satisfied by a model, typically we must show that partic-
ular states in the model are never reached or particular states in the model are reachable.
As an example, to show that Gp is satisfied by the model, we must show that no state is
reachable (from an initial state), from which a (suffix) path where ¬p holds can start.
Reachability is also important in other types of analysis. As an example, for a system
that is intended to be non-terminating, deadlocked states can be characterised as states
that are reachable but from which there are no transitions. In the example BT of Figure
3.1, the states characterised by
(PC1 = 3) ∧ (PC2 = 1) ∧ (PC3 = 1) ∧ (Lock = set) ∧ (Light = amber) (5.1)
resulting from thread 2 executing N7 while thread 3 is at N10 (and thus killing thread
3), or thread 3 executing N12 while thread 2 is at N5 (and thus killing thread 2), are
reachable but there are no transitions from them, hence they represent deadlocked states.
A strategically important question in model checking is how and when do we decide
whether or not a state is reachable? A bad strategy can result in unnecessary complexity
in the model checking. Three basic strategies for dealing with reachability that are used
in model checking are:
1. Precomputing reachable states.
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2. Reachable by construction, e.g., in on-the-fly model checking.
3. Inferring the existence of reachable states.
The following sections discuss each of the basic strategies within the framework. An
algorithm for computing reachable states that mimics Kildall’s algorithm for flow analysis
[Kil73] is proposed in Section 5.1, complete with its proof of correctness.
5.1 Precomputing Reachable States
Precomputing reachability can be prohibitively expensive. However, precomputing reach-
able states often simplifies the operations required to perform an analysis. Going back to
the deadlock problem of the example BT of Figure 3.1, if Reachable(N8) characterises
the set of reachable states at the entrance of N8, then performing the following logical
operation:
Reachable(N8) ∧ ¬
(∨
b∈B
( ∨
(g,u)∈GU(b)
g
))
immediately yields (5.1). Thus the result of precomputing reachable states can be used
to simplify deadlock analysis. Perhaps more importantly, in the context of counterexam-
ple path generation, precomputing counterexample states (reachable “fair states”) allows
an analysis to focus on states that are guaranteed to be reachable, which may be desir-
able since the existence of a finite prefix to a cycle involving counterexample states is
guaranteed.
A state is reachable if it is an initial state or there is a transition from a reachable
state to it. A fixpoint characterisation of the set of reachable states for a system modelled
by a set of elementary blocks B is
µZ.S0 ∨ fB(Z) (5.2)
where S0 is a proposition that characterises the set of initial states and fB is the overall
forward transfer function for the system modelled by B. The fixpoint computation for
reachable states can be performed using a single transition relation to compute fB(Z).
However, it may require a large OBDD to represent a large monolithic transition relation.
Keeping the forward transfer functions distributed mitigates this problem. One can go
one step further by computing reachable states at elementary blocks using Algorithm 5.1
which is inspired by Kildall’s algorithm [Kil73] (sometimes called chaotic iteration).
There are two global variables used by the algorithm:
• W , representing a working set of elementary blocks, and
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• Reachable, a collection of reachable sets of states, indexed by elementary block.
Algorithm 5.1 computes the sets of reachable states at the entrances of elementary blocks,
where choose(W ) chooses an element of W . For each elementary block b, the resulting
reachable states at the entrance of b is stored in Reachable(b). The algorithm assumes
that for each elementary block b, the image transfer function fb is available.
Algorithm 5.1. Compute Reachable States
Step 1 - Initialisation:
W ← ∅;
for each b ∈ B do
Reachable(b)← S0 ∧ (PC(b) = PCval(b));
if Reachable(b) 6= false then W ← W ∪ {b};
Step 2 - Iteration:
while W 6= ∅ do
b← choose(W );
W ← W \ {b};
D ← fb(Reachable(b));
for each c ∈ B do
C ← D ∧ (PC(c) = PCval(c));
if ¬(C ⇒ Reachable(c)) then
Reachable(c)← Reachable(c) ∨ C;
W ← W ∪ {c};
Since we deal with finite systems, it is not too difficult to prove the following theorem:
Theorem 5.1. Algorithm 5.1 terminates and produces the following result:
∀b ∈ B : Reachable(b)⇔ (µZ.S0 ∨ fB(Z)) ∧ (PC(b) = PCval(b)).
Proof. Step 1 in the algorithm iterates over a finite set, so it terminates. Each iteration
in step 2 deletes a block from the working set W and sometimes adds blocks to W. It only
adds a block c to W if the set characterised by Reachable(c) can be enlarged and enlarges
the set in the process. Since the set characterised by Reachable(c) has a maximum size
that is finite, the addition of a block can only be performed a finite number of times, thus
step 2 always terminates.
Let P denote µZ.S0 ∨ fB(Z). We now show that
∀b ∈ B : Reachable(b)⇒ (P ∧ PC(b) = PCval(b)) (5.3)
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is an invariant of step 2. Initialisation of Reachable(b) in step 1 guarantees that the
invariant holds on entry to step 2. The only place in step 2 where Reachable is modified
produces
newReachable(c)⇔ Reachable(c) ∨ (fb(Reachable(b)) ∧ PC(c) = PCval(c)).
Since P is a solution for Z in Z ⇔ (S0 ∨
∨
b∈B fb(Z)),
P ⇔ (S0 ∨
∨
b∈B
fb(P ))
thus fb(P )⇒ P . Recall from Section 3.3 that all image and pre-image transfer functions
are monotonic, thus fb is monotonic, and since Reachable(b)⇒ P , we have
fb(Reachable(b))⇒ fb(P )
and get
(fb(Reachable(b)) ∧ PC(c) = PCval(c))⇒ (P ∧ PC(c) = PCval(c))
and since Reachable(c)⇒ (P ∧ PC(c) = PCval(c)), we get
newReachable(c)⇒ (P ∧ PC(c) = PCval(c)))
thus proving the invariant (5.3). A second invariant is
∀b, c ∈ B : Reachable(b) ∧ PC(c) = PCval(c)⇒ Reachable(c). (5.4)
The invariant (5.4) holds after step 1 since
S0 ∧ (PC(b) = PCval(b))⇔ Reachable(b) and
S0 ∧ (PC(b) = PCval(b)) ∧ (PC(c) = PCval(c))⇒ Reachable(c)
thus Reachable(b) ∧ PC(c) = PCval(c)⇒ Reachable(c). Similarly, in step 2 we have
Reachable(b) ∧ PC(c) = PCval(c)⇒ Reachable(c),
Reachable(b) ∨ (D ∧ (PC(b) = PCval(b)))⇔ newReachable(b) and
D ∧ (PC(b) = PCval(b)) ∧ (PC(c) = PCval(c))⇒ newReachable(c)
thus newReachable(b) ∧ PC(c) = PCval(c)⇒ newReachable(c), meaning the invariant
(5.4) is preserved by each iteration of step 2. Upon termination, we have for all b, c ∈ B :
fb(Reachable(b)) ∧ PC(c) = PCval(c)⇒ Reachable(c),
whether Reachable(b) was updated (to non-false) last in step 1 or step 2, since in either
case b was put in W , and the processing of b in step 2 guarantees the condition (whether
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or not C ⇒ Reachable(c)). In addition, step 1 ensures that ∀b ∈ B : S0 ∧ PC(b) =
PCval(b) ⇒ Reachable(b) (step 2 never makes the set characterised by Reachable(b)
smaller, for any b). Thus we have for all b ∈ B:
(S0 ∨
∨
d∈B
fd(Reachable(d))) ∧ PC(b) = PCval(b)⇒ Reachable(b).
Invariant (5.4) together with fd(S) ≡ fd(S ∧ PC(d) = PCval(d)) guarantees that
fd(Reachable(d)) ≡ fd(
∨
b∈B Reachable(b)). Thus for all b ∈ B:
(S0 ∨ fB(
∨
d∈B
Reachable(d))) ∧ PC(b) = PCval(b)⇒ Reachable(b).
Taking the disjunction over all b ∈ B gives us
(S0 ∨ fB(
∨
d∈B
Reachable(d))) ∧
∨
b∈B
PC(b) = PCval(b)⇒
∨
b∈B
Reachable(b),
and since (
∨
b∈B PC(b) = PCval(b)) ≡ true (we assume that a state is at the entrance
of at least one block) we get
(S0 ∨ fB(
∨
d∈B
Reachable(d)))⇒
∨
d∈B
Reachable(d).
Since P is the least solution for Z in Z ≡ S0 ∨ fB(Z), we get
P ⇒
∨
d∈B
Reachable(d),
thus for all b ∈ B:
P ∧ PC(b) = PCval(b)⇒ Reachable(b). (5.5)
The invariant (5.3) gives us for all b ∈ B:
Reachable(b))⇒ P ∧ PC(b) = PCval(b). (5.6)
Combining (5.5) with (5.6) proves the algorithm produces the desired result.
5.2 Reachable by Construction
Some search strategies start at initial states and search forward from the initial states.
With such a search strategy, at each step, the next set of states is chosen that are reachable
from the current set of states in exactly one transition. At all times, only states that
are reachable from the initial states are considered. Thus reachability is maintained by
construction.
There are two examples of a forward search in this thesis, where the states are reach-
able from the initial states by construction:
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• on-the-fly symbolic LTL model checking (described in Section 7.2.3), and
• the final phase of directed counterexample path generation (described in Chapter
8).
The naive on-the-fly symbolic LTL model checking algorithm described in Section
7.2.3 is an example of a blind (unconstrained) search. It can find a counterexample path
very quickly if one exists, since it typically only needs to go through a tiny fraction of
the search space before a counterexample path is found. However, it performs badly
if there is no counterexample because it needs to go through the entire search space.
Its performance may be improved by constraining the search, e.g., using partial order
reduction [PWW96], where certain paths are excluded from the search because other
paths, which in some sense represent them, are already included in the search.
The final phase of directed counterexample path generation, described in Chapter
8, is different in that the search is guaranteed to be successful without any need for
backtracking. At each step, the existence of a non-empty next set of states is guaranteed.
This is because the search space has been constrained by earlier phases of the directed
counterexample path generation, and the constrained search space has been determined
to contain solutions. Thus the forward search in the final phase is very efficient.
For a forward search using symbolic states, some post-processing is required. Recall
from Section 3.3 that in our framework, forward searches for a path operate on symbolic
states. Although all symbolic states in a forward search are reachable from the initial
symbolic state, once a tentative symbolic path is found, the symbolic states need to
be narrowed using (3.19) so that (3.18) is satisfied. For both of the above examples,
narrowing is performed after a tentative path is found so that (3.18) is satisfied.
In summary, reachable by construction generally entails a forward search, which can
be effective if a depth-first search can quickly find a solution. In the case of on-the-fly
symbolic LTL model checking, if there is a counterexample, then a depth-first search can
quickly find a counterexample path. In the case of the final phase of directed counterex-
ample path generation, a depth-first search is guaranteed to succeed quickly without any
need for backtracking.
5.3 Inferring the Existence of Reachable States
The third strategy for reachability is to ignore it during the main computation. An
example of the application of this strategy is in a fixpoint approach to symbolic model
checking.
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In symbolic LTL model checking using the fixpoint approach, the set of “fair states”
is computed via a fixpoint computation. Ultimately, the goal is to find all fair states
that are reachable from certain initial states (the initial states must satisfy additional
properties, as will be explained in Section 7.2.2). An intermediate goal is to find the set
of initial fair states that satisfy the additional properties. There are two basic strategies
with respect to reachability in achieving the intermediate goal:
1. perform the fixpoint computation within the set of reachable states (precomputed,
e.g., using Algorithm 5.1) producing the set of reachable fair states, or
2. ignore reachability during the fixpoint computation and simply produce the set of
fair states.
To achieve the intermediate goal, it does not matter whether we compute the set of
reachable fair states or simply the set of fair states. Once the set of (reachable) fair states
has been computed, it is intersected with the set of initial states that satisfy additional
properties, producing the set of initial counterexample states. A non-empty set of initial
counterexample states guarantees the existence of a counterexample path (an infinite
sequence of reachable counterexample states), without actually computing the entire
set of counterexample states. This is a consequence of the definition of the set of fair
states and having the initial states satisfy additional properties (the additional properties
commit the initial states to start counterexample paths). Of course, if a counterexample
path is desired, then it would need to be searched, but the search can take advantage of
the set of initial counterexample states and the set of fair states.
Being able to obtain the set of initial counterexample states, whether the set is empty
or not, can be useful. If the set is empty then there is no counterexample and there is
nothing else to do. If the set is not empty, then it can be used to reduce the search
space for counterexample paths. However, there are alternatives for symbolic model
checking that do not require the computation of the set of initial counterexample states:
for example, the on-the-fly symbolic LTL model checking described in Section 7.2.3.
5.4 Summary
Three basic strategies for reachability in model checking have been described: precomput-
ing reachable states, obtaining reachability by construction, and inferring the existence
of reachable states. A particular strategy may not be appropriate for all model checking
problems. Some of the experiments described in Chapter 9 examine the appropriateness
of the strategies for different problems and look at the trade-offs between strategies.
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Chapter 6
Foundation for LTL Model Checking
This chapter identifies general concepts that are used in a wide variety of LTL model
checking approaches. The concepts are applied, in Chapter 7, to the state-machine-level
framework described in Chapter 3 to form a framework for symbolic LTL model checking
and counterexample generation that accommodates various LTL encoding schemes: the
schemes for encoding LTL model-checking problems in a states-and-transitions setting.
The concepts are applied to the classic LTL encoding scheme developed by Lichtenstein
and Pnueli [LP85], and the Transition-based Generalised Bu¨chi Automaton (TGBA)
encoding scheme developed by Rozier and Vardi [RV11].
The main contributions of the conceptual framework include:
• The use of path commitments and transition constraints as building blocks for LTL
tableaux. This allows transition-oriented LTL encoding schemes as well as the clas-
sic LTL encoding scheme to be used. Because path commitments and transition
constraints are propositional formulas, optimisations of LTL tableaux can be per-
formed symbolically.
• Key theorems are stated using general concepts that are independent of the encoding
scheme. To show that an LTL encoding scheme is sound, the key theorems must
be proved within the encoding scheme.
• General proof plans for the key theorems are developed. The applications of the
proof plans for the classic LTL encoding scheme and the TGBA encoding scheme
are included in Appendix A.
To illustrate the concepts covered in this chapter, suppose the following LTL formula
is to be checked against the model for the BT example in Figure 3.1:
GF(Light = green) ∧GF(Light = red). (6.1)
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An LTL formula spec being model-checked is implicitly quantified over all paths in the
model, and thus is taken to be the CTL* formula Aspec. The standard way of model
checking Aspec is to perform “proof by contradiction” by checking to see if E¬spec holds
in the model, i.e., ¬spec is satisfied by a path in the model. In the rest of this thesis, ϕ
is used to denote ¬spec, where spec is the LTL formula being model-checked. Thus, for
our example spec of (6.1), we have ϕ ≡ ¬spec:
ϕ ≡ FG(¬(Light = green)) ∨ FG(¬(Light = red)). (6.2)
It is generally assumed that the model M being checked has a set of initial states
S0 ⊆ S. To show the satisfiability of ϕ in M , we must show that there exists a path pi
in M , with pi0 ∈ S0, that satisfies ϕ, i.e., M,pi |= ϕ. However, model checking usually
does not operate directly on paths since each path is an infinite sequence of states and,
in general, there are an infinite number of paths in the model. Instead, model checking
usually operates on states and transitions.
To deal with path formulas in a states-and-transitions setting, all well-known ap-
proaches for checking the satisfiability of ϕ in a model M = (S,R, L) essentially impose
a tableau for ϕ on the model M , producing an augmented model M ′. The tableau is a
decision graph that determines the cases that need to be examined to check the satis-
fiability of ϕ. In an augmented model M ′, a state in M is augmented such that it is
constrained to only start certain classes of paths. This is accomplished by encoding path
commitments in augmented states and constraining transitions among augmented states
based on the path commitments. As a result, one can keep track of classes of paths
without explicitly constructing the paths, enabling the checking of paths that satisfy ϕ
in a states-and-transitions setting.
Traditionally, M ′ has been described as the product of the Kripke structure M and
the Kripke structure for the tableau. M ′ may also be viewed as a refinement of M where
some behaviours (paths) in M that do not satisfy ϕ are thrown away, but behaviours in
M that satisfy ϕ are preserved in M ′. The idea is the additional structures in M ′ make
it easier to identify paths that satisfy ϕ.
Section 6.1 describes the construction of M ′ from M . Paths that satisfy ϕ in M
must necessarily map to the class of paths that are “committed” to ϕ in M ′. However,
if ϕ involves eventual conditions (subformulas of ϕ that need to eventually hold in suffix
paths), then checking the class of paths is not sufficient. Section 6.2 describes how
eventual conditions can be taken into account. To demonstrate the generality of the
concepts described in this chapter, they are applied to two LTL encoding schemes: the
classic LTL encoding scheme [LP85], and the TGBA encoding scheme [RV11].
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6.1 The Augmented Model
All well-known approaches for checking the satisfiability of ϕ in a model M augment
states and transitions in M with path commitments and transition constraints, although
under different guises. An augmented model M ′ = (S ′, R′, L′) is constructed as a result of
augmenting states and transitions in M . The resulting M ′ depends on the LTL encoding
scheme used as well as ϕ, but the concepts described in this section apply to all encoding
schemes. Let us now delve into the concepts that are used in constructing M ′.
Some encoding schemes rely on ϕ being in negation normal form (NNF). One advan-
tage of having ϕ in NNF is that the satisfiability of ϕ does not rely on the satisfiability
of a negation of a temporal operation as a subproblem.
Definition 6.1 (Negation normal form). A path formula is in negation normal form
(NNF) if negations apply only to atomic formulas.
The TGBA encoding scheme requires that ϕ be in NNF. An LTL formula can be
normalised to NNF by applying the following rules:
¬¬p ≡ p,
¬(p ∧ q) ≡ ¬p ∨ ¬q,
¬(p ∨ q) ≡ ¬p ∧ ¬q,
¬Xp ≡ X¬p,
¬Gp ≡ F¬p,
¬Fp ≡ G¬p,
¬(pU q) ≡ ¬pR¬q, and
¬(pR q) ≡ ¬pU¬q.
(6.3)
The ϕ in (6.2) is already in NNF.
The classic LTL encoding scheme does not require ϕ to be in NNF, but considers
{X,U} to be the set of primitive temporal operators, and requires the temporal opera-
tions in ϕ to be primitive. An LTL formula can be normalised to a form in which the
temporal operators are restricted to be in {X,U} by applying the following rules:
Gp ≡ ¬(trueU¬p),
Fp ≡ trueU p, and
pR q ≡ ¬(¬pU¬q).
(6.4)
Some LTL formulas cannot be normalised to be both in NNF and have the temporal
operators restricted to be in {X,U}. For the classic LTL encoding scheme, the ϕ in (6.2)
can be normalised to
ϕ ≡ (trueU¬(trueU (Light = green))) ∨ (trueU¬(trueU (Light = red))).
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The concept of path commitment is implicitly used in all LTL encoding schemes known
to the author. Informally, if a commitment to satisfying a path formula p is “asserted” by
an augmented state s′, then any finite prefix path in M ′ that starts at s′ is consistent with
an infinite path that satisfies p (although the infinite path might not be in M ′). If p is
also a state formula (in LTL, a state formula cannot have any temporal operation), e.g., p
is (Light = red), then the commitment to satisfy p is asserted by an augmented state s′ if
and only if M ′, s′ |= p. Such a path commitment is called a trivial path commitment since
the commitment is trivially fulfilled by s′. In contrast, if p involves temporal operations,
then the fulfillment of the path commitment may involve other augmented states.
Trivial path commitments are already “encoded” in unaugmented states in M . To
enable non-trivial path commitments to be encoded in augmented states, some non-
trivial path commitments need to be considered as atomic propositions in M ′. This can
be accomplished by representing such non-trivial path commitments as Boolean state
variables in M ′.
Definition 6.2 (Elementary formula). A path formula p involved in checking the satisfi-
ability of ϕ is called an elementary formula if and only if p is not a state formula and the
commitment to satisfy p is represented as a Boolean state variable, denoted Vp, in M
′.
The set of elementary formulas, constructed for the purpose of checking the satisfiability
of ϕ, is denoted el(ϕ).
Note that the definition of elementary formulas here is different from [CGH94] where
they include atomic propositions in el(ϕ). Instead, it follows the definition in [RV11].
Because path commitments for atomic propositions in M are trivial path commitments,
atomic propositions are not included in el(ϕ).
Let us use AP (ϕ) to denote the set of atomic propositions in ϕ; AP (ϕ) ⊆ AP . Exactly
what are in el(ϕ) depends on the LTL encoding scheme but the construction of el(ϕ) must
obey the following rules:
el(p) = {}, if p ∈ AP (ϕ),
el(¬p) = el(p),
el(p ∧ q) = el(p) ∪ el(q), and
el(p ∨ q) = el(p) ∪ el(q).
For the classic LTL encoding scheme, two additional rules complete the definition of
el(ϕ):
el(Xp) = {Xp} ∪ el(p), and
el(pU q) = {X(pU q)} ∪ el(p) ∪ el(q).
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The definition of el(ϕ) for the TGBA encoding scheme includes the following additional
rules:
el(Xp) = {}, if p has no temporal operations,
el(Xp) = {p} ∪ el(p), if p has temporal operations,
el(pU q) = {pU q} ∪ el(p) ∪ el(q),
el(pR q) = {pR q} ∪ el(p) ∪ el(q),
el(GFp) = {GFp} ∪ el(p),
el(Gp) = {Gp} ∪ el(p), if p 6= Fq for any q, and
el(Fp) = {Fp} ∪ el(p).
In addition, for the TGBA encoding scheme, if there is a path formula p of the form
Xq for some q, and there is an occurrence of p in ϕ that is not inside another temporal
operation, then ϕ is added to el(ϕ). This ensures that the path commitment for ϕ can
be encoded in an augmented state. There can be variations for the rules for el(Xp), but
the rules must enable the commitment to satisfy p to be encoded in an augmented state.
For example, the second rule for el(Xp) can be replaced by the following two rules:
el(Xp) = el(p), if there is no occurrence of Xq in p not inside another
temporal operation, for any q, and
el(Xp) = {p} ∪ el(p), if there is an occurrence of Xq in p not inside another
temporal operation, for some q.
Only certain formulas may be involved in checking the satisfiability of ϕ.
Concept 6.1 (Closure). In checking the satisfiability of ϕ, the closure of ϕ, denoted
cl(ϕ) is a set of formulas whose construction is dependent on the encoding scheme. The
satisfiability of ϕ can depend on the satisfiability of p as a subproblem only if p ∈ cl(ϕ).
It is required in the framework that ϕ ∈ cl(ϕ).
For the classic LTL encoding scheme, cl(ϕ) , el(ϕ) ∪ sub(ϕ) where sub(ϕ) denotes
the set of subformulas of ϕ. For the TGBA encoding scheme, cl(ϕ) is inductively defined
as follows:
• If p ∈ el(ϕ) ∪ AP (ϕ) then p ∈ cl(ϕ).
• If p ∈ cl(ϕ) and (¬p) ∈ sub(ϕ) then (¬p) ∈ cl(ϕ).
• If p ∈ cl(ϕ), q ∈ cl(ϕ) and (p ∧ q) ∈ sub(ϕ) then (p ∧ q) ∈ cl(ϕ).
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• If p ∈ cl(ϕ), q ∈ cl(ϕ) and (p ∨ q) ∈ sub(ϕ) then (p ∨ q) ∈ cl(ϕ).
It is not difficult to show that for both the classic LTL encoding scheme and the TGBA
encoding scheme, ϕ ∈ cl(ϕ).
An LTL encoding scheme may add Boolean state variables called promise variables
to the augmented model M ′. Promise variables are used in checking eventual conditions,
to be described in Section 6.2. For the TGBA encoding scheme, for each p ∈ el(ϕ) of the
form qU r, GFq or Fq, a promise variable denoted Pp is added to M
′. Let us denote the
set of promise variables added Pϕ, i.e., for the TGBA encoding scheme,
Pϕ = {Pp | p ∈ el(ϕ) and p is of the form qU r,GFq or Fq}.
For the classic LTL encoding scheme, Pϕ = {}. Let us also define Vϕ = {Vp | p ∈ el(ϕ)}
and varsϕ = Vϕ ∪ Pϕ. A state s ∈ S is refined into 2n augmented states in S ′ where
n = |varsϕ|. Each augmented state s′ ∈ S ′ is an assignment
{v1 ← d1, ..., vm ← dm, vm+1 ← b1, ..., vm+n ← bn}
where v1, ..., vm are the state variables of M , vm+1, ..., vm+n are the Boolean state variables
in varsϕ, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n : di ∈ type(vi), and for 1 ≤ i ≤ m : bi ∈ {true, false}. S ′ is then
defined as follows:
S ′ , type(v1)× type(v2)× ...× type(vm)× bool × ...× bool︸ ︷︷ ︸
n times
. (6.5)
The labelling L′ is defined such that for each s′ ∈ S ′, we have:
L′(s′) = L(s) ∪ {v | v ∈ varsϕ ∧ (M ′, s′ |= v)}. (6.6)
For each s′ ∈ S ′, the projection of s′ denoted proj(s′) is defined to be the s ∈ S such that
L(s) = L′(s′) \ varsϕ (recall from Section 2.1 that a state is completely determined from
its label). The projection of a path pi′ in M ′ is obtained by projecting each augmented
state in pi′:
proj(pi′) = 〈proj(pi′0), proj(pi′1), proj(pi′2), ...〉.
Let us define APT , AP (ϕ)∪ varsϕ. We now have enough concepts to describe path
commitments and transition constraints.
Concept 6.2 (Path commitment). For each p ∈ cl(ϕ), the path commitment to satisfy p,
denoted Sϕ(p), is a state formula in the augmented model M
′ whose atomic propositions
are in APT . The exact definition of Sϕ(p) is specific to the LTL encoding scheme used,
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but must include the following rules:
Sϕ(p) ≡ p, if p ∈ AP (ϕ),
Sϕ(p) ≡ Vp, if p ∈ el(ϕ),
Sϕ(¬p) ≡ ¬Sϕ(p),
Sϕ(p ∧ q) ≡ Sϕ(p) ∧ Sϕ(q), and
Sϕ(p ∨ q) ≡ Sϕ(p) ∨ Sϕ(q).
For the classic LTL encoding scheme, the following additional rule completes the definition
of Sϕ:
Sϕ(pU q) ≡ Sϕ(q) ∨ (Sϕ(p) ∧ Sϕ(X(pU q)).
For the TGBA encoding scheme, no additional rule for Sϕ is required.
A path commitment in an augmented state restricts the paths that can start from
the augmented state. Part of the restriction is enforced using transition constraints. For
p ∈ cl(ϕ), if the path commitment Sϕ(p) holds in an augmented state s′, then it gives
rise to a transition constraint Tϕ(p) for any transition from s
′.
Concept 6.3 (Transition constraint). For p ∈ cl(ϕ) ∪ sub(ϕ), a transition constraint
Tϕ(p) is a propositional formula whose atoms are in APT ∪ {next(q) | q ∈ prop(ϕ)},
where prop(ϕ) is the set of propositions whose atoms are in APT , and an atom next(q)
means the proposition q holds in the next state (the state that is the target of the
transition). The exact definition of Tϕ(p) is specific to the encoding scheme, but must
include the following rules:
Tϕ(p) ≡ p, if p ∈ AP (ϕ),
Tϕ(¬p) ≡ ¬Tϕ(p),
Tϕ(p ∧ q) ≡ Tϕ(p) ∧ Tϕ(q),
Tϕ(p ∨ q) ≡ Tϕ(p) ∨ Tϕ(q), and
Tϕ(Xp) ≡ next(Sϕ(p)).
For the classic LTL encoding scheme, the following additional rule completes the definition
of Tϕ:
Tϕ(pU q) ≡ Tϕ(q) ∨ (Tϕ(p) ∧ Tϕ(X(pU q)).
For the TGBA encoding scheme, the following additional rules complete the definition of
Tϕ (note that the domain of Tϕ is cl(ϕ)∪ sub(ϕ) which, for the TGBA encoding scheme,
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is sub(ϕ)):
Tϕ(pU q) ≡ Tϕ(q) ∨ (Tϕ(p) ∧ PpU q ∧ Tϕ(X(pU q))),
Tϕ(pR q) ≡ Tϕ(q) ∧ (Tϕ(p) ∨ Tϕ(X(pR q))),
Tϕ(Gp) ≡ Tϕ(p) ∧ Tϕ(X(Gp)), if p 6= Fq for any q,
Tϕ(Fp) ≡ Tϕ(p) ∨ (PFp ∧ Tϕ(X(Fp))), and
Tϕ(GFp) ≡ Tϕ(X(GFp)) ∧ (Tϕ(p) ∨ PGFp)
Informally, a transition constraint Tϕ(p) ensures that an augmented state s
′ with a
commitment Sϕ(p) can transition to an augmented state t
′ only if the sequence 〈s′, t′〉
can be the prefix of a path that satisfies p, thus ensuring that the transition is consistent
with the path commitment. As an example, with the TGBA encoding scheme, suppose
the path commitment Sϕ(Gp) holds in an augmented state s
′, meaning s′ is committed
to start only paths that satisfy Gp. Suppose p is not of the form Fq for any q. The
semantic definition of Gp from Section 2.1 is:
M,pi |= Gp⇔ ∀i ≥ 0 : (M,pii |= p), (6.7)
which is equivalent to the definition
M,pi |= Gp⇔ (M,pi |= p) ∧ (M,pi1 |= Gp) (6.8)
which can be read as s′ can start only paths that satisfy p and t′ can start only paths
that satisfy Gp. The transition constraint Tϕ(Gp) is
Tϕ(Gp) ≡ Tϕ(p) ∧ Tϕ(X(Gp))
where Tϕ(p) corresponds to M,pi |= p in (6.8) (s′ can start only paths that satisfy p) and
Tϕ(X(Gp)) corresponds to M,pi
1 |= Gp in (6.8) (t′ can start only paths that satisfy Gp).
Because the transition constraint corresponds exactly with the definition of the satisfia-
bility of Gp, the transition constraint is sufficient to ensure that the commitment Sϕ(Gp)
is fulfilled by the suffix paths (provided subsidiary commitments are also fulfilled). As we
shall see in Section 6.2, transition constraints are not sufficient for temporal operations
involving eventual conditions.
Definition 6.3 (Satisfaction of transition constraint). For augmented states s′1, s
′
2, and a
transition constraint T , the satisfaction of T by the transition (s′1, s
′
2), denoted (s
′
1, s
′
2) |=
T , is evaluated using the following rules:
(s′1, s
′
2) |= p ≡ M ′, s′1 |= p, if p ∈ APT ,
(s′1, s
′
2) |= next(p) ≡ M ′, s′2 |= p,
(s′1, s
′
2) |= ¬p ≡ (s′1, s′2) 6|= p,
(s′1, s
′
2) |= p ∨ q ≡ ((s′1, s′2) |= p) ∨ ((s′1, s′2) |= q), and
(s′1, s
′
2) |= p ∧ q ≡ ((s′1, s′2) |= p) ∧ ((s′1, s′2) |= q).
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Augmenting states in M with Boolean state in varsϕ and adding the necessary tran-
sition constraints, produces an augmented model M ′ = (S ′, R′, L′), with S ′ defined by
(6.5) and L′ defined by (6.6).
Definition 6.4 (Transition Relation for Augmented Model). The transition relation R′
is defined as follows:
(s′1, s
′
2) ∈ R′ ⇔ (proj(s′1), proj(s′2)) ∈ R ∧
(∀p ∈ el(ϕ) : Vp ∈ L′(s′1)⇔ (s′1, s′2) |= Tϕ(p)).
(6.9)
If ϕ is in NNF, the following alternative definition can be used:
(s′1, s
′
2) ∈ R′ ⇔ (proj(s′1), proj(s′2)) ∈ R ∧
(∀p ∈ el(ϕ) : Vp ∈ L′(s′1)⇒ (s′1, s′2) |= Tϕ(p)).
(6.10)
If (6.9) is used as the definition of R′, then the encoding scheme is said to be using
a a strict encoding. If ϕ is in NNF and (6.10) is used as the definition of R′, then the
encoding scheme is said to be using a loose encoding (called sloppy encoding in [RV11]).
The use of a loose encoding when ϕ is in NNF causes M ′, pi′ 6|= p to be treated as a
“do not care” for p ∈ el(ϕ), which may lead to a more efficient encoding than a strict
encoding.
The elementary formulas of ϕ and transition constraints associated with the elemen-
tary formulas form a tableau for checking the satisfiability of ϕ. The tableau may be
thought of as a mechanism to ensure that all relevant cases (of behaviours) are con-
sidered. The cases are determined by el(ϕ), and there are 2el(ϕ) elements in P(el(ϕ))
representing the combinations of elementary formulas that make up the cases.
Definition 6.5 (Symbolic Tableau). IfR′ is defined using (6.9), then the symbolic tableau
for ϕ is: ∨
c∈P(el(ϕ))
 ∧
p∈el(ϕ)
if p ∈ c then Vp ∧ Tϕ(p) else ¬Vp ∧ ¬Tϕ(p)
 (6.11)
If R′ is defined using (6.10) then the symbolic tableau for ϕ is:
∨
c∈P(el(ϕ))
 ∧
p∈el(ϕ)
if p ∈ c then Vp ∧ Tϕ(p) else ¬Vp
 (6.12)
A symbolic a tableau is a transition constraint. In Chapter 7, a symbolic tableau is
further processed into a collection of simpler transition constraints.
The purpose of augmenting states is to keep track of modalities in the search for a
path that satisfies ϕ. Augmenting states in a path introduces no “new truths” for the
path. This is made formal in Theorem 6.1.
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Theorem 6.1 (Conservative Extension).
∀i ≥ 0, p ∈ cl(ϕ) ∪ sub(ϕ) : (M ′, pi′i |= p)⇔ (M, proj(pi′i) |= p).
Proof. The proof is by induction on the structure of p. For the base case, we have
p ∈ AP (ϕ) in which case M ′, pi′i |= p and M, proj(pi′i) |= p are identically determined
by L(proj(pi′i)). Each of the inductive cases follows from the semantics of temporal logic
described in Section 2.1 (the number of cases depends on the encoding scheme, but the
proof for each case is independent of the encoding scheme).
The purpose of constructing the augmented model M ′ is to help keep track of paths
and rule out irrelevant paths. However, we do not want paths that satisfy ϕ to be ruled
out. The following theorem ensures that paths that satisfy ϕ are not ruled out.
Theorem 6.2 (Preservation of Satisfying Paths).
(M,pi |= ϕ) ⇒ ∃pi′ : proj(pi′) = pi ∧ (M ′, pi′0 |= Sϕ(ϕ)).
Proof. The proof of Theorem 6.2 is dependent on the encoding scheme. The proofs for the
classic LTL encoding scheme and the TGBA encoding scheme are provided in Appendix
A.
6.2 Eventual Conditions
Unfortunately, the converse of Theorem 6.2 (the ⇐ direction) does not hold. The exis-
tence of pi′ as in Theorem 6.2, with M ′, pi′0 |= Sϕ(ϕ), does not guarantee that M,pi |= ϕ.
Eventual conditions cannot be guaranteed using only transition constraints. Figure 6.1
s′1 -
N8/N9 s′2 -
N10 s′3 -
N11 s′4
6
N12
M ′, s′1 |= Lock = unset
M ′, s′1 |= Light = amber
M ′, s′1 |= ¬Sϕ(G¬(Light = red))
M ′, s′1 |= Sϕ(FG¬(Light = red))
M ′, s′2 |= Lock = set
M ′, s′2 |= Light = amber
M ′, s′2 |= ¬Sϕ(G¬(Light = red))
M ′, s′2 |= Sϕ(FG¬(Light = red))
M ′, s′3 |= Lock = set
M ′, s′3 |= Light = red
M ′, s′3 |= ¬Sϕ(G¬(Light = red))
M ′, s′3 |= Sϕ(FG¬(Light = red))
M ′, s′4 |= Lock = unset
M ′, s′4 |= Light = red
M ′, s′4 |= ¬Sϕ(G¬(Light = red))
M ′, s′4 |= Sϕ(FG¬(Light = red))
Figure 6.1: A cycle without eventual condition G¬(Light = red) fulfilled.
illustrates a case where an eventual condition G¬(Light = red) is never fulfilled although
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the transitions in the cycle satisfy the transition constraints for Sϕ(FG¬(Light = red))
(the example assumes the TGBA encoding scheme is used).
Let pi′ be the indefinite repetition of the cycle in Figure 6.1 starting at s′1, i.e.,
pi′ = 〈s′1, s′2, s′3, s′4, s′1, ...〉. Then M ′, pi′0 |= Sϕ(FG¬(Light = red)) but because the
eventual condition G¬(Light = red) is never fulfilled in a suffix of pi′, i.e., ∀i ≥ 0 :
M ′, pi′i 6|= Sϕ(G¬(Light = red)), we get M ′, pi′ 6|= FG¬(Light = red), thus M, proj(pi′) 6|=
FG¬(Light = red) (from Theorem 6.1). Note that a cycle with the same transitions
but with ¬Sϕ(G¬(Light = red)) replaced by Sϕ(G¬(Light = red)) is ruled out of M ′
because M ′, s′3 |= Light = red.
Let us examine why transition constraints, although necessary, are insufficient to
ensure that the commitment Sϕ(Fp) is fulfilled for an arbitrary path formula p. The
semantic definition of Fp is
M,pi |= Fp⇔ ∃i ≥ 0 : (M,pii |= p) (6.13)
which is equivalent to the following definition:
M,pi |= Fp⇔ (M,pi |= p) ∨ (M,pi1 |= Fp) ∧ ∃i ≥ 1 : (M,pii |= p). (6.14)
The transition constraint Tϕ(Fp) from a state with path commitment Sϕ(Fp) is
Tϕ(Fp) ≡ Tϕ(p) ∨ (PFp ∧ Tϕ(X(Fp))).
Tϕ(p) corresponds to M,pi |= p in (6.14) and Tϕ(X(Fp)) corresponds to M,pi1 |= Fp, but
∃i ≥ 1 : (M,pii |= p) in (6.14) is not covered by the transition constraint (a transition
constraint can only “look ahead” one transition, thus can guarantee only that a prefix
up to the next state is consistent with a satisfying path). The condition p in ∃i ≥ 1 :
(M,pii |= p) is called an eventual condition.
Concept 6.4 (Eventual condition). The eventual condition for a path formula p ∈ cl(ϕ),
denoted ec(p), is a path formula whose fulfillment is necessary for satisfying p in the sense
(M,pi |= p)⇒ ∃i ≥ 0 : (M,pii |= ec(p)),
and it is based on the form of p. The exact definition of ec is dependent on the encoding
scheme, but must include the following rule:
ec(pU q) ≡ q.
For the classic LTL encoding scheme, the following rule completes the definition of
ec:
ec(p) ≡ true, if p is not of the form qU r for any q and r.
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For the TGBA encoding scheme, the following rules complete the definition of ec:
ec(Fp) ≡ p,
ec(GFp) ≡ p, and
ec(p) ≡ true, if p is not of the form qU r,Fq,GFq, for any q and r.
If ϕ is not in NNF and the encoding scheme is not the classic LTL encoding scheme, then
we need to be able to handle the following:
(M,pi 6|= p)⇒ ∃i ≥ 0 : (M,pii |= ec(¬p)),
which may require rules such as
ec(¬Gp) ≡ ¬p and ec(¬(p R q)) ≡ ¬q.
Although the equivalence
M,pi |= Fp⇔ (M,pi |= p) ∨ (M,pi1 |= Fp) (6.15)
is a consequence of the definition (6.13), (6.15) as a co-inductive definition is not equiva-
lent to (6.13). Had (6.15) been the definition, then transition constraints would have been
sufficient, but pi′ = 〈s′1, s′2, s′3, s′4, s′1, ...〉 would have incorrectly satisfied FG¬(Light =
red) (pi′ does not satisfy ∃i ≥ 0 : pi′i |= G¬(Light = red)). Thus (6.15) is incorrect
as a definition, and (6.14) must be used instead. Because transition constraints do not
ensure that eventual conditions will be fulfilled, additional checking must be performed
to ensure the fulfillment of eventual conditions.
Rather than directly tracking fulfillments of eventual conditions, LTL checking typ-
ically uses fairness constraints for checking eventual conditions. (Recall from Section
2.2.3, Lichtenstein and Pnueli showed that the check for eventual conditions can be per-
formed in terms of fairness constraints.) The set of fairness constraints for the purpose
of checking the satisfiability of ϕ is denoted Cϕ. For the classic LTL encoding scheme,
Cϕ is defined as follows:
Cϕ , {¬Sϕ(p) ∨ Sϕ(ec(p)) | p ∈ cl(ϕ) ∧ (ec(p) 6≡ true)}. (6.16)
For the TGBA encoding scheme, Sϕ(ec(p)) is not necessarily defined for p ∈ cl(ϕ). In-
stead, the TGBA encoding scheme uses promise variables to track fulfillment of eventual
conditions. For the TGBA encoding scheme, Cϕ is defined as follows:
Cϕ , {¬v | v ∈ Pϕ}. (6.17)
The theorem that is the basis for all LTL model checking algorithms known to the author
is as follows:
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Theorem 6.3 (Main Theorem for LTL Checking).
M,pi |= ϕ ⇔ ∃pi′ : proj(pi′) = pi ∧ (M ′, pi′0 |= Sϕ(ϕ))
∧ ∀c ∈ Cϕ, i ≥ 0 : ∃j ≥ i : M ′, pi′j |= c.
Proof. The proof of Theorem 6.3 is dependent on the encoding scheme. The proofs for the
classic LTL encoding scheme and the TGBA encoding scheme are provided in Appendix
A.
6.3 Proof Plans
6.3.1 Proof Plan for Theorem 6.2
Let us start with a proof plan for Theorem 6.2:
(M,pi |= ϕ) ⇒ ∃pi′ : proj(pi′) = pi ∧ (M ′, pi′0 |= Sϕ(ϕ)).
Given that M,pi |= ϕ, how do we construct a path pi′ in M ′ such that proj(pi′) =
pi ∧ (M ′, pi′0 |= Sϕ(ϕ))? The safest way is to make pi′ a “strict mapping” of pi in that
∀i ≥ 0, p ∈ el(ϕ) : (M,pii |= p)⇔ (M ′, pi′i |= Vp). (6.18)
Additionally, for an encoding scheme that uses promise variables, the values of the promise
variables at each augmented state in the path are determined as follows:
∀i ≥ 0, Pp ∈ Pϕ : (M,pii |= p ∧ ¬ec(p))⇔ (M ′, pi′i |= Pp). (6.19)
Thus for an encoding scheme that does not use promise variables, each augmented state
pi′i is constructed as follows:
L′(pi′i) = L(pii) ∪ {Vp | p ∈ el(ϕ) ∧ (M,pii |= p)}, (6.20)
and for an encoding scheme that uses promise variables, each augmented state pi′i is
constructed as follows:
L′(pi′i) = L(pii) ∪ {Vp | p ∈ el(ϕ) ∧ (M,pii |= p)} ∪ {Pp | Pp ∈ Pϕ ∧ (M,pii |= p ∧ ¬ec(p))}
(6.21)
(recall from Section 2.1 that a state is completely determined by its label).
To show that pi′ constructed as above is in fact a path in M ′, we must show that
∀i ≥ 0 : (pi′i, pi′i+1) ∈ R′. (6.22)
The proof can be made easier if Theorem 6.2 is strengthened to state the existence of a
“strict” mapping of a path that satisfies ϕ.
For an encoding scheme that does not use promise variables, the strengthening pro-
duces Lemma 6.1.
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Lemma 6.1.
M,pi |= ϕ
⇒ ∃pi′ : proj(pi′) = pi ∧ ∀i ≥ 0, p ∈ cl(ϕ) : (M,pii |= p)⇔ (M ′, pi′i |= Sϕ(p)).
The proof of Lemma 6.1 is specific to the encoding scheme but can use the following
plan:
1. show that pi′ as a sequence of states constructed according to (6.20) satisfies
∀i ≥ 0, p ∈ cl(ϕ) : (M,pii |= p)⇔ (M ′, pi′i |= Sϕ(p)), (6.23)
and
2. given that pi′ satisfies (6.23) show that pi′ satisfies (6.22).
The application of the proof plan to the classic LTL encoding scheme, proving Lemma
6.1 in the scheme, is described in Section A.1.
For an encoding scheme that uses promise variables and requires ϕ to be in NNF, the
strengthening produces Lemma 6.2.
Lemma 6.2.
M,pi |= ϕ
⇒ ∃pi′ : proj(pi′) = pi ∧ ∀i ≥ 0, p ∈ cl(ϕ) : (M,pii |= p)⇔ (M ′, pi′i |= Sϕ(p))
∧ ∀i ≥ 0, p ∈ el(ϕ) ∧ (ec(p) 6≡ true) : (M,pii |= p ∧ ¬ec(p))⇔ (M ′, pi′i |= Pp).
The proof of Lemma 6.2 is specific to the encoding scheme but can use the following
plan:
1. show that pi′ as a sequence of states constructed according to (6.21) satisfies
∀i ≥ 0, p ∈ cl(ϕ) : (M,pii |= p)⇔ (M ′, pi′i |= Sϕ(p))
∧ ∀i ≥ 0, p ∈ el(ϕ) ∧ (ec(p) 6≡ true) : (M,pii |= p ∧ ¬ec(p))⇔ (M ′, pi′i |= Pp),
(6.24)
and
2. given that pi′ satisfies (6.24) show that pi′ satisfies (6.22).
The application of the proof plan to the TGBA encoding scheme, proving Lemma 6.2 in
the scheme, is described in Section A.2.
For an encoding scheme that does not use promise variables, Theorem 6.2 follows from
Lemma 6.1 (since ϕ ∈ cl(ϕ)). For an encoding scheme that uses promise variables (and
requires ϕ to be in NNF), Theorem 6.2 follows from Lemma 6.2 (since ϕ ∈ cl(ϕ)).
6.3. PROOF PLANS 73
6.3.2 Proof Plan for Theorem 6.3
Next, let us develop a proof plan for Theorem 6.3:
M,pi |= ϕ ⇔ ∃pi′ : proj(pi′) = pi ∧ (M ′, pi′0 |= Sϕ(ϕ))
∧ ∀c ∈ Cϕ, i ≥ 0 : ∃j ≥ i : M ′, pi′j |= c.
Let us start with the ⇒ direction.
For an encoding scheme that does not use promise variables, using Lemma 6.1, what
remains to prove the ⇒ direction is to prove Lemma 6.3.
Lemma 6.3.
(M,pi |= ϕ) ∧ proj(pi′) = pi
∧ ∀i ≥ 0, p ∈ cl(ϕ) : (M,pii |= p)⇔ (M ′, pi′i |= Sϕ(p))
⇒ ∀c ∈ Cϕ, i ≥ 0 : ∃j ≥ i : M ′, pi′j |= c,
The proof of Lemma 6.3 is specific to the encoding scheme but can use the following
plan:
1. expand Cϕ according to its definition,
2. transform the quantification over elements of Cϕ into quantification over formulas
in the closure of ϕ that have non-trivial eventual conditions, and
3. use the last antecedent in the lemma, from which the conclusion of the lemma
follows, to complete the proof.
The application of the proof plan to the classic LTL encoding scheme, proving Lemma
6.3 in the scheme, is described in Section A.1.
For an encoding scheme that uses promise variables and requires ϕ to be in NNF,
using Lemma 6.2, what remains to prove the ⇒ direction is to prove Lemma 6.4.
Lemma 6.4.
(M,pi |= ϕ) ∧ proj(pi′) = pi
∧ ∀i ≥ 0, p ∈ cl(ϕ) : (M,pii |= p)⇔ (M ′, pi′i |= Sϕ(p))
∧ ∀i ≥ 0, p ∈ el(ϕ) ∧ (ec(p) 6≡ true) : (M,pii |= p ∧ ¬ec(p))⇔ (M ′, pi′i |= Pp)
⇒ ∀c ∈ Cϕ, i ≥ 0 : ∃j ≥ i : M ′, pi′j |= c.
The proof of Lemma 6.4 is specific to the encoding scheme but can use the following
plan:
1. expand Cϕ according to its definition,
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2. transform the quantification over elements of Cϕ into quantification over elementary
formulas of ϕ that have non-trivial eventual conditions, and
3. use the last antecedent in the lemma, from which the conclusion of the lemma
follows, to complete the proof.
The application of the proof plan to the TGBA encoding scheme, proving Lemma 6.4 in
the scheme, is described in Section A.2.
For the ⇐ direction, we must prove
proj(pi′) = pi ∧ (M ′, pi′0 |= Sϕ(ϕ)) ∧ ∀c ∈ Cϕ, i ≥ 0 : ∃j ≥ i : M ′, pi′j |= c
⇒ (M,pi |= ϕ) (6.25)
which can be done with the help of Lemma 6.5.
Lemma 6.5.
∀c ∈ Cϕ, i ≥ 0 : ∃j ≥ i : M ′, pi′j |= c
⇒ ∀i ≥ 0, p ∈ cl(ϕ) : (M ′, pi′i |= Sϕ(p))⇒ (M ′, pi′i |= p).
The proof of Lemma 6.5 is specific to the encoding scheme but can use the following
plan:
1. expand Cϕ according to its definition,
2. transform the quantification over elements of Cϕ into quantification over formulas
in the closure of ϕ or elementary formulas of ϕ, depending on whether the encoding
scheme uses promise variables, and
3. complete the proof by induction on the structure of the variable quantified over
formulas in the closure of ϕ.
The application of the proof plan to the classic LTL encoding scheme, proving Lemma
6.5 in the scheme, is described in Section A.1. The application of the proof plan to the
TGBA encoding scheme, proving Lemma 6.5 in the scheme, is described in Section A.2.
(6.25) follows from Lemma 6.5 (with the second i instantiated to 0 and p instantiated
to ϕ) and Theorem 6.1.
6.3.3 Summary
In summary, for an encoding scheme that does not use promise variables, the proof plans
developed have reduced the proof of Theorem 6.2 to a proof of Lemma 6.1, and the proof
of Theorem 6.3 to proofs of Lemmas 6.3 and 6.5. For an encoding scheme that uses
promise variables (and requires ϕ to be in NNF), the proof plans developed have reduced
the proof of Theorem 6.2 to a proof of Lemma 6.2 and the proof of Theorem 6.3 to proofs
of Lemmas 6.4 and Lemma 6.5.
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6.4 Summary and Discussion
Essential concepts in LTL model checking have been presented in a fashion that is in-
dependent of the LTL encoding scheme and the model checking approach and strategy.
This results in a framework for LTL model checking that supports multiple approaches
and strategies. A tool based on the framework can be developed that accommodates a
multitude of approaches and strategies. This is important because no single approach or
strategy has been found to be best for all model checking problems. It also allows the
possibility of running different approaches and strategies in parallel and using the result
of whichever succeeds first.
All LTL model checking approaches known to the author are based on a version of
Theorem 6.3, thus our framework covers all of those approaches. The soundness of an
LTL encoding scheme in model checking can be assured by proving Theorem 6.3 within
the encoding scheme. Proof plans for proving theorems that represent the soundness of
an LTL encoding scheme have been developed. The applications of the proof plans to
show the soundness of the classic LTL encoding scheme and the TGBA encoding scheme
are included in Appendix A.
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Chapter 7
LTL Model Checking within the
Framework
Chapter 6 identified the essential concepts used in LTL model checking that are indepen-
dent of the encoding scheme and the model checking approach. The concepts identified,
together with the symbolic framework for state machines described in Chapter 3, serve
as a foundation for symbolic LTL model checking and counterexample generation. This
chapter describes how the concepts are applied and how model checking might be per-
formed within the resulting framework.
The novel contributions of this chapter include:
• The use of global constraints to optimise analysis. For some forms of LTL formulas,
the checking of the formula can be optimised by treating part of the formula as a
global constraint and checking a smaller formula under the global constraint.
• The idea of normalising transition constraints for an LTL tableau into disjunctive
normal form, where each disjunct is a simple transition constraint and represents
a case in the tableau. A simple transition constraint may be viewed as consisting
of a guard and a post condition, and is used in the framework to construct transfer
functions in the augmented model.
• An algorithm for on-the-fly symbolic LTL model checking. The algorithm is a novel
adaptation of the double depth-first search (double-DFS) algorithm of [CVWY92]
in a symbolic setting.
Section 7.1 shows how the augmented model M ′ described in Section 6.1 can be
constructed within the framework described in Chapter 3, and defines the concept of
symbolic counterexample paths. The result provides a framework for LTL model checking
and counterexample generation. Section 7.2 shows how different techniques and strategies
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for LTL model checking and counterexample generation can be performed within the
resulting framework.
7.1 The LTL Model Checking Framework
7.1.1 Normalisation of ϕ
Recall from Section 6.1 that an LTL encoding scheme typically requires ϕ to be in some
normal form. Normalisation involves the application of transformation rules. The classic
LTL encoding scheme requires that ϕ be normalised to contain temporal operators only
from the set {X,U}. The normalisation for the classic LTL encoding scheme can be
performed using the transformation rules in (6.4). The TGBA encoding scheme requires
that ϕ be normalised into NNF. Normalisation into NNF can be performed using the
transformation rules in (6.3).
Although not necessary, additional transformations may be performed to obtain an
efficient encoding. As an example, the following transformation rules may be applied to
obtain fewer temporal operations:
Gp ∧Gq ≡ G(p ∧ q), and
Fp ∨ Fq ≡ F(p ∨ q).
For the classic LTL encoding scheme, the above optimising transformation rules need to
be applied before the normalising transformation rules.
Another type of optimisation deals with global constraints. Consider the following
LTL specification
¬Gp ∨ q (7.1)
with p being a state formula (thus p contains no temporal operation). The negation of
(7.1) is equivalent to
Gp ∧ ¬q. (7.2)
Checking the satisfiability of (7.2) can be made more efficient if p is made into a global
constraint (i.e., all states must satisfy p). The satisfiability checking of (7.2) would then
be performed with ϕ ≡ ¬q under the global constraint p.
Finally, some LTL model checking problems require no tableau construction. Consider
the following LTL specification
Gp (7.3)
with p being a state formula (thus p contains no temporal operation). The negation of
(7.3) is equivalent to
F¬p. (7.4)
7.1. THE LTL MODEL CHECKING FRAMEWORK 79
If the system is non-terminating, then checking the satisfiability of (7.4) amounts to
checking for reachable states that satisfy ¬p, since a finite path to a state that satisfies
¬p can be extended into an infinite path. For a system that may terminate, although
strictly speaking such a system is not covered by standard temporal logic, the reachability
of a state that satisfies ¬p may be viewed as a violation of (7.3) as a safety property,
even if a finite path to p cannot be extended into an infinite path.
7.1.2 Tableau Generation
Recall from Section 6.1 that the tableau for ϕ is characterised by the transition constraint
∨
c∈P(el(ϕ))
 ∧
p∈el(ϕ)
if p ∈ c then Vp ∧ Tϕ(p) else ¬Vp ∧ ¬Tϕ(p)

if R′ is defined by (6.9), or
∨
c∈P(el(ϕ))
 ∧
p∈el(ϕ)
if p ∈ c then Vp ∧ Tϕ(p) else ¬Vp

if R′ is defined by (6.10). For simplicity, let us assume that the Boolean state variables
added when constructing M ′ (i.e., elements of Vϕ ∪ Pϕ) are also OBDD variables. The
sequence of these variables ordered according to the OBDD ordering is denoted xvars(ϕ)
(the sequence represents a totally ordered set).
Since a transition constraint is a propositional formula, it can be normalised into
disjunctive normal form. Moreover, each disjunct can be further normalised such that
it contains at most one literal involving next and the literal occurs positively. Such
a normalised disjunct is called a simple transition constraint. The normalisation of a
disjunct can use the following transformation rules:
¬next(p) ≡ next(¬p), and
next(p) ∧ next(q) ≡ next(p ∧ q).
A transition constraint is in normal form if and only if it is in disjunctive normal form
and each disjunct is a simple transition constraint. A normalised transition constraint is
a transition constraint in normal form.
For a simple transition constraint ctr, the conjunction of the non-next literals in ctr
is called the guard of ctr, denoted guard(ctr), and if there is a literal of the form next(p)
in ctr, then p is called the post condition of ctr, denoted post(ctr). If ctr does not have
a next literal, then post(ctr) ≡ true. A transition (s′, t′) satisfies a simple transition
constraint ctr if and only if M ′, s′ |= guard(ctr) and M ′, t′ |= post(ctr), i.e.,
((s′, t′) |= c)⇔ (M ′, s′ |= guard(c)) ∧ (M ′, t′ |= post(c)).
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An augmented state s′ can transition to an augmented state t′ if and only if there is a
disjunct ctr of the normalised transition constraint characterising the tableau for ϕ such
that (s′, t′) |= ctr. A disjunct that contains next(false) as a literal can be removed from
a normalised transition constraint since no transition can satisfy the post condition false.
Let TCϕ represent the set of disjuncts of a normalised transition constraint charac-
terising the tableau for ϕ. Then the symbolic image and pre-image transfer functions in
M ′ for each elementary block b are defined as follows:
f ′b(I) ,
∨
ctr∈TCϕ
fb(ignore(xvars(ϕ), I ∧ guard(ctr))) ∧ post(ctr), (7.5)
r′b(O) ,
∨
ctr∈TCϕ
rb(ignore(xvars(ϕ), O ∧ post(ctr))) ∧ guard(ctr). (7.6)
Note that the normalisation procedure for the overall transition constraint TCϕ can
perform propositional simplification. In fact, with the use of OBDDs, some impossible
transitions are automatically removed. The Minato-Morreale algorithm developed by
Minato [Min93] based on the recursive operators of Morreale [Mor70] can be used to
produce disjunctive normal forms from OBDDs.
To illustrate the construction of a tableau on a concrete example, let us use the ϕ in
(6.2) as an example, using the TGBA encoding scheme:
ϕ ≡ FG(¬(Light = green)) ∨ FG(¬(Light = red)).
The set of elementary formulas, el(ϕ) would be
el(ϕ) = {FG¬(Light = green),G¬(Light = green),
FG¬(Light = red),G¬(Light = red)}.
Let
v1 denote VFG¬(Light=green),
v2 denote VG¬(Light=green),
v3 denote VFG¬(Light=red),
v4 denote VG¬(Light=red),
p1 denote PFG¬(Light=green), and
p2 denote PFG¬(Light=red).
Suppose R′ is defined by (6.10) (a loose encoding is used). For simplicity, let us further
suppose that the normalisation into disjunctive normal form is naive and considers each
c ∈ P(el(ϕ)) as a separate case independent of the other elements of P(el(ϕ)). The case
for c = {v2, v3} corresponds to the following transition constraint:
¬v1 ∧ v2 ∧ v3 ∧ ¬v4 ∧ Tϕ(G(¬(Light = green))) ∧ Tϕ(FG(¬(Light = red)))
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(since v2 denotes VG¬(Light=green) and v3 denotes VFG¬(Light=red)), which, when evaluated
using the rules for Tϕ and Sϕ, and simplified using propositional logic and the rule for
next, produces the normalised transition constraint
¬v1 ∧ v2 ∧ v3 ∧ ¬v4 ∧ ¬(Light = green) ∧ ¬(Light = red) ∧ next(v2 ∧ v4) ∨
¬v1 ∧ v2 ∧ v3 ∧ ¬v4 ∧ p2 ∧ ¬(Light = green) ∧ (Light = red) ∧ next(v2 ∧ v3),
which has two disjuncts. Each disjunct is a simple transition constraint with a guard and
a post condition. Let ctr1 be the first disjunct and ctr2 be the second disjunct. Then we
have:
guard(ctr1) ≡ ¬v1 ∧ v2 ∧ v3 ∧ ¬v4 ∧ ¬(Light = green) ∧ ¬(Light = red),
post(ctr1) ≡ v2 ∧ v4,
guard(ctr2) ≡ ¬v1 ∧ v2 ∧ v3 ∧ ¬v4 ∧ p2 ∧ ¬(Light = green) ∧ (Light = red),
post(ctr2) ≡ v2 ∧ v3.
Both ctr1 and ctr2 would become elements of TCϕ. The guards and post conditions would
be used to modify the image and pre-image transfer functions as specified by (7.5) and
(7.6).
7.1.3 Symbolic Counterexample Paths
Recall from Section 2.2.3, Lichtenstein and Pnueli [LP85] showed that ϕ is satisfiable in
M ′ if and only if there is a prefix to a self-fulfilling strongly connected component (SCC)
in the graph of states and transitions in M ′. A self-fulfilling cycle within the self-fulfilling
SCC can always be constructed, thus if ϕ is satisfiable in M ′, then there is a path pi′
in M ′ that satisfies ϕ of the form p · sω where p is a possibly empty finite sequence of
augmented states and s is a non-empty finite sequence of augmented states that forms a
self-fulfilling cycle that is repeated forever (pi′ is of the so-called lasso form). pi′ can be
projected to M to become pi with M,pi |= ϕ (pi retains the lasso form of pi′). Although
there may also be paths that satisfy ϕ that are not of the lasso form, such paths are
difficult to characterise and are of no practical interest.
A counterexample path of the form p · sω is difficult to read if the model M is large
because the value of each state variable must be specified at each state in the path.
An advantage of a symbolic setting is that a symbolic state (which represents a set of
states) often has a more concise characterisation than an explicit state. Also, with a
counterexample path of the form p · sω, there is no indication of how a state transitions
to the next state in the path. A counterexample path can be easier to comprehend if the
transitions are included at the level of the modelling notation used. Many model checkers
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present counterexample paths with these high-level transitions. In our framework, these
high-level transitions are represented by elementary blocks.
Definition 7.1 (Symbolic Counterexample Path). A symbolic counterexample path is a
triple:
(Ipi, ppi, spi)
where Ipi characterises a set of initial states, prefix ppi is a possibly empty finite sequence
of elementary blocks, and cycle spi is a non-empty finite sequences of elementary blocks
that is repeated forever. The elementary blocks represent high-level transitions.
Symbolic states after Ipi can be computed successively using the image transfer func-
tions for the corresponding elementary blocks in ppi and spi. For a symbolic counterex-
ample path in M ′, a symbolic state represents a set of augmented states and the image
transfer function used for an elementary block b is f ′b. A symbolic counterexample path
in M ′ can be projected to a symbolic counterexample path in M by projecting each
symbolic augmented state in the path.
If 〈SS0, SS1, SS2, ...〉 represents the sequence of symbolic augmented states in a sym-
bolic counterexample path, and 〈b0, b1, b2, ...〉 represents the sequence of transitions, then
the following must hold:
∀i ≥ 0 : (SSi+1 ≡ f ′bi(SSi)) ∧ (SSi ≡ r′bi(SSi+1)). (7.7)
As a consequence, if ppi = 〈bp1 , bp2 , ..., bpm〉 and spi = 〈bs1 , bs2 , ..., bsn〉 (where m ≥ 0 is the
length of the prefix and n > 0 is the length of the cycle), then the following must hold:
(SS0 ≡ Ipi)
∧ ∀i : 1 ≤ i ≤ m⇒ (SSi ≡ f ′bpi (SSi−1)) ∧ (SSi−1 ≡ r′bpi (SSi))
∧ ∀i : 1 ≤ i ≤ n⇒ (SSm+i ≡ f ′bsi (SSm+i−1)) ∧ (SSm+i−1 ≡ r′bsi (SSi))
∧ (SSm+n ≡ SSm).
(7.8)
Note that m can be 0 (ppi can be an empty sequence). Since each elementary block b is
deterministic, we have |f ′b(SS)| ≤ |SS| (the cardinality of the the image of SS under R′b
is not greater than the cardinality of SS). Thus all symbolic states in a cycle must have
the same cardinality.
During a search for a symbolic counterexample path, (7.8) may be temporarily vio-
lated. This is because a forward search involves making choices of elementary blocks for
transitions. As an example, suppose from a symbolic state SSi the prefix search chooses
elementary block bpi+1 as the transition. Some of the states in SSi might not be able to
transition through bpi+1 , thus the equivalence r
′
bpi+1
(f ′bpi+1 (SSi)) ≡ SSi might not be sat-
isfied, which means (7.8) might not be satisfied. Hence, once ppi, spi and SSm+n have been
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determined, the symbolic states in the path must be narrowed so that (7.8) is satisfied.
The symbolic states that are affected by spi are narrowed first as follows:
for i from n down to 1 do SSm+i−1 ← SSm+i−1 ∧ r′bsi (SSm+i). (7.9)
Note that we must have SSm+n 6≡ false. If the result of narrowing SSm results in
SSm+n 6≡ SSm, then we do not have a cycle and some recovery action is needed (see
Section 8.4 for an example recovery action).. Otherwise the symbolic states affected by
ppi are narrowed as follows:
for i from m down to 1 do SSi−1 ← SSi−1 ∧ r′bpi (SSi);
Ipi ← SS0.
(7.10)
7.2 Analyses within the Framework
7.2.1 Strategies for Model Checking
The LTL model checking framework described in Section 7.1 does not specify how model
checking and counterexample generation are to be performed. A range of approaches and
strategies can be applied within the framework. The complete analysis comprising model
checking and counterexample generation can be incremental, e.g., perform the following
tasks:
1. compute the set of reachable states,
2. compute the set of reachable “fair” states using the set of reachable states,
3. search for a counterexample path using the set of reachable fair states,
or it can be a single task as in on-the-fly LTL model checking, which directly searches for
a counterexample path.
In the incremental approach, the set of fair states is computed using fixpoint oper-
ations before the search for a counterexample path is performed. Strategically, there is
choice between determining reachability eagerly or lazily. Reachability determination can
be postponed until the search for a counterexample path, skipping the first task in the
above sequence and computing the set of fair states instead of the set of reachable fair
states. Regardless of the strategy for reachability, subsequent searches for counterexample
paths need not repeat the computation of fair states.
Two standard approaches for LTL model checking are:
• the fixpoint approach, and
84 CHAPTER 7. LTL MODEL CHECKING WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK
• the on-the-fly approach.
The following sections describes how the two approaches can be applied within our frame-
work.
7.2.2 The Fixpoint Approach
Symbolic model checking as originally proposed by McMillan [McM92], follows a fixpoint
approach first proposed by Emerson and Lei [EL86], using the fixpoint operations of µ-
calculus [Koz83]. Although the original symbolic model checker was for CTL with fairness
constraints, Clarke et al [CGMZ95] showed how LTL model checking can be encoded as a
model checking problem for CTL with fairness constraints. The fixpoint approach for LTL
model checking here is essentially that of Clarke et al, but is described directly in terms
of fixpoint and propositional operations. Fixpoint operations are explained in Section
3.3, and Algorithm 5.1 for computing reachability in Chapter 5 provides an example of
an implementation of a fixpoint operation.
Recall from Section 6.2 that as part of checking the satisfiability of ϕ, eventual con-
ditions are checked using a set Cϕ of fairness constraints.
Definition 7.2 (Fair States). An augmented state is said to be fair with respect to Cϕ
if it can start a path in which each of the fairness constraints in Cϕ is satisfied infinitely
often.
The set of fair states is denoted Fϕ, and has the following fixpoint characterisation
(see [McM92] where transition relations are used rather than pre-image functions under
transition relations):
Fϕ , νZ.
∧
c∈Cϕ
r′B(µY.(Z ∧ c) ∨ r′B(Y )). (7.11)
The actual computation of r′B(p) can be distributed among the elementary blocks using
r′b for each elementary block b. Equation (7.11) applies to all encoding schemes.
Theorem 7.1. An LTL formula ϕ is satisfiable in the underlying unaugmented model M
if and only if Fϕ ∧ Sϕ(ϕ) ∧ S0 is not false in the augmented model M ′.
Proof. The theorem is a symbolic formulation of Theorem 6.3 with paths constrained to
start at initial states characterised by S0. Theorem 6.3 states that a path pi satisfies ϕ
if and only if there exists a refinement pi′ of pi in M ′ which starts at an augmented state
that satisfies Sϕ(ϕ) and is fair with respect to Cϕ. The existence of such pi
′ that starts at
an augmented state in S0 can be determined from Fϕ ∧Sϕ(ϕ)∧S0 since Fϕ characterises
all augmented states that can start fair (with respect to Cϕ) paths.
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Since ϕ is the negation of the LTL formula model checked, Fϕ∧Sϕ(ϕ)∧S0 characterises
the set of augmented states that can start counterexample paths, hence the following
definition
Definition 7.3 (Initial counterexample states). Iϕ defined as
Iϕ , Fϕ ∧ Sϕ(ϕ) ∧ S0
characterises the set of initial counterexample states.
Equation (7.11) and Theorem 7.1 form the basis for symbolic LTL model checking
using the fixpoint approach. Both are independent of the encoding scheme. If Iϕ 6≡ false
then the existence of a counterexample path is guaranteed. States in a counterexample
path are necessarily reachable fair states. On the other hand, if Iϕ ≡ false, then there
is no counterexample, and the original LTL specification is satisfied by M . However,
Iϕ does not immediately give us a counterexample path. We still need to search for a
counterexample path.
The first method for generating a counterexample path given Cϕ, Fϕ and Iϕ was
developed by Clarke et al [CGMZ95] in the context of symbolic CTL model checking
with fairness constraints. The search for a counterexample path is guided by fair states
that satisfy fairness constraints. In our framework, the set of fair states that satisfy a
fairness constraint c ∈ Cϕ is characterised by c ∧ Fϕ. If Qci denotes the set of fair states
that can reach c ∧ Fϕ in exactly i steps, we have
Qc0 ← c ∧ Fϕ, and
Qci ← r′B(Qci−1) for i ≥ 1,
In [CGMZ95], Qci denotes the set of fair states that can reach c ∧ Fϕ in i or fewer steps
instead of exactly i steps. We could do the same thing by computing
Qc0 ← c ∧ Fϕ, and
Qci ← Qci−1 ∨ r′B(Qci−1) for i ≥ 1,
but it is not clear which approach is better. Perhaps the approach in [CGMZ95] takes
advantage of the fixpoint computation already performed. The rest of the search proceeds
as in [CGMZ95]. Narrowing using (7.9) and (7.10) needs to be performed on a potential
symbolic counterexample path.
The method of Clarke et al is not the only way to generate counterexample paths
once Iϕ is computed. A method for directed counterexample path generation that can be
performed after Fϕ is computed is proposed in Chapter 8.
Recall from Section 7.2.1 that different reachability strategies can be used in a fixpoint
approach to model checking. For general reachability, we have two basic strategies:
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1. Precompute the set of reachable states (reachable from S0) and use the information
for subsequent analysis. We call this strategy eager reachability strategy (ERS).
2. Do not precompute general reachability and compute fair states without any con-
cern for reachability. Reachability of fair states can be determined in subsequent
analysis. We call this strategy lazy reachability strategy (LRS).
There are also two basic strategies for reachability with respect to counterexample
path generation:
1. Precompute the set of reachable counterexample states (the set FCϕ of fair states
reachable from S0 ∧ Sϕ(ϕ)), and use FCϕ as the search space for counterexample
path generation. We call this strategy eager counterexample strategy (ECS).
2. Do not precompute the set of reachable counterexample states, and use Fϕ as
the search space for counterexample path generation. We call this strategy lazy
counterexample strategy (LCS).
7.2.3 On-the-fly Symbolic LTL Model Checking
The proposed on-the-fly symbolic model checking algorithm is an adaptation of the double
depth-first-search (double-DFS) algorithm [CVWY92] that is commonly associated with
an explicit automata approach in LTL model checking. No fixpoint computation of fair
states is needed. The algorithm searches for a counterexample path directly from the set
of initial states. Fairness is discovered on-the-fly in a depth-first search for a symbolic
counterexample path.
Algorithm 7.1. Standard Double-DFS Algorithm
dfs1(s) :
push(s, stk1);
for each successor s′ of s do
if s′ not in stk1 then dfs1(s′);
if s is an accepting state then dfs2(s);
pop(stk1);
dfs2(s) :
push(s, stk2);
for each successor s′ of s do
if s′ in stk1 then terminate(true);
else if s′ not in stk2 then dfs2(s′)
pop(stk2);
7.2. ANALYSES WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK 87
The basic double-DFS algorithm in [CVWY92] is shown as Algorithm 7.1 (but without
hashing). The procedure dfs1 searches for a reachable accepting state and the procedure
dfs2 searches for a cycle involving the reachable accepting state found. To use the algo-
rithm, dfs1 is invoked with each initial state until either success (when terminate(true)
is executed) or there is no more initial state to process. The algorithm implements an
emptiness check for a language of infinite paths. The language may be viewed as being ac-
cepted by a Bu¨chi automaton (BA) [Bu¨c60]. When the algorithm detects non-emptiness,
a witness for the non-emptiness can be produced from the contents of stk1 and stk2. In
our application, the witness corresponds to a counterexample path (a path satisfying ϕ).
The proposed on-the-fly symbolic LTL checking algorithm is an adaptation of the
standard double-DFS algorithm with the following important differences:
• The proposed algorithm works with symbolic transitions (using elementary blocks)
and symbolic states.
• The proposed algorithm constructs the Bu¨chi automaton implicitly and on-the-fly.
The proposed algorithm is first and foremost a search for a counterexample path
rather than simply an emptiness check for a language accepted by a BA. A search for a
counterexample path needs to keep track of fairness constraints fulfilled. As the num-
ber of fairness constraints becomes large, precise tracking of fairness constraints fulfilled
becomes infeasible. Here we follow an approach that is commonly used in moving from
a generalised Bu¨chi automaton (GBA) to a BA1: serialising the fulfillment of fairness
constraints in a specific order. The fairness constraints are placed in some order, say
c1, c2, ..., cn, and their fulfillment is strictly one by one in that order. A counter ctr is
used to keep track of fairness constraints fulfilled in the path considered so far. Initially,
no fairness constraint is fulfilled and ctr = 0. Thereafter, ctr = i means for all j such that
1 ≤ j ≤ i, cj has been fulfilled, but for all j such that i < j ≤ n, cj has not been recorded
as being fulfilled (although it might have been fulfilled). Using this method of imprecise
but safe tracking (if a fairness constraint has been recorded as being fulfilled, then it has
been fulfilled), the counter ctr is reset to 0 upon transition from a state in which ctr = n.
For our application, a state in a BA is an augmented state further augmented with the
counter ctr. An accepting state in the Bu¨chi automaton is a state with ctr = n.
Because the tracking of fairness constraints is imprecise, some counterexample paths
may not be recognised by the algorithm. However, if there is a counterexample path,
then there is one that is recognised by the algorithm because a counterexample path
1The GBA and the BA do not necessarily accept the same language. The GBA allows precise tracking
of fairness constraint and the BA corresponds to imprecise tracking.
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can always be “serialised” by transforming its cycle part (whose states belong to a “self-
fulfilling” strongly connected component) to one that fulfills the fairness constraints in
order. In general, the serialisation may result in a longer cycle.
Algorithm 7.2. Naive Symbolic On-the-fly LTL Counterexample Path Generation
dfs1(S, ctr) :
push((S, ctr), stk1);
for each b ∈ B do
push(b, bstk1);
if ctr = n then
S1 ← f ′b(S);
if (S1 6≡ false) ∧ ¬in((S1, 0), stk1) then dfs1(S1, 0);
else
S1 ← f ′b(S) ∧ C(ctr + 1);
if (S1 6≡ false) ∧ ¬in((S1, ctr + 1), stk1) then dfs1(S1, ctr + 1);
S1 ← f ′b(S) ∧ ¬C(ctr + 1);
if (S1 6≡ false) ∧ ¬in((S1, ctr), stk1) then dfs1(S1, ctr);
pop(bstk1);
if ctr = n then dfs2(S, n);
pop(stk1);
dfs2(S, ctr) :
push((S, ctr), stk2);
for each b ∈ B do
push(b, bstk2);
if ctr = n then
S1 ← f ′b(S);
if in((S1, 0), stk1) then terminate(S1, 0);
if (S1 6≡ false) ∧ ¬in((S1, 0), stk2) then dfs2(S1, 0);
else
S1 ← f ′b(S) ∧ C(ctr + 1);
if in((S1, ctr + 1), stk1) then terminate(S1, ctr + 1);
if (S1 6≡ false) ∧ ¬in((S1, ctr + 1), stk2) then dfs2(S1, ctr + 1);
S1 ← f ′b(S) ∧ ¬C(ctr + 1);
if in((S1, ctr), stk1) then terminate(S1, ctr);
if (S1 6≡ false) ∧ ¬in((S1, ctr), stk2) then dfs2(S1, ctr);
pop(bstk2);
pop(stk2);
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Algorithm 7.2 is to be invoked with dfs1(S0 ∧ Sϕ(ϕ), 0), and C is assumed to be an
array of fairness constraints with C(i) ≡ ci for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. The stacks stk1, bstk1, stk2,
bstk2 are initially empty. Termination via terminate means a counterexample path is
found. Further processing needs to be performed to obtain (Ipi, ppi, spi) from S0 ∧ Sϕ(ϕ),
stk1, bstk1, stk2, bstk2, and the symbolic state and index arguments of the terminate.
The stacks bstk1 and bstk2 contain the symbolic transitions, while stk1 and stk2 contain
the provisional symbolic states between symbolic transitions. Note that upon termination
via terminate, length(bstk1) = length(stk1) and length(bstk2) = length(stk2). The
algorithm terminates (via terminate or otherwise) since the model is finite and n is
finite.
If Algorithm 7.2 terminates via terminate with symbolic state SS and index ii, the
cycle part of a symbolic counterexample path spi can be computed as follows:
• j ← stackIndex((SS, ii), stk1);
• spi ← append(substack(bstk1, j), bstk2);
where stackIndex((SS, ii), stk1) gives the length of the prefix of stk1 up to and including
(SS, ii), substack(bstk1, j) gives the prefix of bstk1 of length j, and append is the sequence
append operation. Note that we assume that when a stack is treated as a sequence, a push
operation pushes an element to the tail end of the sequence. Let stk3 and bstk3 be the
results of popping j times the stacks stk1 and bstk1 respectively. Then ppi ← bstk3. Let
i = length(stk3), stk3 = 〈(SS0, ii0), ..., (SSi−1, iii−1)〉, ppi = 〈bp1 , ..., bpm〉 and SSi ≡ SS.
Then after narrowing symbolic states using (7.10), the narrowed SS0 becomes Ipi.
In Algorithm 7.2, the operation in((SS, ii), stk) simply checks to see if (SS, ii) is an
entry in the stack stk. A less naive algorithm can use a subsumption test instead of
equality when checking if (SS, ii) is a stack entry so that in((SS, ii), stk) is equivalent
to there exists an entry (SSS, ii) in stk such that SSS ∧ SS ≡ SS. However, the
resulting cycle needs to have the symbolic states narrowed and the narrowed initial and
final symbolic states in the cycle need to be identical (see Section 7.1.3). Otherwise, spi
does not necessarily produce a valid cycle.
Theorem 7.2. ϕ is satisfiable in M ′ if and only if Algorithm 7.2 terminates via termi-
nate when invoked with dfs1(S0 ∧ Sϕ(ϕ), 0).
Proof. The only differences between Algorithm 7.2 and Algorithm 7.1 (whose correctness
has been shown in [CVWY92]) are:
• Algorithm 7.2 uses symbolic transitions and symbolic states, and
• Algorithm 7.2 constructs the Bu¨chi automaton on-the-fly.
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A set of Bu¨chi automaton states is represented by a pair consisting of a symbolic state
S and a counter ctr. Whereas a successor s′ of a BA state is chosen directly from the
BA, Algorithm 7.2 implicitly constructs the BA on-the-fly, and breaks the handling of
successors into three cases:
1. The case where ctr = n (which means the symbolic state is an accepting state),
the successor must have ctr = 0 regardless of fairness constraints satisfied in the
successor.
2. The case where ctr = i, 0 ≤ i < n, and the successor symbolic state satisfies
C(i+ 1), ctr is incremented to i+ 1.
3. The case where ctr = i, 0 ≤ i < n, and the successor symbolic state does not satisfy
C(i+ 1), ctr remains at i.
The three cases represent the serialisation of fulfillment of fairness constraints. The use of
symbolic states simply means the enumeration of explicit states is avoided or postponed.
A symbolic state in the search (which in the algorithm is checked to be not equivalent
to false) represents a non-empty set of states. The explicit states in the symbolic state
are exactly those that can be reached from any state satisfying Sϕ(ϕ) ∧ S0 through the
transitions (elementary blocks) chosen up to that point.
Partial order reduction [PWW96] can be used to reduce the search space in on-the-
fly LTL checking. [HPY96] shows how the double-DFS algorithm can be modified to
accommodate partial order reduction in explicit on-the-fly model checking. To accom-
modate partial order reduction in a symbolic setting, Algorithm 7.2 needs to be similarly
modified.
A variation of the on-the-fly approach might be an “iterative deepening” search for
counterexamples, achieved by placing a depth limit in the depth-first search, and itera-
tively increasing the depth limit.
7.3 Summary
This chapter described how the conceptual foundation for LTL model checking from
Chapter 6 can be applied using the state machine framework of Chapter 3. The result is
a symbolic framework for LTL model checking and counterexample generation that ac-
commodates various approaches and strategies, including on-the-fly LTL model checking
as well as the traditional fixpoint approach. A novel idea proposed in this chapter is that
of on-the-fly symbolic LTL model checking.
Chapter 8
Directed Counterexample Path
Generation
With on-the-fly LTL model checking, the search for a counterexample path is a blind
search, while the method of Clarke et al [CGMZ95] performs a search that is guided by
states that satisfy fairness constraints. Without modification, such searches correspond to
blunt instruments that cannot be directed towards or away from specific cases of interest.
In this chapter, a method for symbolic counterexample path generation that involves a
goal-directed search is proposed.
Section 8.1 gives a motivating example for directed counterexample path generation.
Section 8.2 outlines the proposed method for directed counterexample path generation.
Sections 8.3 and 8.4 provide details of the proposed method. Section 8.5 discusses possible
uses of directed counterexample path generation.
8.1 A Motivating Example
Consider the BT example in Figure 8.1 representing a simple hypothetical system, chosen
to illustrate the capabilities required for directed search. The system has three subsystems
— SubA, SubB and SubC — and two critical components: CompA and CompB. After
CompA and CompB are initialised, five threads are spawned. Two of the threads allow
components CompA and CompB to fail, and the other three control the operations of
subsystems SubA, SubB and SubC. The operation of subsystem SubA, represented by BT
nodes 7 through 11, requires both CompA and CompB to be operational. The operation
of SubB, represented by BT nodes 12 through 15, requires CompA to be operational.
The operation of SubC, represented by BT nodes 16 through 18, does not require either
component to be operational. External events (indicated by 〉〉event〈〈) and prioritisation
of system transitions over external events (explained in Section 4.6.4) are used in the
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Figure 8.1: A Motivating Example
model to prevent race conditions.
When the system is operating failure-free, CompA and CompB would be operational,
indicated in the BT model by both CompA and CompB having the value op after their
initialisation in BT nodes 1 and 2. Failure-free operation of the system can be formalised
as the LTL formula:
G((PC1 = 1) ∨ (CompA = op) ∧ (CompB = op)). (8.1)
The state formula (PC1 = 1) characterises the set of starting states before CompA and
CompB are initialised (the BT translation described in Chapter 4 does not assume that
state variables are initialised, thus there may be many possible starting states).
Suppose we want to know if subsystem SubC can still operate after a component fails.
The continued operation of SubC is represented in the BT model by a cycle that goes
through BT node 18 (which is a reversion back to the BT node 16, meaning the effect
of executing BT node 18 is the same as the effect of executing BT node 16). Thus, the
continued operation of SubC after a component failure is indicated by a counterexample
to the LTL formula (8.1) whose cycle goes through BT node 18. This motivates the idea
of a cycle constraint in a counterexample path.
Definition 8.1 (Cycle Constraint). We define a cycle constraint cc in a symbolic coun-
terexample path to be a state formula that must be satisfied by at least one symbolic
state in the cycle part of the counterexample path.
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For continued operation of SubC, cc ≡ (PC6 = 3) would be sufficient. This is because
• system transitions are prioritised over external events in the model, and
• each iteration of a thread in the model goes through at least one external event,
thus when the thread for SubC is at (PC6 = 3) (at the entrance to BT node 18), the
other threads would all be waiting for external events, and since the execution of BT
node 18 is considered a system transition, the other threads would all be blocked leaving
the execution of BT node 18 as the only possible transition.
An example symbolic counterexample path for (8.1) that satisfies the cycle constraint
(PC6 = 3) is the following:
Ipi ≡ (PC1 = 1) ∧ (PC2 = 0) ∧ (PC3 = 0) ∧ (PC4 = 0)
∧ (PC5 = 0) ∧ (PC6 = 0),
ppi = 〈(1, 2), 7, 12, 16, 3, 4, 17〉,
spi = 〈18, 17〉.
The counterexample path was in fact produced by a prototype described in Section 9.1.
The counterexample path can be read as: after initialisations of CompA and CompB,
each of the subsystems advances to its wait-for-event state, CompA then fails and SubC
proceeds indefinitely in a cycle. The counterexample path corresponds to CompA failing
and SubC keeps on operating, and shows how it can happen.
The above counterexample involves CompA failing. Suppose now we would like to
know if there are counterexamples to (8.1) in which SubC keeps on operating but CompA
does not fail. A global constraint can be used here.
Definition 8.2 (Global Constraint). We define a global constraint gc in a counterexample
path to be a state formula that must be satisfied by all states in the counterexample path.
By specifying gc ≡ ¬(CompA = failed) as well as cc ≡ (PC6 = 3), we are specifying
constraints for a counterexample to (8.1) in which CompA does not fail and SubC keeps
on operating.
When asked to find a symbolic counterexample path to (8.1) that satisfies the cycle
constraint (PC6 = 3) and the global constraint ¬(CompA = failed), the prototype
produced a symbolic counterexample path with Ipi and spi as above, and
ppi = 〈(1, 2), 7, 12, 16, 5, 6, 17〉.
This corresponds to CompB failing instead of CompA. The global constraint essentially
directs the search for a counterexample away from cases where CompA fails.
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Cycle constraints can also be used to direct the search for a counterexample path
towards a specific set of components failing. As an example, we can specify cc ≡ (PC6 =
3)∧(CompA = failed)∧(CompB = failed) to direct the search towards a counterexample
path where SubC still operates after CompA and CompB both failed. When asked
to find a symbolic counterexample path that satisfies cc ≡ (PC6 = 3) ∧ (CompA =
failed) ∧ (CompB = failed), the prototype produced a symbolic counterexample path
with Ipi and spi as above and
ppi = 〈(1, 2), 7, 12, 16, 3, 4, 5, 6, 17〉.
The prefix is longer than in the previous two counterexample paths since now both
components need to fail before the cycle is reached.
Suppose now we direct the search for a counterexample path for (8.1) with the cycle
constraint (PC5 = 3). The prototype produced the following symbolic counterexample
path:
Ipi ≡ (PC1 = 1) ∧ (PC2 = 0) ∧ (PC3 = 0) ∧ (PC4 = 0)
∧ (PC5 = 0) ∧ (PC6 = 0),
ppi = 〈(1, 2), 7, 12, 16, 5, 6, (13, 14)〉,
spi = 〈15, (13, 14)〉.
The counterexample path corresponds to CompB failing and SubB keeps on operating.
If we direct the search for a counterexample path for (8.1) with cc ≡ (PC5 = 3) and
gc ≡ ¬(CompB = failed) then no counterexample path would be found. Similarly, for
the case where SubA keeps on operating, there is no counterexample to (8.1).
8.2 Method Outline
The proposed method for directed symbolic counterexample path generation is invoked
with two parameters:
• cc - a state formula (a proposition without temporal operations) specifying a con-
straint that must be satisfied by a symbolic state in the cycle part of the symbolic
counterexample path (all states in the symbolic state must satisfy cc). A cc value
of true means there is no cycle constraint.
• gc - a state formula specifying a global constraint (all states in the symbolic coun-
terexample path must satisfy gc). A gc value of true means there is no global
constraint.
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The two parameters direct the search for a counterexample path. Neither of the two
parameters can be false.
The basic strategy in the search for a counterexample path is as follows:
• Find a cycle in which all fairness constraints are fulfilled, which visits a symbolic
state that satisfies gc ∧ cc (i.e., all states in the symbolic state satisfy gc ∧ cc), and
in which all the symbolic states satisfy gc. The cycle found produces spi.
• Find a prefix ppi from a symbolic state that satisfies Sϕ(ϕ) ∧ S0 ∧ gc to the cy-
cle. If found, the prefix determines Ipi and completes the generation of a symbolic
counterexample path.
The symbolic state that functions as a starting point for the search is SB0. If the
method is invoked after Fϕ has been computed, then SB0 is initialised as follows:
SB0 ← gc ∧ cc ∧ Fϕ.
Otherwise SB0 is initialised as follows:
SB0 ← gc ∧ cc.
SB0 in effect becomes the cycle constraint.
8.3 Cycle Search
The method searches for the cycle part of a symbolic counterexample path first. The
cycle search consists of the following stages:
• Search backward from SB0 to find a starting point for “choosing” a cycle, while
partitioning the possible intermediate symbolic states in the cycle based on the
fairness constraints to be fulfilled.
• From the starting point found, choose transitions (elementary blocks) to form a
candidate cycle, using the partitioned possible intermediate symbolic states.
• Narrow and validate the the symbolic states in the candidate cycle (see Section
7.1.3 for why this is needed).
The cycle search described here uses precise tracking of fairness constraints. If the
number of fairness constraints is large, imprecise tracking, e.g., via the serialisation tech-
nique as in Section 7.2.3, can be used instead to avoid the exponential complexity of
precise tracking.
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Possible intermediate states are partitioned. At each step in the backward search stage
of the cycle, the symbolic state is partitioned based on the fairness constraints fulfilled
in paths from the symbolic state to SB0. There are 2
k partitions at each step i, denoted
Pi(cmb) where each index cmb is a subset of Cϕ, and k = |Cϕ|. The partition Pi(cmb)
represents states that can transition to states in SB0 in exactly i steps with exactly the
fairness constraints in cmb fulfilled along the path (inclusive of the end points). P0 is
initialised as follows:
for cmb ⊆ Cϕ do
P0(cmb)← SB0 ∧
∧
c∈Cϕ if c ∈ cmb then c else ¬c.
Procedure 8.1, when successful (via terminate(success)), produces a positive integer n
and partitions Pi(cmb) for 0 ≤ i ≤ n and cmb ⊆ Cϕ. It is invoked after initialisation of P0,
using cycle-stage1(1). Termination other than through terminate(success) is considered
a failure, and restart(cycle-stage-1(1)) abandons the current search and restarts a new
search (with revised SB0 and P0). The variables SB0, n, and Pi(cmb) for 0 ≤ i ≤
n, cmb ⊆ Cϕ, are global variables.
Procedure 8.1. Cycle Search Stage 1
cycle-stage1(i) :
SBi ← r′B(SBi−1) ∧ gc;
for each cmb ⊆ Cϕ do
Pi(cmb)← SBi ∧
(∧
c∈Cϕ\cmb ¬c
)
∧∨t⊆cmb (r′B(Pi−1(t)) ∧∧c∈cmb\t c) ;
if (Pi(Cϕ) ∧ SB0) ≡ SB0 then
n← i;
terminate(success);
if (Pi(Cϕ) ∧ SB0) 6≡ false then
SB0 ← Pi(Cϕ) ∧ SB0;
for each cmb ⊆ Cϕ do
P0(cmb)← SB0 ∧
∧
c∈Cϕ if c ∈ cmb then c else ¬c;
restart(cycle-stage-1(1));
if ¬∃j : i > j ≥ 0 ∧ ∀cmb ⊆ Cϕ : Pi(cmb) ≡ Pj(cmb) then
cycle-stage-1(i+ 1);
In the case where (Pi(Cϕ)∧SB0) 6≡ SB0 but (Pi(Cϕ)∧SB0) 6≡ false, SB0 is narrowed
and the backward search is restarted. This step solves the problem of SB0 possibly
containing states that cannot be in cycles (and thus cannot be the starting point for
choosing a cycle). This step also tends to favour short cycles.
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Theorem 8.1. If Procedure 8.1 terminates successfully via terminate(success), then
the resulting SB0 characterises a non-empty subset of the set characterised by the original
SB0, and from any state in the resulting SB0, there is a path with exactly n transitions
to a state in SB0, where all fairness constraints in Cϕ are fulfilled in the path. Otherwise
Procedure 8.1 terminates unsuccessfully. Note that only states that satisfy the global
constraint gc are considered.
Proof. For the first part of Theorem 8.1 (where Procedure 8.1 terminates successfully),
we first prove (8.2).
∀0 ≤ i ≤ n, cmb ⊆ Cϕ : ∀s ∈ Pi(cmb) :
∃p : p is a path from s, of exactly i transitions, to a state in SB0
and for each c ∈ Cϕ : c is fulfilled in p iff c ∈ cmb.
(8.2)
The proof of (8.2) is by induction on i.
• Case i = 0 (base case). This follows from the initialisation of P0 if Procedure 8.1 is
never restarted or from the last assignment of P0 if there is a restart.
• Case i > 0. This follows from the assignment
Pi(cmb)← SBi ∧
 ∧
c∈Cϕ\cmb
¬c
 ∧ ∨
t⊆cmb
r′B(Pi−1(t)) ∧ ∧
c∈cmb\t
c
 ;
in Procedure 8.1. The induction hypothesis assures us that Pi−1(t) contains exactly
the states that can transition to SB0 in exactly i − 1 transitions with exactly the
fairness constraints in t fulfilled in the path to SB0. A fairness constraint c not in
cmb cannot be fulfilled in a state in Pi(cmb) or in a path of i− 1 transitions from a
state in Pi−1(t) to a state in SB0 for all t ⊆ cmb, thus cannot be fulfilled in a path
of i transitions from a state in Pi(cmb) to a state in SB0. The above assignment
also guarantees that a state s in Pi(cmb) can transition to a state in Pi−1(t) where
t ⊆ cmb and any c ∈ cmb that is not fulfilled by s is in t. Thus Pi(cmb) contains
exactly those state from which there are paths of exactly i transitions to SB0 where
all fairness constraints in cmb are fulfilled.
If Procedure 8.1 terminates successfully, then SB0 is a subset of Pn(Cϕ), and from (8.2)
we can conclude that from any state in SB0 there is a path of n transitions to a state in
SB0 with all the fairness constraints in Cϕ are fulfilled in the path.
The second part of Theorem 8.1 is guaranteed by the “visited check”:
if ¬∃j : i > j ≥ 0 ∧ ∀cmb ⊆ Cϕ : Pi(cmb) ≡ Pj(cmb)
and the finiteness of the model.
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If Procedure 8.1 terminates successfully, then the second stage — represented by
Procedure 8.2 — can start. Procedure 8.2 produces a provisional cycle represented by
transitions b1, ..., bn and intermediate symbolic states SS0, ..., SSn. It is invoked using
cycle-stage2(1) after SS0 and cmb0 are initialised as follows:
SS0 ← SB0;
cmb0 ← Cϕ.
The variables b1, ..., bn, SS0, ..., SSn and cmb0, ..., cmbn are global variables.
Procedure 8.2. Cycle Search Stage 2
cycle-stage2(i) :
for each b ∈ B, t ⊆ cmbi−1 do
SSi ← f ′b(SSi−1 ∧
∧
c∈cmbi−1\t c) ∧ Pn−i(t);
if SSi 6≡ false then
bi ← b;
cmbi ← t;
if i = n then terminate(success);
else cycle-stage2(i+ 1);
Theorem 8.2. If invoked after a successful Procedure 8.1, Procedure 8.2 terminates
successfully.
Proof. At every iteration (recursive call) of Procedure 8.2, the choice of elementary block
bi and combination cmbi (which means partition Pn−i(cmbi) is chosen) together with (8.2)
ensure success without any need to backtrack (cmbi represents fairness constraints to be
fulfilled starting from the next iteration).
After Procedure 8.2 terminates via terminate(success), SS0, ..., SSn and b1, ..., bn
represent a provisional cycle. The provisional symbolic states must be narrowed as follows:
for i from n down to 1 do SSi−1 ← SSi−1 ∧ r′bi(SSi).
After narrowing the symbolic states, the equivalence SS0 ≡ SSn is checked. If the
equivalence holds, then the cycle search is successful, with spi ← 〈b1, ..., bn〉, and the
prefix search can begin.
8.4 Prefix Search
If the SS0 from the cycle search gives us (SS0 ∧ S0) 6≡ false, then an empty prefix has
been found and we assign ppi ← 〈〉 and Ipi ← SS0 ∧ S0. Since the starting symbolic state
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for the cycle is now Ipi, SS0 must be adjusted: SS0 ← Ipi, and the symbolic states in the
cycle further narrowed. It is possible, although unlikely in practice, that the resulting
SS0 is not equivalent to the resulting SSn. In such a case, (Ipi, ppi, spi) is still a symbolic
counterexample path (since all states in the original unnarrowed cycle can participate in
the cycle and remain in the original cycle), but the cycle is of length a multiple of n. The
intermediate symbolic states in the cycle can be computed as follows:
SS0 ← Ipi;
j ← 0;
repeat
for i from 1 to n do
SSjn+i ← f ′bi(SSjn+i−1);
j ← j + 1;
until SSjn ≡ SS0
The real length of the cycle is jn.
If (SS0 ∧ S0) ≡ false, then a search for a prefix to the cycle must be performed. The
search for a prefix to the cycle also consists of a backward search stage followed by a
forward “choosing” stage, but the stages are simpler than the corresponding stages for
the cycle search because there is no need to track fairness constraints, thus the restricted
possible intermediate symbolic states in the prefix need not be partitioned. The symbolic
state that functions as the starting point for the backward search is SP0, initialised as
follows:
SP0 ← SS0.
The backward search stage of finding a prefix is represented by Procedure 8.3. Procedure
8.3, when successful (via terminate(success)), produces a positive integer m representing
the length of the prefix, and SP0, ..., SPm representing the restricted possible intermediate
symbolic states. After the initialisation of SP0, it is invoked using prefix-stage1(1).
Procedure 8.3. Prefix Search Stage 1
prefix-stage1(i) :
SPi ← r′B(SPi−1) ∧ gc;
SPi ∧ S0 6≡ false then
m← i;
terminate(success)
if ¬∃j : i > j ≥ 0 ∧ (SPi ≡ SPj) then
prefix-stage-1(i+ 1);
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Theorem 8.3. If Procedure 8.3 terminates successfully, then from any state in the
resulting SPm, there is a path with exactly m transitions to a state in SP0. Otherwise
Procedure 8.3 terminates with failure.
Proof. For the first part of Theorem 8.3 (where Procedure 8.3 terminates successfully),
we first prove (8.3).
∀0 ≤ i ≤ m : ∀s ∈ SPi :
∃p : p is a path from s, of exactly i transitions, to a state in SP0.
(8.3)
The proof of (8.3) is by induction on i.
• Case i = 0 (base case). This is trivial.
• Case i > 0. This follows from the assignment
SPi ← r′B(SPi−1) ∧ gc;
in Procedure 8.1. The induction hypothesis assures us that SPi−1 contains exactly
the states that can transition to SP0 in exactly i− 1 transitions.
The first part of Theorem 8.3 follows directly from (8.3).
The second part of Theorem 8.3 is guaranteed by the “visited check”:
if ¬∃j : i > j ≥ 0 ∧ (SPi ≡ SPj)
and the finiteness of the model.
If Procedure 8.3 terminates via terminate(success), then a prefix can be found and
the second stage, represented by Procedure 8.4, can start. The starting point for the
choosing stage is the symbolic state SSS0, initialised as follows:
SSS0 ← SPm ∧ S0.
After initialisation, Procedure 8.4 is invoked using prefix-stage2(1).
Procedure 8.4. Prefix Search Stage 2
prefix-stage2(i) :
for each b ∈ B do
SSSi ← f ′b(SSSi−1) ∧ SPm−i;
if SSSi 6≡ false then
bi ← b;
if i = m then
terminate(success);
else
prefix-stage2(i+ 1);
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Theorem 8.4. If invoked after a successful Procedure 8.3, Procedure 8.4 terminates
successfully.
Proof. At every iteration (recursive call) of Procedure 8.4, the choice of elementary block
bi together with (8.3) ensure success without any need to backtrack.
After Procedure 8.3 is successful, invocation of Procedure 8.4 will terminate success-
fully, with SSS0, ..., SSSm and b1, ..., bm representing a provisional prefix. The provisional
symbolic states must be narrowed as follows:
for i from m down to 1 do SSSi−1 ← SSSi−1 ∧ r′bi(SSSi).
After narrowing the symbolic states for the prefix, we have Ipi ← SSS0 and ppi ←
〈b1, ..., bm〉, and SS0 must be adjusted: SS0 ← SSSm, and the symbolic states in the
cycle further narrowed. It is possible, although unlikely in practice, that the resulting
SS0 is not equivalent to the resulting SSn, just like in the null prefix case. The treatment
for when SS0 6≡ SSn is similar to the null prefix case, but with SS0 ← SSSm instead of
SS0 ← Ipi.
Although it is possible to get variations of directed counterexample search that guar-
antee the production of a counterexample path satisfying the constraints if one exists, it
may be preferable to not provide the guarantee and use a fixpoint approach to verify the
absence of counterexample paths. For example, to ensure that there are no counterex-
ample paths satisfying the global constraint gc, then the fixpoint computation
νZ.
∧
c∈Cϕ
gc ∧ r′B(µY.(gc ∧ Z ∧ c) ∨ gc ∧ r′B(Y ))
can be performed with Z initialised to Fϕ. The intersection of the result with S0 and
Sϕ(ϕ) can be checked for emptiness. Note that it is not sufficient to check only S0 ∧
Sϕ(ϕ) ∧ Fϕ ∧ gc.
8.5 Using Directed Counterexample Generation
The example in Section 8.1 illustrates a case where directed counterexample path genera-
tion can be useful. Although the model in the example is a simplified model, it illustrates
concepts that can be used in larger and more realistic models.
The global constraint gc in directed counterexample path generation provides a simple
and efficient way of ruling out certain parts of the model from counterexamples. One
systematic way of finding multiple counterexamples of interest is as follows:
1. Let the model checker find the first counterexample.
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2. Based on the counterexample found, determine certain parts of the model to rule out
from subsequent counterexamples. Characterise those parts as a global constraint
gc1.
3. Set gc← ¬gc1, i← 2.
4. Let directed counterexample path generation find a counterexample with the global
constraint gc.
5. If a counterexample path is found, determine more parts of the model to rule out
from subsequent counterexamples. Characterise the parts as a global constraint
gci, set gc← gc ∧ ¬gci, i← i+ 1 and repeat from step 4.
6. Otherwise use the fixpoint computation as in Section 8.4 with global constraint gc
to verify that there are no more counterexamples.
If step 2 can be automated, then the generation of multiple counterexamples can be
automated. Whether step 2 can be automated depends on the problem domain. An
example application where step 2 can be automated is described in Section 9.5
In Section 8.1 we saw how cycle constraints can be used to rule in certain parts of the
model in the cycle parts of counterexample paths. Setting cc to some value other than
true may be useful even if we are not interested in the cycle part of a counterexample
path. For example, if we know that the system has a main loop, then specifying cc to
correspond to a point in the main loop may speed up the search for a counterexample
path. For BT models, an obvious candidate for the point is a reversion BT node. Thus,
suppose elementary block b corresponds to the reversion BT node, PC(b) = PCi and
PCval(b) = vali; then we would specify cc to be PCi = vali.
8.6 Summary
In this chapter, a novel technique for directed counterexample path generation has been
presented. The mechanism allows a search for a counterexample path to be directed
away from certain parts of the model and/or towards certain parts of the model. The
mechanism is intended to support a controlled and incremental generation of multiple
counterexample paths.
Chapter 9
Experiments with a Prototype
As a proof of concept, a prototype LTL model checker that incorporates the ideas pro-
posed in this thesis has been developed. A brief description of the prototype appears in
Section 9.1. Experiments were performed with the prototype for the following purposes:
• To demonstrate the utility of directed counterexample path generation in ruling in
or ruling out certain classes of counterexamples.
• To confirm that using directed counterexample path generation in an incremental
approach to generating multiple counterexamples is more efficient than the approach
whereby the LTL specification is modified and the model checker is rerun.
• To examine the effect of choice of reachability strategy on the performance (execu-
tion time) of directed counterexample path generation.
• To assess the viability of mixing and matching directed counterexample path gener-
ation with other techniques, in particular with the symbolic on-the-fly LTL model
checking technique described in Section 7.2.3.
The utility of directed counterexample path generation is partially demonstrated by
the example in Section 8.1. However, the example is small. Larger examples were tried
to assess how directed counterexample path generation scales up. We hypothesise that
directed counterexample path generation scales up as well as model checking using the
fixpoint approach. These examples are described in Sections 9.2 and 9.3.
Sections 9.2 and 9.3 also provide timing comparisons between the incremental ap-
proach using directed counterexample path generation versus the approach whereby the
LTL specification is modified and the model checker is rerun. A favourable timing com-
parison strengthens the case for the directed counterexample path generation approach.
This is in addition to other advantages of the directed counterexample path generation
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approach, including being less prone to error because of its simplicity when compared to
modifying the LTL specification.
The effects of different reachability strategies on directed counterexample path gen-
eration are examined in Sections 9.2 and 9.3. The main decisions with respect to reach-
ability strategy in LTL model checking using the fixpoint approach and the subsequent
counterexample path generation are:
• Whether to compute the set of reachable states and use the set to directly compute
the set of reachable fair states or simply compute the set of fair states Fϕ. (Recall
from Section 7.2.2 that the strategy whereby the set of reachable states is computed
and used to compute the set of reachable fair states is called the eager reachability
strategy, and the strategy whereby the set Fϕ of fair states is computed without
computing the set of reachable states first is called the lazy reachability strategy.)
• Whether or not to compute the set FCϕ of fair states reachable from Fϕ ∧ Sϕ(ϕ) ∧
S0. If FCϕ is computed, then directed counterexample path generation initialises
SB0 as follows: SB0 ← gc ∧ cc ∧ FCϕ, where gc represents a global constraint
and cc represents a cycle constraint (see Section 8.2 for the roles of SB0, gc and
cc in directed counterexample path generation). (Recall from Section 7.2.2 that
the strategy whereby FCϕ is computed is called the eager counterexample strategy,
and the strategy whereby FCϕ is not computed is called the lazy counterexample
strategy.)
The symbolic on-the-fly LTL model checking technique described in Section 7.2.3 can
sometimes find a counterexample path much faster than the fixpoint approach, but the
counterexample path found tends to have a much longer prefix and cycle than necessary.
Experiments were conducted to assess the viability of using directed counterexample
path generation as a post-processor to improve the counterexample path found by the
on-the-fly technique. These experiments are described in Section 9.4.
9.1 The Prototype
The prototype is written in ANSI Common Lisp and includes its own ordered binary
decision diagram (OBDD) package with the capability to output formulas directly from
OBDDs in disjunctive normal form or conjunctive normal form using the Minato-Morreale
algorithm [Min93,Mor70].
The prototype includes a translator from a substantial subset of BT to elementary
blocks as described in Chapter 4. The prototype allows the BT translation to either
prioritise system transitions over external events or not prioritise at all.
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Directed counterexample path generation has been implemented in the prototype with
an interface that allows the analyst to specify the entrance of a BT node to become part
of the cycle constraint cc. For the example in Figure 8.1, the analyst can simply specify
BT node 18, and the interface automatically adds PC6 = 3 as a conjunction to cc.
The symbolic on-the-fly LTL model checking technique described in Section 7.2.3 has
been implemented in the prototype. The implementation allows a global constraint gc to
be specified, in which case the search space is restricted to states satisfying gc.
All of the experiments were performed on a notebook computer with an Intel i7-
3740QM processor and 16GB of RAM running 64-bit Ubuntu 14.04. The Common Lisp
used was Steel Bank Common Lisp version 1.1.9.
9.2 An Example from a Case Study
Experiments were conducted using an example from a case study on model-based safety
risk assessment [LWK12] for the following purposes:
• To assess how directed counterexample path generation scales up. We hypothesise
that directed counterexample path generation scales up as well as model checking
using the fixpoint approach.
• To confirm that an incremental approach using directed counterexample path gen-
eration is more efficient than modifying the LTL specification and rerunning the
model checker.
• To examine the effect of reachability strategy on directed counterexample path
generation.
The system in the case study is part of a command and control system for drop missions of
a firefighting aircraft. A drop solution for a mission is calculated based on meteorological
and navigational data. Meteorological data is sent from a command centre through a
data link with backup through voice communication. The entire case study is available
on the web at http://itee.uq.edu.au/sse/afms/.
The model used as an example here is the model at the second stage of the risk
assessment process (the model is called Model 2 on the web). The BT model has 79
BT nodes, 10 threads, and 260 states. The model has system transitions prioritised over
external events. At this stage of the process, functional failures such as the data link
going down are included in the model.
Several hazardous situations were formulated in the original case study. For the
example here, we choose the hazard where a drop solution is calculated with out-of-date
106 CHAPTER 9. EXPERIMENTS WITH A PROTOTYPE
meteorological data.
?PC4=3
DataLink
?status=down?
2.3
?PC4=4
VoiceLink
[sendMetData]2.4
?PC4=5
MetData
[pending]
2.5
?PC4=6
Operator
〉〉EnterMetData〈〈2.6
?PC4=7
MetData
[stored]
2.7
?PC4=8
UpdateMetData
[start]
2.8 ∧
?PC7=5
PrepareDS
[start]
9.4
?PC7=6
Calculator
[CalculateDS]
9.5
?PC7=7
DropSolution
[computed]
9.6
?PC7=9
Operator
〉〉RejectDS〈〈9.8
?PC7=10
PrepareDS
[start]
9.9 ∧
?PC7=13
Operator
〉〉EnterExCmd〈〈9.17
?PC7=14
PrepareDS
[start]
9.18 =>
?PC7=20
Operator
〉〉EnterExCmd〈〈9.26
?PC7=21
PrepareDS
[start]
9.27 =>
Figure 9.1: Fragments of the BT Model
The fragment at the top of the second column in Figure 9.1 is where the drop solution
is calculated in the BT model (it is calculated with the execution of BT node 9.5). Out-
of-date meteorological data is represented by MetData = Pending, thus the hazard H
where a drop solution is calculated with out-of-date meteorological data can be formulated
as follows:
H ≡ ¬(Calculator = CalculateDS)
∧ MetData = Pending
∧ X(Calculator = CalculateDS).
The formula G(¬H) states that the hazard H does not occur in any behaviour:
G(¬(¬(Calculator = CalculateDS)
∧MetData = Pending
∧ X(Calculator = CalculateDS))).
(9.1)
A counterexample found in model checking (9.1) represents a behaviour in which the
hazard H occurs. Different situations that lead to the hazard are represented by different
counterexamples.
9.2.1 The Original Approach
In the original case study, SAL [dMOS03] was used as the model checker. The BT-to-SAL
translator mentioned in Section 4.1 was used to translate the BT model into SAL. The
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method for finding multiple counterexamples for G(¬H) in the original case study was
as follows:
1. Model check G(¬H).
2. If there is a counterexample then analyse the counterexample to determine the
situation that leads to the hazard.
3. Modify the LTL specification so that the situations covered by counterexamples
already found do not appear as subsequent counterexamples.
4. Rerun the model checker with the modified LTL specification and repeat from step
2.
Step 2 was a manual process that required some problem domain expertise. The modi-
fication of the LTL specification in step 3 was rather ad hoc and could have been made
more systematic.
The counterexample path that SAL produced when model checking (9.1) executed
BT nodes 9.17 and 9.18 with MetData = Pending just before BT node 9.5 is executed
(execution of the counterexample path prefix to BT node 9.17, involving BT node 2.5,
causes MetData to be set to Pending). Manual examination of the counterexample path
determined that this corresponds to a situation under which the hazard H occurs after
the operator enters the “execute” command when meteorological data is pending (the
“execute” command is indicated by an event that occurs in BT node 9.17 and BT node
9.26).
Recall from Section 4.1 that the SAL translation of a BT model assigns a Boolean
SAL input variable to each BT external input event. A BT node in which an external
input event occurs can only be executed if the corresponding SAL input variable has the
value true. Let xcmd represent the SAL input variable for the “execute command” event.
Then the LTL specification is modified to
(¬G(¬((MetData = Pending) ∧ xcmd))) ∨ (G¬H). (9.2)
When given (9.2) to model check, SAL produced a counterexample path that executed BT
nodes 9.3 and 9.4 with MetData = Pending just before BT node 9.5 is executed. Manual
examination determined that the counterexample corresponds to a situation under which
the hazard H occurs when the mission is of a scheduled type (one of three types of drop
missions). To prevent the situation from appearing in subsequent counterexamples, the
LTL specification was modified to
(DMP.Type = Scheduled)∨ (¬G(¬((MetData = Pending)∧ xcmd)))∨ (G¬H). (9.3)
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Table 9.1: Results for SAL on Case Study Example
run1 run2 run3 run4
time 3.8s 15.2s 25.4s 15.1s
prefix length 20 20 25 N/A
cycle length N/A 5 5 N/A
The clause (DMP.Type = Scheduled) appears in (9.3) without the G operation because
DMP.Type never changes in the BT model. When given (9.3) to model check, SAL
produced a counterexample path that executed BT nodes 9.8 and 9.9 with MetData =
Pending just before BT node 9.5 is executed. Manual examination determined that
the counterexample corresponds to a situation under which the operator rejected a drop
solution with meteorological data pending. Let rdrp represent the SAL input variable
for the event “operator rejects drop solution”. The LTL specification was then modified
to
(DMP.Type = Scheduled)∨(¬G(¬((MetData = Pending)∧(xcmd∨rdrp))))∨(G¬H).
(9.4)
When given (9.4) to model check, SAL determined that there is no counterexample.
Assuming SAL and the manual examinations are correct, this means all situations that
can lead to hazard H have been covered.
Table 9.1 shows statistics from the SAL runs when rerun on the machine described in
Section 9.1. SAL version 3.3 was used. The runs run1, run2, run3 and run4 correspond
to model checking (9.1), (9.2), (9.3) and (9.4) respectively. Note that for run1, SAL
produced a prefix only. This suggests that SAL recognised (9.1) as a safety property
and optimised its model checking (it did not perform a “full” LTL model checking). The
timing results show that modifying the LTL specification can increase the SAL running
time considerably.
9.2.2 Incremental Approach using Directed Counterexample Path
Generation
In the incremental approach using directed counterexample path generation, computation
of the set Fϕ of fair states is performed just once, and directed counterexample path gen-
eration is used multiple times to produce multiple counterexamples. Global constraints
are used to direct the search for counterexample paths away from certain parts of the
model.
The methodology used in the incremental approach is slightly more systematic than
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the methodology used in the original case study. For each ith counterexample found, the
situation under which the hazard H occurs is characterised by a state formula ci (the
situation corresponds to a class of counterexamples, and the counterexample found is a
representative of the class). Note that in general a class of counterexamples cannot be
characterised using a state formula. Without directed counterexample path generation,
if the LTL specification had to be modified, then the modified LTL formula for the ith
model checking run (where i > 1) can be as follows:
(¬G(¬c1 ∧ ... ∧ ¬ci−1)) ∨ (G¬H). (9.5)
With directed counterexample path generation, ¬c1 ∧ ...∧¬ci−1 becomes the global con-
straint gc, without the LTL specification G(¬H) modified. The steps in the methodology
are as follows:
1. Compute the set of fair states Fϕ where ϕ ≡ F(H).
2. Set i to 1.
3. Use directed counterexample path generation with global constraint ¬c1∧¬c2∧ ...∧
¬ci−1.
4. If a counterexample path is produced, characterise the new situation under which
the hazard H occurs as a state formula ci. Repeat from step 3 after incrementing
i by 1.
Let ctri denote the generation of the ith counterexample path according to the above
steps. For ctr1, directed counterexample path generation produced a counterexample
path that executed BT nodes 9.3 and 9.4 with MetData = Pending just before BT node
9.5 is executed. This corresponds to the second counterexample found by SAL (where
DMP.Type = Scheduled). Since PC7 = 5 at the entrance to BT node 9.4, we set c1 as
follows:
c1 ← (MetData = pending) ∧ (PC7 = 5).
For ctr2, directed counterexample path generation produced a counterexample path that
executed BT nodes 9.17 and 9.18 with MetData = Pending just before BT node 9.5
is executed. This corresponds to the first counterexample found by SAL in which the
operator enters the “execute” command while meteorological data is pending. Since the
event “operator enters the execute command” only occurs in BT node 9.17 and BT node
9.26, PC7 = 13 at the entrance to BT node 9.17 and PC7 = 20 at the entrance to BT
node 9.26, we set c2 as follows:
c2 ← (MetData = pending) ∧ ((PC7 = 13) ∨ (PC7 = 20)).
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For ctr3, directed counterexample path generation produced a counterexample path that
executed BT nodes 9.8 and 9.9 with MetData = Pending just before BT node 9.5 is
executed. This corresponds to the third counterexample found by SAL in which the
operator rejects a drop solution while meteorological data is pending. Since PC7 = 10
at the entrance to BT node 9.9, we set c3 as follows:
c3 ← (MetData = pending) ∧ (PC7 = 10).
No counterexample path was found by directed counterexample path generation for ctr4.
A check using the fixpoint approach described in Section 8.4 was performed for ctr4 to
ensure there are no more counterexamples.
Experiments were performed with different reachability strategies. Recall from Section
7.2.2 that there are two basic strategies for general reachability:
1. eager reachability strategy (ERS) whereby the set reachable of reachable states is
computed and reachable is used in subsequent analysis (computing reachable∧Fϕ
instead of Fϕ, for example), and
2. lazy reachability strategy (LRS) whereby reachable is not computed and Fϕ is
directly computed.
There are also two basic strategies for reachability with respect to counterexample gen-
eration:
1. eager counterexample strategy (ECS) whereby the set FCϕ of fair states reachable
from S0 ∧ Sϕ(ϕ) is computed and used as the search space for counterexample
generation, and
2. lazy counterexample strategy (LCS) whereby FCϕ is not computed and Fϕ or
reachable ∧ Fϕ is used as the search space for counterexample generation.
Four different overall reachability strategies were tried for the experiments:
1. ERS-LCS: ERS followed by LCS,
2. ERS-ECS: ERS followed by ECS,
3. LRS-LCS: LRS followed by LCS, and
4. LRS-ECS: LRS followed by ECS.
Table 9.2 shows the timing results for the four reachability strategies above. The
column labelled “reach” is for computing reachable. The column labelled “check” is for
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Table 9.2: Timing Results for the Incremental Approach
strategy reach Fϕ FCϕ ctr1 ctr2 ctr3 ctr4 check
ERS-LCS 9.72s 1.15s N/A 3.62s 2.82s 2.11s 1.81s 0.56s
ERS-ECS 9.73s 1.15s 7.07s 1.43s 1.05s 0.62s 0.41s 0.70s
LRS-LCS N/A 275s N/A 18.9s 20.5s 24.9s 14.4s 219s
LRS-ECS N/A 275s 9.2s 1.6s 1.1s 0.6s 0.4s 220s
checking that there are no more counterexamples, using the fixpoint approach described
in Section 8.4. For i from 1 to 4, the column ctri is for directed counterexample generation
with global constraint ¬c1 ∧ ¬c2 ∧ ... ∧ ¬ci−1. Note that for an overall strategy that uses
ERS, the column Fϕ is for computing reachable ∧ Fϕ. Regardless of the strategy, the
same set of counterexamples was found. The paths ctr1 and ctr2 each has a prefix length
of 24 and a cycle length of 7, and ctr3 has a prefix length of 29 and cycle length of 7.
However, in each case, the counterexample path could have been shortened by rolling
part of the prefix into the cycle.
The following are some observations from Table 9.2.
• For the example, ERS is a better general reachability strategy than LRS.
• For the example, ECS improves (lowers) the running times of directed counterex-
ample generation compared to LCS, but incurs a one-time overhead of computing
FCϕ.
• For the example, a good reachability strategy with respect to counterexample gen-
eration (ECS) can salvage a bad basic reachability strategy (LRS).
• In each case, the run time for directed counterexample generation is lower than the
run time for the fixpoint computations (reachable plus Fϕ plus FCϕ).
To demonstrate the advantages of an incremental approach, experiments were also
performed with the traditional approach whereby the model checker is rerun with each
modified LTL specification, allowing comparisons between the approaches. The modifi-
cations to the LTL specification (9.1) were in accordance with (9.5). The counterexample
paths produced using the traditional approach are the same as the corresponding coun-
terexample paths produced using the incremental approach.
Table 9.3 shows the timing results for individual stages as well as the total for model
checking and counterexample generation. The following are some observations from table
9.3.
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Table 9.3: Timing Results for the Traditional Approach
strategy ctr1 ctr2 ctr3 ctr4
ERS-LCS reachable 9.78s 7.72s 6.79s 6.82s
ERS-LCS reachable ∧ Fϕ 1.14s 2.16s 3.77s 1.38s
ERS-LCS ctr 3.61s 3.31s 4.4s 0s
ERS-LCS total 14.53s 13.19s 14.96s 8.2s
ERS-ECS reachable 9.75s 7.64s 6.81s 6.79s
ERS-ECS reachable ∧ Fϕ 1.14s 2.14s 3.77s 1.38s
ERS-ECS FCϕ 7.07s 6.23s 5.63s 0s
ERS-ECS ctr 1.42s 1.62s 1.11s 0s
ERS-ECS total 19.38s 17.63s 17.32s 8.17s
LRS-LCS Fϕ 275s 416s 1037s 1127s
LRS-LCS ctr 19s 23s 122s 0s
LRS-LCS total 294s 439s 1159s 1127s
LRS-ECS Fϕ 275s 348s 1035s 1126s
LRS-ECS FCϕ 9.3s 7.6s 7.4s 0s
LRS-ECS ctr 1.6s 1.3s 1.4s 0s
LRS-ECS total 285.9s 356.9s 1043.8s 1126s
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Table 9.4: Incremental Approach vs Traditional Approach
approach strategy ovhd ctr1 ctr2 ctr3 ctr4 total
incremental ERS-LCS 10.87s 3.62s 2.82s 2.11s 12.37s 31.79s
traditional ERS-LCS N/A 14.53s 13.19s 14.96s 8.2s 50.88s
incremental ERS-ECS 17.95s 1.43s 1.05s 0.62s 1.11s 22.16s
traditional ERS-ECS N/A 19.38s 17.63s 17.32s 8.17s 62.5s
incremental LRS-LCS 275s 18.9s 20.5s 24.9s 234s 573.3s
traditional LRS-LCS N/A 294s 439s 1159s 1127s 3019s
incremental LRS-ECS 284.2s 1.6s 1.1s 0.6s 220.4s 507.9s
traditional LRS-ECS N/A 285.9s 356.9s 1043.8 1126s 2812.6s
• The worst reachability strategy (LRS-LCS) applies equally bad to the original LTL
formula and all modified LTL formulas.
• For the example, a good reachability strategy with respect to counterexample gen-
eration (ECS) can salvage a bad basic reachability strategy (LRS).
• The effect of a bad reachability strategy is magnified as the problem gets bigger
(comparing LRS-LCS versus ERS-LCS).
A side-by-side comparison of the incremental approach versus the traditional approach
is shown in Table 9.4. The column labelled “ovhd” is for the initial overhead for fixpoint
computations in the incremental approach. Irrespective of the reachability strategy, the
total time for the incremental approach is less than the total time for the traditional
approach.
The following conclusions are reached based on the results of the experiments:
• The results of the experiments are consistent with the hypothesis that directed coun-
terexample path generation scales up as well as model checking using the fixpoint
approach. For all of the examples, the inital overhead of computing reachability and
Fϕ is greater than the computation time for an individual directed counterexample
path generation.
• The results in Table 9.4 are consistent with the hypothesis that the incremental
approach using directed counterexample path generation is more efficient than the
traditional approach whereby the LTL specification is modified.
• For the example, it is better to use ERS as the strategy for general reachability
rather than LRS. If LRS is used, ECS can be used to salvage the situation.
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Table 9.5: Timing Results for Non-prioritised Model
strategy reach Fϕ FCϕ ctr1 ctr2 ctr3 ctr4
ERS-ECS 756s 1999s 1282s 149s 161s 151s 152s
LRS-LCS N/A 21.2s N/A 3.2s 3.9s 4.4s 4.1s
Table 9.6: Results for SAL on Non-prioritised Model
run1 run2 run3 run4
time 8.2s 124.8s 107.9s 200.3s
prefix length 17 17 17 17
cycle length N/A 4 4 4
9.3 Example Without Prioritisation
In the example here, we modify the model from Section 9.2 by not prioritising system
transitions. The directed counterexample path generation produced paths with prefix
length of 21 and cycle length of 5 for ctr1, ctr2 and ctr3, and produced a path with prefix
length 23 and cycle length 5 for ctr4. As with the experiments with the prioritised model,
each counterexample path could have been shortened by rolling part of the prefix into
the cycle.
Two reachability strategies were tried for the example: ERS-ECS and LRS-LCS. In
contrast to the prioritised model, here LRS-LCS is a much better strategy than ERS-
ECS. The timing results are shown in Table 9.5. An implementation of Algorithm 5.1
was used for computing reachable and FCϕ. When an implementation of a naive fixpoint
computation algorithm was used instead, the computation of reachable took 1806s (versus
756s) and the computation of FCϕ took 2902s (versus 1282s).
Results for SAL are included in Table 9.6 for comparison. Side by side comparison
of the incremental approach using directed counterexample path generation versus the
traditional approach of model checking modified LTL specifications as per (9.5) appears
in Table 9.7, with the LRS-LCS reachability strategy. The traditional approach with
the modified LTL specifications produced the same set of counterexample paths as the
incremental approach using directed counterexample path generation.
Table 9.7: Incremental Approach vs Traditional Approach for Non-prioritised Model
approach strategy Fϕ ctr1 ctr2 ctr3 ctr4 total
incremental LRS-LCS 21.2s 3.2s 3.9s 4.4s 4.1s 36.8s
traditional LRS-LCS N/A 24.2s 19.8s 126.1s 243.2s 413.3s
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Table 9.8: Results for Symbolic On-the-fly LTL Model Checking
ctr1 ctr2 ctr3 ctr4
time 0.200s 0.223s 0.109s ∞
prefix 144 144 144 N/A
cycle 14 14 14 N/A
Based on the results of the experiments, the following conclusions are reached:
• The results in Table 9.5 are consistent with the hypothesis that directed coun-
terexample path generation scales up as well as model checking using the fixpoint
approach. In each case, the time required for directed counterexample path gener-
ation is much less than the time required to compute Fϕ.
• The side by side comparison in Table 9.7 supports the hypothesis that the incre-
mental approach using directed counterexample path generation is more efficient
than the approach where the LTL specification is modified.
• In contrast to the prioritised model, ERS is a bad strategy for the non-prioritised
model.
• Algorithm 5.1 scales up better than a naive fixpoint computation algorithm.
9.4 Combination with On-the-fly Approach
Experiments were conducted using the model from Section 9.2 to assess the viability
of using directed counterexample path generation as a post-processor to improve coun-
terexample paths found by symbolic on-the-fly LTL model checking described in Section
7.2.3.
First, an experiment was performed using symbolic on-the-fly LTL model checking
with global constraints to find multiple counterexamples, emulating the methodology in
Section 9.2. The purpose of the experiment is to assess symbolic on-the-fly LTL model
checking in terms of computation time and quality of counterexample paths found.
The second experiment was to use directed counterexample path generation as a
post processor for improving a counterexample path found by the symbolic on-the-fly
LTL model checker. For each counterexample path found by the on-the-fly LTL model
checker, the starting symbolic state for the cycle part of the counterexample path is used
as SB0 in directed counterexample path generation (see Section 8.2).
Table 9.8 shows the results from symbolic on-the-fly LTL model checking with global
constraints. The timing results show that symbolic on-the-fly LTL model checking can
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Table 9.9: Combined On-the-fly and Directed Counterexample Generation
reach ctr1 ctr2 ctr3 ctr4
time 11.43s 2.48s 2.14s 1.56s 0.72s
prefix N/A 33 33 38 N/A
cycle N/A 7 7 7 N/A
find a counterexample path quickly if there is one. However, the quality of the coun-
terexample paths are not very good as both the prefixes and the cycles are too long.
This is caused by the depth-first nature of the search plus the imprecise tracking of fair-
ness constraints. The on-the-fly LTL checker also had trouble with ctr4, which has no
counterexample. The checking was aborted after 24 hours. Perhaps a technique such as
partial order reduction [PWW96] can help, but it would need to be adjusted to handle
the X operator. Partial order reduction would also help for a non-prioritised model.
Table 9.9 shows the result of experiments with using directed counterexample path
generation as a post-processor to symbolic on-the-fly LTL model checking (the ctr4 timing
is for verifying that there are no more counterexamples). The counterexample paths
were improved by the post-processing (the cycle lengths were reduced to 7 from 14, and
the prefix lengths were reduced to 33 and 38 from 144). However, the quality of the
counterexample paths are not as good as using directed counterexample path generation
directly using Fϕ as the search space. Perhaps the SB0 determined using on-the-fly LTL
checking is less than optimal.
9.5 Automated Multiple Counterexample Generation
To demonstrate the possibility of automating the generation of multiple counterexamples
for specific problem domains, experiments were performed based on a case study in
generating minimal cut sets in safety analysis [LWY10,LYW12]. The case study involves
the hydraulic system in an Airbus A320. There are three redundant hydraulic subsystems
involving eleven components that can fail (and assumed to fail independently of each
other). The three hydraulic subsystems are called yellow, green and blue. The eleven
components are:
1. the yellow distribution line (disty),
2. the green distribution line (distg),
3. the blue distribution line (distb),
4. engine 1 (E1),
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5. engine 2 (E2),
6. power transfer unit (PTU)
7. engine-driven pump for the yellow subsystem (EDPy),
8. engine-driven pump for the green subsystem (EDPg),
9. electric motor pump for the blue subsystem (EMPb),
10. electric motor pump for the yellow subsystem (EMPy), and
11. a ram air turbine pump (RAT).
For a complete description of the model, see [LWY10] or [LYW12].
The model for the hydraulic system includes some behaviour so that, for example,
RAT does not become active unless both engines are off and the aircraft is flying at a speed
of greater then 100 knots. The failure status of a component is effectively represented by a
Boolean state variable, for example the Boolean state variable distyFailed represents the
failure status of disty. (Technically, distyFailed is of an enumerated type (true, false),
and the possible values of the failure status are represented by the equalities distyFailed =
true and distyFailed = false.)
For our purposes, a minimal cut set is a subset of
{distyFailed, distgFailed, distbFailed, E1Failed, E2Failed, PTUFailed,
EDPyFailed, EDPgFailed, EMPbFailed, EMPyFailed, RATFailed}
which “violates” some specification and a removal of any element from the subset will
result in a non-violation. For example, {distyFailed, distgFailed} would be a minimal
cut set if
• there is a behaviour involving a state in which disty failed and distg failed that is
a counterexample to the specification, and
• there is no counterexample where all the other components do not fail and at least
one of disty or distg does not fail.
The experiments used the following specification:
G((initialised and all three active)⇒ G(at least two active)) (9.6)
where “at least two active” is equivalent to
• yellow subsystem is active and green subsystem is active, or
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• yellow subsystem is active and blue subsystem is active, or
• green subsystem is active and blue subsystem is active.
In the model, once a components fails, it remains in a failed state.
To arrive at cut sets (which are potential minimal cut sets), each symbolic counterex-
ample path produced for (9.6) is examined. Specifically, we can zoom into the symbolic
state that starts the cycle part of the counterexample path and normalise the symbolic
state into conjunctive normal form (irredundant product of sums). As an example, the
symbolic state that starts the cycle part of the first counterexample path found by the
prototype for (9.6), in conjunctive normal form, is
(PC1 = 3) ∧ (PC2 = 3) ∧ (PC3 = 2) ∧ (PC4 = 1) ∧ (PC5 = 1) ∧ (PC6 = 2)
∧ (PC16 = 0) ∧ (PC17 = 2) ∧ (PC7 = 4) ∧ (PC8 = 2) ∧ (PC18 = 4) ∧ (PC19 = 1)
∧ (PC9 = 2) ∧ (PC20 = 2) ∧ (PC21 = 1) ∧ (PC10 = 2) ∧ (PC22 = 2) ∧ (PC23 = 1)
∧ (PC11 = 1) ∧ (PC12 = 2) ∧ (PC24 = 3) ∧ (PC25 = 1) ∧ (PC13 = 2) ∧ (PC26 = 1)
∧ (PC27 = 1) ∧ (PC14 = 2) ∧ (PC28 = 0) ∧ (PC30 = 0) ∧ (PC31 = 0) ∧ (PC29 = 2)
∧ (PC15 = 2) ∧ (PC32 = 3) ∧ (PC33 = 1) ∧ (Pilot = ready) ∧ (Engine1 = active)
∧ (Engine2 = active) ∧ (yellow = off) ∧ (PTUy = active) ∧ (PTU = active)
∧ (EDPy = active) ∧ (EDPg = active) ∧ (EMPy = active) ∧ (EMPb = active)
∧ (RAT = off) ∧ distyFailed ∧ ¬distgFailed ∧ distbFailed ∧ ¬E1Failed
∧ ¬E2Failed ∧ ¬PTUFailed ∧ ¬EDPyFailed ∧ ¬EDPgFailed ∧ ¬EMPbFailed
∧ ¬EMPyFailed ∧ ¬RATFailed ∧ (green = active) ∧ (blue = off)
∧ (Aircraft = flyingSlow) ∧ (System = operating).
(In the prototype, the symbolic state is represented by a Lisp s-expression which may be
viewed as an abstract syntax representation.)
We can collect conjuncts that represent failed components from the conjunctive normal
form. In the above example, we get {distyFailed, distbFailed}, and this becomes a cut
set and therefore a potential minimal cut set. To verify that {distyFailed, distbFailed}
is in fact a minimal cut set, we must show that there is no counterexample for (9.6) in
which all the other components do not fail and at least one of disty or distb does not fail.
This can be performed by model checking (9.6) with the global constraint
¬distgFailed ∧ ¬E1Failed ∧ ¬E2Failed ∧ ¬PTUFailed ∧ ¬EDPyFailed
∧ ¬EDPgFailed ∧ ¬EMPbFailed ∧ ¬EMPyFailed ∧ ¬RATFailed
∧ (¬distyFailed ∨ ¬distbFailed).
(9.7)
The prototype was able to verify that (9.6) with global constraint (9.7) has no coun-
terexample. Had (9.6) with global constraint (9.7) produce a counterexample, then the
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counterexample would have at least one less failing component (because of the global
constraint) and we get a smaller cut set. The process can be repeated until a minimal
cut set is found.
Once a minimal cut set is found, it can be eliminated from further consideration using
the technique in Section 9.2.2. This can be repeated until we can verify that there are no
more cut sets. The entire process has been automated in a script written in Lisp. Using
the script, there were five 2-element minimal cut sets found:
{distyFailed, distbFailed}, {distyFailed, distgFailed}, {distgFailed, distbFailed},
{distyFailed, EMPbFailed}, {distgFailed, EMPbFailed}.
There were ten 3-element minimal cut sets found:
{distyFailed, PTUFailed, EDPgFailed}, {distbFailed, PTUFailed, EDPgFailed},
{distyFailed, E1Failed, PTUFailed}, {distbFailed, E1Failed, PTUFailed},
{PTUFailed, EDPgFailed, EMPbFailed}, {E1Failed, PTUFailed, EMPbFailed},
{EDPyFailed, EDPgFailed, EMPyFailed}, {E1Failed, EDPyFailed, EMPyFailed},
{E2Failed, EDPgFailed, EMPyFailed}, {E1Failed, E2Failed, EMPyFailed}.
There were six 4-element minimal cut sets found:
{distbFailed, PTUFailed, EDPyFailed, EMPyFailed},
{distgFailed, PTUFailed, EDPyFailed, EMPyFailed},
{distbFailed, E2Failed, PTUFailed, EMPyFailed},
{distgFailed, E2Failed, PTUFailed, EMPyFailed},
{PTUFailed, EDPyFailed, EMPbFailed, EMPyFailed},
{E2Failed, PTUFailed, EMPbFailed, EMPyFailed}.
The script was able to verify that there are no more cut sets. During the run, it produced
3 cut sets that are non-minimal before all the minimal cut sets were found. The running
time for the script was around 65 minutes.
When the script was modified to use the combination approach of Section 9.4 instead
of directed counterexample path generation, it performed worse with a running time of
almost 4 hours. Although counterexamples were found faster, many were of poor quality
in that they were unnecessarily long involving too many component failures (caused by
the depth-first nature of the on-the-fly LTL model checking). This resulted in the script
producing 58 cut sets that were non-minimal before all minimal cut sets were found. Thus,
although the individual cut set generation was faster, the total run time was longer.
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9.6 Summary and Discussion
Experiments have been performed with a prototype to demonstrate the utility of the
directed counterexample path generation. Results from the experiments support the
hypothesis that directed counterexample path generation scales up as well as the fixpoint
approach of model checking, i.e., if the computation of Fϕ is feasible, then directed
counterexample path generation is feasible.
Results from the experiments also support the hypothesis that the incremental ap-
proach of multiple counterexample generation using the directed search is more efficient
than the traditional approach of modifying the LTL specification and rerunning the model
checker.
Various reachability strategies were tried in the experiments. The experiments showed
that the choice of strategy for reachability can have a dramatic effect on the model
checking and counterexample path generation times. In general, if the BT model uses
prioritisation, it is better to use an eager reachability strategy (ERS), and if the BT
model does not use prioritisation, it is better to use a lazy reachability strategy (LRS).
With respect to OBDD ordering, the prototype simply uses the dynamic weight as-
signment method of Minato et al [MIY90] with guards and post conditions viewed as
forming a circuit. Although OBDD ordering is important and can have a dramatic effect
on model checking time, it is beyond the scope of this thesis.
The OBDD package is not a state-of-the-art OBDD package (it only has about half
the features of a state-of-the-art OBDD package). The OBDD package is used because of
its ease of integration into the prototype. The purpose of the prototype is not to build a
faster model checker but to demonstrate potential advantages of directed counterexample
path generation.
Experiments on combining symbolic on-the-fly LTL model checking with directed
counterexample path generation produced some mixed results. Although the simple
combination improved the quality of counterexample paths from those produced by the
on-the-fly checking, the counterexample paths produced are not as good as those produced
with directed counterexample path generation directly using Fϕ as the search space. Much
work is required to produce an effective combination of on-the-fly checking and directed
counterexample path generation.
Experiments with a case study in cut set analysis demonstrated that the techniques
developed in this thesis can be used to automatically and efficiently generate “meaningful”
multiple counterexamples in a specific domain. The experiments also demonstrated the
poor quality of counterexamples found using a depth-first search.
Chapter 10
Conclusion
10.1 Answers to Research Questions
This thesis has answered the research questions posed in Section 1.2 as follows.
• Research Question 1.
– Question: Can the search for an LTL counterexample path be directed away
from certain parts of a model or towards certain parts of a model?
– Answer: Affirmative. Global constraints can be used to direct the search away
from certain parts of the model, while cycle constraints can be used to direct
the search towards certain parts of the model.
• Research Question 2.
– Question: Can a method for such a directed counterexample path generation
be made independent of the modelling notation?
– Answer: Affirmative. This is accomplished by having the directed counterex-
ample path generation operate in a general framework that is independent of
the modelling notation.
• Research Question 3.
– Question: Can a method for directed counterexample path generation be in-
corporated into a symbolic framework?
– Answer: Affirmative. The general framework in which the directed counterex-
ample path generation operates is a symbolic framework.
• Research Question 4.
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– Question: How do model checking strategies, such as when reachability is
determined, affect directed counterexample path generation?
– Answer: For reachability strategies, a model with a “sparse” transition relation
(where the ratio between the number of transitions and the number of states
is relatively small) seems to be better handled using an eager strategy such
as ERS, while a model with a “dense” transition relation (where the ratio
between the number of transitions and the number of states is relatively large)
seems to be better handled using a lazy strategy such as LRS.
• Research Question 5.
– Question: Can directed counterexample path generation be mixed and matched
with existing techniques?
– Answer: Affirmative. This was demonstrated by combining symbolic on-the-
fly LTL model checking with directed counterexample path generation.
10.2 Contribution
The main contribution of this thesis is a technique for directed counterexample path
generation in a symbolic framework for LTL model checking. Directed counterexample
path generation can be used to control the generation of multiple counterexample paths,
which is important in many applications of model checking, including safety analysis
and test-case generation. It provides an alternative to a blind search for multiple coun-
terexamples and to an approach in which either the LTL specification or the model is
modified to rule out certain classes of counterexamples. With directed counterexample
path generation, cycle and global constraints are used to rule in or rule out certain classes
of counterexamples.
Directed counterexample path generation provides a mechanism to explore the coun-
terexample space. Symbolic model checking using the fixpoint approach need only be
performed once. Thereafter, either the set of counterexample states (states that can oc-
cur in counterexamples) or the set of fair states can be used as a counterexample space
which can be explored using directed counterexample path generation. Multiple coun-
terexamples can be generated without the need to perform a fixpoint computation each
time a counterexample path is to be generated. Results of experiments with a prototype
show that this incremental approach to generating multiple counterexamples can be more
efficient than modifying the LTL specification and rerunning the model checker for each
subsequent counterexample after the first counterexample.
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Another contribution of this thesis is the symbolic framework for LTL model checking,
consisting of a state-machine level and an LTL-encoding level. The choice of a symbolic
setting reflects the author’s view that symbolic techniques scale up better than techniques
that operate on individual states and transitions. Also, transformations on symbolic
expressions are easier to perform (e.g., using ordered binary decision diagrams) and prove
correct than transformations on graph structures.
The state-machine level of the framework is essentially a Kripke structure with addi-
tional structures representing objects in the modelling notation in the form of elementary
blocks. Elementary blocks allow analysis to take advantage of structural information
from the modelling notation and simplifies the mapping of the result of analysis back to
the modelling notation. The use of guarded updates in describing an elementary block
lends to simple implementations of image and pre-image functions — under the transition
relation for the block — without the need for relational products.
Essential concepts in LTL model checking are incorporated in the LTL-encoding level
of the framework. Using the concepts of path commitments and transition constraints,
the LTL-encoding level of the framework accommodates various LTL encoding schemes
including the classic LTL encoding scheme and the Transition-based Generalised Bu¨chi
Automaton (TGBA) encoding scheme. Proof plans for showing the soundness of an
encoding scheme within the framework are included. The use of the proof plans were
demonstrated on the classic LTL encoding scheme and the TGBA encoding scheme.
As well as accommodating various LTL encoding schemes, the symbolic framework
is neutral with respect to the model checking approach and strategy. In addition to
the traditional fixpoint approach to symbolic model checking, an on-the-fly approach
to LTL model checking, usually associated with an explicit automata-based approach,
can be used within the symbolic framework, as evidenced by the symbolic on-the-fly LTL
model checking algorithm proposed in the thesis. By accommodating different approaches
and strategies within a single framework, the approaches and strategies can be mixed and
matched. An example of mixing and matching was the experiment on combining symbolic
on-the-fly model checking with directed counterexample path generation.
Being able to use different LTL encoding schemes, different model checking approaches
and different model checking strategies within a single framework is important. This is
because a good choice of LTL encoding scheme, model checking approach or model check-
ing strategy for one problem can be a bad choice for a different problem. Experiments
with the prototype demonstrated this with respect to the strategy on reachability.
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10.3 Possible Future Work
Although the utility of directed counterexample path generation has been demonstrated,
much work remains to make it even more effective. In particular, we have not investigated
the effect of OBDD ordering on directed counterexample path generation. Perhaps using
some ordering criteria can improve the performance of directed counterexample path
generation.
So far, directed counterexample path generation has been used with symbolic model
checking using the fixpoint approach. However, the algorithm does not assume that the
search space is a subset of the set of fair states. More investigation is needed to determine
whether directed counterexample path generation can be effective without restricting the
search space to be a subset of the set of fair states.
Another possibility is to combine directed counterexample path generation with the
counterexample generation technique of Clarke et al [CGMZ95]. In principle, global
constraints can be used with the technique of Clarke et al. It remains to be seen whether
the cycle constraint aspect of directed counterexample generation can be combined with
the search strategy used in the technique of Clarke et al to produce a more efficient
directed search.
The on-the-fly symbolic LTL model checking algorithm proposed in the thesis is a
naive algorithm that does not perform well if there is no counterexample path. Incorpo-
rating a technique such as partial order reduction [PWW96] into the algorithm to improve
its performance is a possibility. To make partial order reduction have wider applicability,
it may need to be adjusted to be able to handle the X operator.
Finally, an approach similar to bounded model checking [BCCZ99] is a possibility
with on-the-fly symbolic LTL model checking by placing a depth limit on the depth-first
search. A variation on this would be to iteratively increase the depth limit (sometimes
called iterative deepening).
Appendix A
Soundness Proofs
A.1 Soundness of the Classic Encoding Scheme
We now apply the proof plans from Section 6.3 to the classic LTL encoding scheme.
A.1.1 Proof of Theorem 6.2
To complete the proof of Theorem 6.2, we must prove Lemma 6.1:
M,pi |= ϕ
⇒ ∃pi′ : proj(pi′) = pi ∧ ∀i ≥ 0, p ∈ cl(ϕ) : (M,pii |= p)⇔ (M ′, pi′i |= Sϕ(p)).
Proof. The first step according to the plan from Section 6.3.1 is to show that pi′ as a
sequence of states constructed according to (6.20) satisfies (6.23):
∀i ≥ 0, p ∈ cl(ϕ) : (M,pii |= p)⇔ (M ′, pi′i |= Sϕ(p)).
This corresponds to proving (A.1).
(M,pi |= ϕ) ∧ proj(pi′) = pi
∧ ∀i ≥ 0, p ∈ el(ϕ) : (M,pii |= p)⇔ (M ′, pi′i |= Vp)
⇒ ∀i ≥ 0, p ∈ cl(ϕ) : (M,pii |= p)⇔ (M ′, pi′i |= Sϕ(p)).
(A.1)
Note that at this point, pi′ is not necessarily a path in M ′. The proof is by induction on
the structure of p ∈ cl(ϕ). The cases are as follows:
• Case p ∈ AP (ϕ):
(M,pii |= p)⇔ (M,pii |= p)⇔ (M ′, pi′i |= p)⇔ (M ′, pi′i |= Sϕ(p)).
• Case p ≡ ¬q, using the induction hypothesis, we have
(M,pii |= ¬q)⇔ (M,pii 6|= q)⇔ (M ′, pi′i 6|= Sϕ(q))⇔ (M ′, pi′i |= Sϕ(¬q)).
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• Case p ≡ q ∧ r, using the induction hypothesis, we have
(M,pii |= q ∧ r)
⇔ (M,pii |= q) ∧ (M,pii |= r)
⇔ (M ′, pi′i |= Sϕ(q)) ∧ (M ′, pi′i |= Sϕ(r))
⇔ (M ′, pi′i |= Sϕ(q ∧ r)).
• Case p ≡ q ∨ r, using the induction hypothesis, we have
(M,pii |= q ∨ r)
⇔ (M,pii |= q) ∨ (M,pii |= r)
⇔ (M ′, pi′i |= Sϕ(q)) ∨ (M ′, pi′i |= Sϕ(r))
⇔ (M ′, pi′i |= Sϕ(q ∨ r)).
• Case p ≡ Xq (p ∈ el(ϕ)):
(M,pii |= p)⇔ (M ′, pi′i |= Vp)⇔ (M,pi′i |= Sϕ(p)).
• Case p ≡ qU r, using the induction hypothesis (note that X(qU r) ∈ el(ϕ)):
(M,pii |= qU r)
⇔ (M,pii |= r) ∨ (M,pii |= q) ∧ (M,pii |= X(qU r))
⇔ (M ′, pi′i |= Sϕ(r)) ∨ (M ′, pi′i |= Sϕ(q)) ∧ (M ′, pi′i |= Sϕ(X(qU r)))
⇔ (M ′, pi′i |= Sϕ(qU r)).
The second step in the proof plan is, given that pi′ satisfies (6.23), show that pi′ satisfies
(6.22). This corresponds to proving (A.2).
(M,pi |= ϕ) ∧ proj(pi′) = pi
∧ ∀i ≥ 0, p ∈ el(ϕ) : (M,pii |= p)⇔ (M ′, pi′i |= Vp)
⇒ ∀i ≥ 0 : (pi′i, pi′i+1) ∈ R′.
(A.2)
The mapping from pi to pi′ where each pi′i satisfies (6.20) is a “strict mapping”. As a result,
the transitions in pi′ ought to satisfy R′ as defined by (6.9) (which corresponds to a strict
encoding), regardless of whether R′ is defined by (6.9) or (6.10). Thus it is sufficient to
prove that the transitions satisfy R′ as defined by (6.9), even if R′ is defined by (6.10).
Because pi is a path in M , we have ∀i ≥ 0 : (proj(pi′i), proj(pi′i+1)) ∈ R. Since (A.1)
has been proved, what remains is to prove
(M,pi |= ϕ) ∧ proj(pi′) = pi
∧ ∀i ≥ 0, p ∈ el(ϕ) : (M,pii |= p)⇔ (M ′, pi′i |= Vp)
∧ ∀i ≥ 0, p ∈ cl(ϕ) : (M,pii |= p)⇔ (M ′, pi′i |= Sϕ(p))
⇒ ∀i ≥ 0, p ∈ el(ϕ) : (M ′, pi′i |= Sϕ(p))⇔ ((pi′i, pi′i+1) |= Tϕ(p)).
(A.3)
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For the classic LTL encoding scheme, an elementary formula p is of the form Xq for some
q, and we have
(M ′, pi′i |= Sϕ(Xq))
⇔ (M,pii |= Xq)
⇔ (M,pii+1 |= q)
⇔ (M ′, pi′i+1 |= Sϕ(q))
⇔ ((pi′i, pi′i+1) |= next(Sϕ(q)))
⇔ ((pi′i, pi′i+1) |= Tϕ(Xq)),
thus (M ′, pi′i |= Sϕ(p)) ⇔ ((pi′i, pi′i+1) |= Tϕ(p)), which proves (A.3), and thus (A.2) irre-
spective of whether (6.9) or (6.10) is used for the definition of R′. Combining (A.1) and
(A.2) gives us a proof of Lemma 6.1.
The proof of Lemma 6.1 completes the proof of Theorem 6.2 (see Section 6.3.1).
A.1.2 Proof of Theorem 6.3
To complete the proof of Theorem 6.3, we need to prove Lemmas 6.3 and 6.5. Let us
first prove Lemma 6.3:
(M,pi |= ϕ) ∧ proj(pi′) = pi
∧ ∀i ≥ 0, p ∈ cl(ϕ) : (M,pii |= p)⇔ (M ′, pi′i |= Sϕ(p))
⇒ ∀c ∈ Cϕ, i ≥ 0 : ∃j ≥ i : M ′, pi′j |= c.
Proof. The first two steps in the proof plan for Lemma 6.3 from Section 6.3.2 is to expand
Cϕ in ∀c ∈ Cϕ, i ≥ 0 : ∃j ≥ i : M ′, pi′j |= c, and transform the quantification:
∀c ∈ Cϕ, i ≥ 0 : ∃j ≥ i : M ′, pi′j |= c
⇔ ∀c ∈ {¬Sϕ(p) ∨ Sϕ(ec(p)) | p ∈ cl(ϕ) ∧ (ec(p) 6≡ true)}, i ≥ 0 : ∃j ≥ i : M ′, pi′j |= c
⇔ ∀p ∈ cl(ϕ), i ≥ 0 : (ec(p) 6≡ true)⇒ ∃j ≥ i : M ′, pi′j |= ¬Sϕ(p) ∨ Sϕ(ec(p)).
Since only p of the form qU r has ec(p) 6≡ true, all we need to prove is
(M,pi |= ϕ) ∧ proj(pi′) = pi
∧ ∀i ≥ 0, p ∈ cl(ϕ) : (M,pii |= p)⇔ (M ′, pi′i |= Sϕ(p))
⇒ ∀i ≥ 0 : ∃j ≥ i : M ′, pi′j |= ¬Sϕ(qU r) ∨ Sϕ(r).
(A.4)
Zooming in on ∀i ≥ 0 : ∃j ≥ i : M ′, pi′j |= ¬Sϕ(qU r) ∨ Sϕ(r), suppose (A.4) does not
hold, i.e., there exists i0 ≥ 0 such that ∀j ≥ i0 : M ′, pi′j 6|= ¬Sϕ(qU r) ∨ Sϕ(r), thus we
have ∀j ≥ i0 : M ′, pi′j |= Sϕ(qU r) ∧ ¬Sϕ(r). But from the last antecedent in (A.4) we
have (M ′, pi′j |= Sϕ(qU r)) ⇔ (M,pij |= qU r) and (M ′, pi′j |= Sϕ(r)) ⇔ (M,pij |= r) for
all j ≥ i0. Thus we have M,pii0 |= qU r and ∀j ≥ i0 : M,pij 6|= r, which is a contradiction,
therefore (A.4) holds. The proof of Lemma 6.3 is complete.
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Next, we prove Lemma 6.5:
∀c ∈ Cϕ, i ≥ 0 : ∃j ≥ i : M ′, pi′j |= c
⇒ ∀i ≥ 0, p ∈ cl(ϕ) : (M ′, pi′i |= Sϕ(p))⇒ (M ′, pi′i |= p).
Proof. Following the proof plan in Section 6.3.2, after expanding the definition of Cϕ and
transforming the quantification, we get
∀p ∈ cl(ϕ) : (ec(p) 6≡ true)⇒ ∀i ≥ 0 : ∃j ≥ i : M ′, pi′j |= ¬Sϕ(p) ∨ Sϕ(ec(p))
⇒ ∀p ∈ cl(ϕ), i ≥ 0 : (M ′, pi′i |= Sϕ(p))⇒ (M ′, pi′i |= p).
The final step according to the proof plan is the induction on the structure of p. For
the classic LTL encoding scheme, either a strict encoding is used (R′ defined by (6.9)) or
ϕ is in NNF and a loose encoding may be used (R′ defined by (6.10)). Zooming in on
(M ′, pi′i |= Sϕ(p))⇒ (M ′, pi′i |= p), the cases are as follows:
• Case p ∈ AP (ϕ): (M ′, pi′i |= Sϕ(p))⇔ (M ′, pi′i |= p)⇔ (M ′, pi′i |= p).
• Case p ≡ ¬q, for a strict encoding, using the induction hypothesis, we have:
(M ′, pi′i |= Sϕ(¬q))⇔ (M ′, pi′i 6|= Sϕ(q))⇒ (M ′, pi′i 6|= q)⇔ (M ′, pi′i |= ¬q),
and for a loose encoding (where q ∈ AP (ϕ)), we have:
(M ′, pi′i |= Sϕ(¬q))⇔ (M ′, pi′i 6|= Sϕ(q))⇔ (M ′, pi′i 6|= q)⇔ (M ′, pi′i |= ¬q).
• Case p ≡ q ∧ r, using the induction hypothesis:
(M ′, pi′i |= Sϕ(q ∧ r))
⇔ (M ′, pi′i |= Sϕ(q)) ∧ (M ′, pi′i |= Sϕ(r))
⇒ (M ′, pi′i |= q) ∧ (M ′, pi′i |= r)
⇔ (M ′, pi′i |= q ∧ r).
• Case p ≡ q ∨ r, using the induction hypothesis:
(M ′, pi′i |= Sϕ(q ∨ r))
⇔ (M ′, pi′i |= Sϕ(q)) ∨ (M ′, pi′i |= Sϕ(r))
⇒ (M ′, pi′i |= q) ∨ (M ′, pi′i |= r)
⇔ (M ′, pi′i |= q ∨ r).
• Case p ≡ Xq, using the induction hypothesis and R′, for a strict encoding we have:
(M ′, pi′i |= Sϕ(Xq))⇔ (M ′, pi′i+1 |= Sϕ(q))⇒ (M ′, pi′i+1 |= q)⇔ (M ′, pi′i |= Xq),
and for a loose encoding we have:
(M ′, pi′i |= Sϕ(Xq))⇒ (M ′, pi′i+1 |= Sϕ(q))⇒ (M ′, pi′i+1 |= q)⇔ (M ′, pi′i |= Xq).
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• Case p ≡ qU r, the conjecture’s antecedent gives us ∃j ≥ i : (M ′, pi′j |= ¬Sϕ(qU r)∨
Sϕ(r)). Let j0 be the smallest j such that j ≥ i ∧ (M ′, pi′j |= ¬Sϕ(qU r) ∨ Sϕ(r)),
i.e.,
j0 ≥ i ∧ (M ′, pi′j0 |= ¬Sϕ(qU r) ∨ Sϕ(r))
∧ ∀j : i ≤ j < j0 ⇒ (M ′, pi′j |= Sϕ(qU r) ∧ ¬Sϕ(r)).
(A.5)
If j0 = i then, using the induction hypothesis and M
′, pi′j0 |= ¬Sϕ(qU r) ∨ Sϕ(r),
we have
(M ′, pi′i |= Sϕ(qU r))⇔ (M ′, pi′i |= Sϕ(r))⇒ (M ′, pi′i |= r)⇒ (M ′, pi′i |= qU r)
and we are done. Otherwise, j0 > i and from (A.13) and the definition of Sϕ(qU r)
we get
(M ′, pi′i |= Sϕ(qU r))⇒ ∀j : i ≤ j < j0 ⇒ (M ′, pi′j |= Sϕ(q)).
Using the definitions of Sϕ(qU r) and R
′, we have
(M ′, pi′j0−1 |= Sϕ(qU r) ∧ ¬Sϕ(r))
⇒ (M ′, pi′j0−1 |= Sϕ(q) ∧ Sϕ(X(qU r)))
⇒ (M ′, pi′j0 |= Sϕ(qU r)),
and combined with (M ′, pi′j0 |= ¬Sϕ(qU r) ∨ Sϕ(r)), we get (M ′, pi′j0 |= Sϕ(r)).
Therefore, using the induction hypothesis, we have
(M ′, pi′i |= Sϕ(qU r))
⇒ (M ′, pi′j0 |= Sϕ(r)) ∧ (∀j : i ≤ j < j0 ⇒ (M ′, pi′j |= Sϕ(q)))
⇒ (M ′, pi′j0 |= r) ∧ (∀j : i ≤ j < j0 ⇒ (M ′, pi′j |= q))
⇒ (M ′, pi′i |= qU r).
We have proved Theorem 6.2 and Theorem 6.3 within the classic LTL encoding
scheme. The proofs handle both the case where the encoding is strict (i.e., R′ is de-
fined by (6.9)) and the case where the encoding is loose (i.e., R′ is defined by (6.10) and
ϕ is in NNF).
A.2 Soundness of the TGBA Encoding Scheme
We now apply the proof plans from Section 6.3 to the TGBA encoding scheme.
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A.2.1 Proof of Theorem 6.2
To complete the proof of Theorem 6.2, we must prove Lemma 6.2:
M,pi |= ϕ
⇒ ∃pi′ : proj(pi′) = pi ∧ ∀i ≥ 0, p ∈ cl(ϕ) : (M,pii |= p)⇔ (M ′, pi′i |= Sϕ(p))
∧ ∀i ≥ 0, p ∈ el(ϕ) ∧ (ec(p) 6≡ true) : (M,pii |= p ∧ ¬ec(p))⇔ (M ′, pi′i |= Pp).
Proof. The first step according to the plan from Section 6.3.1 is to show that pi′ as a
sequence of states constructed according to (6.21) satisfies (6.23):
∀i ≥ 0, p ∈ cl(ϕ) : (M,pii |= p)⇔ (M ′, pi′i |= Sϕ(p)).
This corresponds to proving (A.6).
(M,pi |= ϕ) ∧ proj(pi′) = pi
∧ ∀i ≥ 0, p ∈ el(ϕ) : (M,pii |= p)⇔ (M ′, pi′i |= Vp)
∧ ∀i ≥ 0, p ∈ el(ϕ) ∧ (ec(p) 6≡ true) : (M,pii |= p ∧ ¬ec(p))⇔ (M ′, pi′i |= Pp)
⇒ ∀i ≥ 0, p ∈ cl(ϕ) : (M,pii |= p)⇔ (M ′, pi′i |= Sϕ(p)).
(A.6)
Note that at this point, pi′ is not necessarily a path in M ′. The proof is by induction on
the structure of p ∈ cl(ϕ). The cases are as follows:
• Case p ∈ AP (ϕ):
(M,pii |= p)⇔ (M,pii |= p)⇔ (M ′, pi′i |= p)⇔ (M ′, pi′i |= Sϕ(p)).
• Case p ∈ el(ϕ): (M,pii |= p)⇔ (M ′, pi′i |= Vp)⇔ (M,pi′i |= Sϕ(p)).
• Case p ≡ ¬q, since ϕ is in NNF, q ∈ AP (ϕ), and we have
(M,pii |= ¬q)⇔ (M,pii 6|= q)⇔ (M ′, pi′i 6|= Sϕ(q))⇔ (M ′, pi′i |= Sϕ(¬q)).
• Case p ≡ q ∧ r, using the induction hypothesis, we have
(M,pii |= q ∧ r)
⇔ (M,pii |= q) ∧ (M,pii |= r)
⇔ (M ′, pi′i |= Sϕ(q)) ∧ (M ′, pi′i |= Sϕ(r))
⇔ (M ′, pi′i |= Sϕ(q ∧ r)).
• Case p ≡ q ∨ r, using the induction hypothesis, we have
(M,pii |= q ∨ r)
⇔ (M,pii |= q) ∨ (M,pii |= r)
⇔ (M ′, pi′i |= Sϕ(q)) ∨ (M ′, pi′i |= Sϕ(r))
⇔ (M ′, pi′i |= Sϕ(q ∨ r)).
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The second step in the proof plan is, given that pi′ satisfies (6.23), show that pi′ satisfies
(6.22). This corresponds to proving (A.7).
(M,pi |= ϕ) ∧ proj(pi′) = pi
∧ ∀i ≥ 0, p ∈ el(ϕ) : (M,pii |= p)⇔ (M ′, pi′i |= Vp)
∧ ∀i ≥ 0, p ∈ el(ϕ) ∧ (ec(p) 6≡ true) : (M,pii |= p ∧ ¬ec(p))⇔ (M ′, pi′i |= Pp)
⇒ ∀i ≥ 0 : (pi′i, pi′i+1) ∈ R′.
(A.7)
The mapping from pi to pi′ where each pi′i satisfies (6.21) is a “strict mapping”. As a
result, the transitions in pi′ ought to satisfy R′ as defined by (6.9) (which corresponds
to a strict encoding), regardless of whether R′ is defined by (6.9) or (6.10). Thus it is
sufficient to prove that the transitions satisfy R′ as defined by (6.9).
Unlike the classic LTL encoding scheme whose elementary formulas are of the form
Xp, elementary formulas in the TGBA encoding scheme has various forms. In addition,
a transition constraint for an elementary formula in the TGBA encoding scheme may
be defined in terms of subsidiary transition constraints on formulas that may not be
elementary but are in sub(ϕ). To help prove (A.7), the following is proved first:
(M,pi |= ϕ) ∧ proj(pi′) = pi
∧ ∀i ≥ 0, p ∈ el(ϕ) : (M,pii |= p)⇔ (M ′, pi′i |= Vp)
∧ ∀i ≥ 0, p ∈ el(ϕ) ∧ (ec(p) 6≡ true) : (M,pii |= p ∧ ¬ec(p))⇔ (M ′, pi′i |= Pp)
∧ ∀i ≥ 0, p ∈ cl(ϕ) : (M,pii |= p)⇔ (M ′, pi′i |= Sϕ(p))
⇒ ∀i ≥ 0, p ∈ sub(ϕ) : (M,pii |= p)⇔ ((pi′i, pi′i+1) |= Tϕ(p)).
(A.8)
The proof is by induction on the structure of p ∈ sub(ϕ). Zooming in on (M,pii |= p)⇔
((pi′i, pi
′
i+1) |= Tϕ(p)), the cases are as follows:
• Case p ∈ AP (ϕ): (M,pii |= p)⇔ (M ′, pi′i |= p)⇔ ((pi′i, pi′i+1) |= Tϕ(p)).
• Case p ≡ ¬q: since ϕ is in NNF, we have q ∈ AP (ϕ), and we get
(M,pii |= ¬q)⇔ (M,pii 6|= q)⇔ ((pi′i, pi′i+1) 6|= Tϕ(q))⇔ ((pi′i, pi′i+1) |= Tϕ(¬q)).
• Case p ≡ q ∧ r: using the induction hypothesis, we get
(M,pii |= q ∧ r)
⇔ (M,pii |= q) ∧ (M,pii |= r)
⇔ ((pi′i, pi′i+1) |= Tϕ(q)) ∧ ((pi′i, pi′i+1) |= Tϕ(r))
⇔ ((pi′i, pi′i+1) |= Tϕ(q ∧ r)).
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• Case p ≡ q ∨ r: using the induction hypothesis, we get
(M,pii |= q ∨ r)
⇔ (M,pii |= q) ∨ (M,pii |= r)
⇔ ((pi′i, pi′i+1) |= Tϕ(q)) ∨ ((pi′i, pi′i+1) |= Tϕ(r))
⇔ ((pi′i, pi′i+1) |= Tϕ(q ∨ r)).
• Case p ≡ Xq: q ∈ cl(ϕ), we get
(M,pii |= Xq)
⇔ (M,pii+1 |= q)
⇔ (M ′, pi′i+1 |= Sϕ(q))
⇔ ((pi′i, pi′i+1) |= next(Sϕ(q)))
⇔ ((pi′i, pi′i+1) |= Tϕ(Xq)).
• Case p ≡ qU r: using the induction hypothesis, we get
(M,pii |= qU r)
⇔ (M,pii |= r ∨ (qU r ∧ ¬r) ∧ q ∧X(qU r))
⇔ ((pi′i, pi′i+1) |= Tϕ(r) ∨ Tϕ(q) ∧ PqU r ∧ Tϕ(X(qU r)))
⇔ ((pi′i, pi′i+1) |= Tϕ(qU r)).
• Case p ≡ qR r: using the induction hypothesis, we get
(M,pii |= qR r)
⇔ (M,pii |= r ∧ (q ∨X(qR r)))
⇔ ((pi′i, pi′i+1) |= Tϕ(r) ∧ (Tϕ(q) ∨ Tϕ(X(qR r))))
⇔ ((pi′i, pi′i+1) |= Tϕ(qR r)).
• Case p ≡ Gq, q 6≡ Fr for any r: using the induction hypothesis, we get
(M,pii |= Gq)
⇔ (M,pii |= q ∧X(Gq))
⇔ ((pi′i, pi′i+1) |= Tϕ(q) ∧ Tϕ(X(Gq)))
⇔ ((pi′i, pi′i+1) |= Tϕ(Gq)).
• Case p ≡ Fq: using the induction hypothesis, we get
(M,pii |= Fq)
⇔ (M,pii |= q ∨ (Fq ∧ ¬q) ∧X(Fq))
⇔ ((pi′i, pi′i+1) |= Tϕ(q) ∨ PFq ∧ Tϕ(X(Fq)))
⇔ ((pi′i, pi′i+1) |= Tϕ(Fq)).
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• Case p ≡ GFq: using the induction hypothesis, we get
(M,pii |= GFq)
⇔ (M,pii |= (q ∨ (GFq ∧ ¬q)) ∧X(GFq))
⇔ ((pi′i, pi′i+1) |= (Tϕ(q) ∨ PGFq) ∧ Tϕ(X(GFq)))
⇔ ((pi′i, pi′i+1) |= Tϕ(GFq)).
The proof of (A.8) is complete. From (A.6) and (A.8), we get
(M,pi |= ϕ) ∧ proj(pi′) = pi
∧ ∀i ≥ 0, p ∈ el(ϕ) : (M,pii |= p)⇔ (M ′, pi′i |= Vp)
∧ ∀i ≥ 0, p ∈ el(ϕ) ∧ (ec(p) 6≡ true) : (M,pii |= p ∧ ¬ec(p))⇔ (M ′, pi′i |= Pp)
⇒ ∀i ≥ 0, p ∈ el(ϕ) : (M ′, pi′i |= Vp)⇔ ((pi′i, pi′i+1) |= Tϕ(p)),
which when combined with ∀i ≥ 0 : (proj(pi′i), proj(pi′i+1)) ∈ R (pi is a path in M), proves
(A.7):
(M,pi |= ϕ) ∧ proj(pi′) = pi
∧ ∀i ≥ 0, p ∈ el(ϕ) : (M,pii |= p)⇔ (M ′, pi′i |= Vp)
∧ ∀i ≥ 0, p ∈ el(ϕ) ∧ (ec(p) 6≡ true) : (M,pii |= p ∧ ¬ec(p))⇔ (M ′, pi′i |= Pp)
⇒ ∀i ≥ 0 : (pi′i, pi′i+1) ∈ R′,
irrespective of whether (6.9) or (6.10) is used for the definition of R′. Lemma 6.2 follows
from (A.6), (A.7), and the immediate satisfaction of ∀i ≥ 0, p ∈ el(ϕ) ∧ (ec(p) 6≡ true) :
(M,pii |= p ∧ ¬ec(p))⇔ (M ′, pi′i |= Pp) when pi′ is constructed according to (6.21).
The proof of Lemma 6.2 completes the proof of Theorem 6.2 within the TGBA en-
coding scheme.
A.2.2 Proof of Theorem 6.3
To complete the proof of Theorem 6.3, we need to prove Lemmas 6.4 and 6.5. Let us
first prove Lemma 6.4:
(M,pi |= ϕ) ∧ proj(pi′) = pi
∧ ∀i ≥ 0, p ∈ cl(ϕ) : (M,pii |= p)⇔ (M ′, pi′i |= Sϕ(p))
∧ ∀i ≥ 0, p ∈ el(ϕ) ∧ (ec(p) 6≡ true) : (M,pii |= p ∧ ¬ec(p))⇔ (M ′, pi′i |= Pp)
⇒ ∀c ∈ Cϕ, i ≥ 0 : ∃j ≥ i : M ′, pi′j |= c.
Proof. Following the proof plan from Section 6.3.2, we expand Cϕ in ∀c ∈ Cϕ, i ≥ 0 :
∃j ≥ i : M ′, pi′j |= c and transform the quantification:
∀c ∈ Cϕ, i ≥ 0 : ∃j ≥ i : M ′, pi′j |= c
⇔ ∀c ∈ {¬v | v ∈ {Pp | p ∈ el(ϕ) ∧ (ec(p) 6≡ true)}}, i ≥ 0 : ∃j ≥ i : M ′, pi′j |= c
⇔ ∀p ∈ el(ϕ), i ≥ 0 : (ec(p) 6≡ true)⇒ ∃j ≥ i : M ′, pi′j |= ¬Pp.
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Thus we need to prove
(M,pi |= ϕ) ∧ proj(pi′) = pi
∧ ∀i ≥ 0, p ∈ cl(ϕ) : (M,pii |= p)⇔ (M ′, pi′i |= Sϕ(p))
∧ ∀i ≥ 0, p ∈ el(ϕ) ∧ (ec(p) 6≡ true) : (M,pii |= p ∧ ¬ec(p))⇔ (M ′, pi′i |= Pp)
⇒ ∀p ∈ el(ϕ), i ≥ 0 : (ec(p) 6≡ true)⇒ ∃j ≥ i : M ′, pi′j |= ¬Pp.
(A.9)
Zooming in on ∀p ∈ el(ϕ), i ≥ 0 : (ec(p) 6≡ true) ⇒ ∃j ≥ i : M ′, pi′j |= ¬Pp, suppose
(A.9) does not hold, i.e., for some p ∈ el(ϕ) with ec(p) 6≡ true, there exists i0 ≥ 0
such that ∀j ≥ i0 : M ′, pi′j |= Pp. Using the last antecedent in (A.9) we get ∀j ≥ i0 :
(M,pij |= p ∧ ¬ec(p)). Thus we have M,pii0 |= p and ∀j ≥ i0 : M,pij 6|= ec(p), which is
a contradiction (since M,pii0 |= p implies ∃j ≥ i0 : M,pij |= ec(p) — see Concept 6.4),
therefore (A.9) holds. This completes the proof of Lemma 6.4.
Next, we prove Lemma 6.5:
∀c ∈ Cϕ, i ≥ 0 : ∃j ≥ i : M ′, pi′j |= c
⇒ ∀i ≥ 0, p ∈ cl(ϕ) : (M ′, pi′i |= Sϕ(p))⇒ (M ′, pi′i |= p).
Proof. Following the proof plan in Section 6.3.2, after expanding the definition of Cϕ and
transforming the quantification, we get (A.10).
∀p ∈ el(ϕ), i ≥ 0 : (ec(p) 6≡ true)⇒ ∃j ≥ i : M ′, pi′j |= ¬Pp
⇒ ∀p ∈ cl(ϕ), i ≥ 0 : (M ′, pi′i |= Sϕ(p))⇒ (M ′, pi′i |= p).
(A.10)
Before we prove (A.10), we prove two things. The first is (A.11).
∀p ∈ cl(ϕ), i ≥ 0 : (M ′, pi′i |= Sϕ(p))⇒ ((pi′i, pi′i+1) |= Tϕ(p)). (A.11)
The proof of (A.11) is by induction on the structure of p ∈ cl(ϕ). The cases are as follows:
• Case p ∈ AP (ϕ): (M ′, pi′i |= Sϕ(p))⇔ (M ′, pi′i |= p)⇔ ((pi′i, pi′i+1) |= Tϕ(p)).
• Case p ≡ ¬q, we have q ∈ AP (ϕ), and we get
(M ′, pi′i |= Sϕ(¬q))
⇔ (M ′, pi′i 6|= Sϕ(q))
⇔ ((pi′i, pi′i+1) 6|= Tϕ(q))
⇔ ((pi′i, pi′i+1) |= Tϕ(¬q)).
• Case p ≡ q ∧ r, using the induction hypothesis:
(M ′, pi′i |= Sϕ(q ∧ r))
⇔ (M ′, pi′i |= Sϕ(q)) ∧ (M ′, pi′i |= Sϕ(r))
⇒ ((pi′i, pi′i+1) |= Tϕ(q)) ∧ ((pi′i, pi′i+1) |= Tϕ(r))
⇔ ((pi′i, pi′i+1) |= Tϕ(q ∧ r)).
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• Case p ≡ q ∨ r, using the induction hypothesis:
(M ′, pi′i |= Sϕ(q ∨ r))
⇔ (M ′, pi′i |= Sϕ(q)) ∨ (M ′, pi′i |= Sϕ(r))
⇒ ((pi′i, pi′i+1) |= Tϕ(q)) ∨ ((pi′i, pi′i+1) |= Tϕ(r))
⇔ ((pi′i, pi′i+1) |= Tϕ(q ∨ r)).
• Case p ∈ el(ϕ), using (6.9) or (6.10) as the definition of R′:
(M ′, pi′i |= Sϕ(p))⇔ (M ′, pi′i |= Vp))⇒ ((pi′i, pi′i+1) |= Tϕ(p)).
The second thing to prove is (A.12). This is because the TGBA encoding scheme is
transition-oriented, so the proof of (A.10) involves reasoning about transition constraints
on formulas in sub(ϕ).
∀p ∈ el(ϕ), i ≥ 0 : (ec(p) 6≡ true)⇒ ∃j ≥ i : M ′, pi′j |= ¬Pp
⇒ ∀p ∈ sub(ϕ), i ≥ 0 : ((pi′i, pi′i+1) |= Tϕ(p))⇒ (M ′, pi′i |= p).
(A.12)
The proof of (A.12) makes up the bulk of the proof of the soundness of the TGBA
encoding scheme, and contains many intricate details. The proof of (A.12) is by induction
on the structure of p ∈ sub(ϕ). Zooming in on ((pi′i, pi′i+1) |= Tϕ(p))⇒ (M ′, pi′i |= p), the
cases are as follows:
• Case p ∈ AP (ϕ): ((pi′i, pi′i+1) |= Tϕ(p))⇔ (M ′, pi′i |= p)⇔ (M ′, pi′i |= p).
• Case p ≡ ¬q, we have q ∈ AP (ϕ), and we get
((pi′i, pi
′
i+1) |= Tϕ(¬q))⇔ ((pi′i, pi′i+1) 6|= Tϕ(q))⇔ (M ′, pi′i 6|= q)⇔ (M ′, pi′i |= ¬q).
• Case p ≡ q ∧ r, using the induction hypothesis:
((pi′i, pi
′
i+1) |= Tϕ(q ∧ r))
⇔ ((pi′i, pi′i+1) |= Tϕ(q)) ∧ ((pi′i, pi′i+1) |= Tϕ(r))
⇒ (M ′, pi′i |= q) ∧ (M ′, pi′i |= r)⇔ (M ′, pi′i |= q ∧ r).
• Case p ≡ q ∨ r, using the induction hypothesis:
((pi′i, pi
′
i+1) |= Tϕ(q ∨ r))
⇔ ((pi′i, pi′i+1) |= Tϕ(q)) ∨ ((pi′i, pi′i+1) |= Tϕ(r))
⇒ (M ′, pi′i |= q) ∨ (M ′, pi′i |= r)⇔ (M ′, pi′i |= q ∨ r).
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• Case p ≡ Xq, using the induction hypothesis, (6.9) or (6.10) as the definition of R′,
and (A.11):
((pi′i, pi
′
i+1) |= Tϕ(Xq))
⇔ ((pi′i, pi′i+1) |= next(Sϕ(p)))
⇔ (M ′, pi′i+1 |= Sϕ(q))
⇒ ((pi′i+1, pi′i+2) |= Tϕ(q))
⇒ (M ′, pi′i+1 |= q)
⇔ (M ′, pi′i |= Xq).
• Case p ≡ qU r: first we prove
((pi′i, pi
′
i+1) |= Tϕ(qU r))
⇒ ∀j ≥ i : ((pi′j, pi′j+1) |= Tϕ(q) ∧ PqU r ∧ Tϕ(X(qU r)))
∨ ∃k : i ≤ k ≤ j ∧ ((pi′k, pi′k+1) |= Tϕ(r))
(A.13)
by induction on j. For j = i, the antecedent ((pi′i, pi
′
i+1) |= Tϕ(qU r)) gives us
((pi′j, pi
′
j+1) |= Tϕ(qU r))
⇔ ((pi′j, pi′j+1) |= Tϕ(r) ∨ Tϕ(q) ∧ PqU r ∧ Tϕ(X(qU r)))
⇔ ((pi′j, pi′j+1) |= Tϕ(q) ∧ PqU r ∧ Tϕ(X(qU r)))
∨ ∃k : i ≤ k ≤ j ∧ ((pi′k, pi′k+1) |= Tϕ(r)).
For j > i, the induction hypothesis gives us two cases to prove. In the first case,
the induction hypothesis gives us ((pi′j−1, pi
′
j) |= Tϕ(q) ∧ PqU r ∧ Tϕ(X(qU r))), thus
((pi′j−1, pi
′
j) |= Tϕ(q) ∧ PqU r ∧ Tϕ(X(qU r)))
⇒ ((pi′j, pi′j+1) |= Tϕ(qU r))
⇔ ((pi′j, pi′j+1) |= Tϕ(r) ∨ Tϕ(q) ∧ PqU r ∧ Tϕ(X(qU r)))
⇒ ((pi′j, pi′j+1) |= Tϕ(q) ∧ PqU r ∧ Tϕ(X(qU r)))
∨ ∃k : i ≤ k ≤ j ∧ ((pi′k, pi′k+1) |= Tϕ(r)).
In the second case, the induction hypothesis gives use ∃k : i ≤ k ≤ j − 1 ∧
((pi′k, pi
′
k+1) |= Tϕ(r)), thus
∃k : i ≤ k ≤ j − 1 ∧ ((pi′k, pi′k+1) |= Tϕ(r))
⇒ ((pi′j, pi′j+1) |= Tϕ(q) ∧ PqU r ∧ Tϕ(X(qU r)))
∨ ∃k : i ≤ k ≤ j ∧ ((pi′k, pi′k+1) |= Tϕ(r)).
This completes the induction proof for (A.13).
We now show that given ((pi′i, pi
′
i+1) |= Tϕ(qU r)), then ∃k ≥ i : ((pi′k, pi′k+1) |=
Tϕ(r)). Suppose not, then using (A.13) we get ∀j ≥ i : ((pi′j, pi′j+1) |= Tϕ(q)∧PqU r∧
Tϕ(X(qU r))). However, the antecedent ∀p ∈ el(ϕ), i ≥ 0 : (ec(p) 6≡ true)⇒ ∃j ≥
A.2. SOUNDNESS OF THE TGBA ENCODING SCHEME 137
i : M ′, pi′j |= ¬Pp in (A.12) gives us ∀i ≥ 0 : ∃j ≥ i : M ′, pi′j |= ¬PqU r, thus we get a
contradiction.
Given ((pi′i, pi
′
i+1) |= Tϕ(qU r)), let k0 be the smallest k such that k ≥ i∧((pi′k, pi′k+1) |=
Tϕ(r)). From (A.13) we get ∀j : i ≤ j < k0 ⇒ ((pi′j, pi′j+1) |= Tϕ(q)). In addition, we
have k0 ≥ i ∧ ((pi′k0 , pi′k0+1) |= Tϕ(r)). Thus we have
((pi′i, pi
′
i+1) |= Tϕ(qU r))
⇒ ((pi′k0 , pi′k0+1) |= Tϕ(r)) ∧ ∀j : i ≤ j < k0 ⇒ ((pi′j, pi′j+1) |= Tϕ(q))
⇒ ((M ′, pi′k0 |= r) ∧ ∀j : i ≤ j < k0 ⇒ (M ′, pi′j |= q))
⇔ (M ′, pi′i |= qU r).
This completes the proof for the case p ≡ qU r.
• Case p ≡ qR r: first we prove
((pi′i, pi
′
i+1) |= Tϕ(qR r))
⇒ ∀j ≥ i : ((pi′j, pi′j+1) |= Tϕ(r) ∧ Tϕ(X(qR r)))
∨ ∃k : i ≤ k ≤ j ∧ ((pi′k, pi′k+1) |= Tϕ(q) ∧ Tϕ(r))
(A.14)
by induction on j. For j = i, the antecedent ((pi′i, pi
′
i+1) |= Tϕ(qR r)) gives us
((pi′j, pi
′
j+1) |= Tϕ(qR r))
⇔ ((pi′j, pi′j+1) |= Tϕ(r) ∧ Tϕ(X(qR r))) ∨ Tϕ(r) ∧ Tϕ(q)
⇔ ((pi′j, pi′j+1) |= Tϕ(r) ∧ Tϕ(X(qR r)))
∨ ∃k : i ≤ k ≤ j ∧ ((pi′k, pi′k+1) |= Tϕ(q) ∧ Tϕ(r)).
For j > i, the induction hypothesis gives us two cases. In the first case, the induction
hypothesis gives us ((pi′j−1, pi
′
j) |= Tϕ(r) ∧ Tϕ(X(qR r))), thus
((pi′j−1, pi
′
j) |= Tϕ(r) ∧ Tϕ(X(qR r)))
⇒ ((pi′j, pi′j+1) |= Tϕ(qR r))
⇔ ((pi′j, pi′j+1) |= Tϕ(r) ∧ Tϕ(X(qR r))) ∨ Tϕ(r) ∧ Tϕ(q)
⇒ ((pi′j, pi′j+1) |= Tϕ(r) ∧ Tϕ(X(qR r)))
∨ ∃k : i ≤ k ≤ j ∧ ((pi′k, pi′k+1) |= Tϕ(q) ∧ Tϕ(r)).
In the second case, the induction hypothesis gives us ∃k : i ≤ k ≤ j − 1 ∧
((pi′k, pi
′
k+1) |= Tϕ(q) ∧ Tϕ(r)), thus
∃k : i ≤ k ≤ j − 1 ∧ ((pi′k, pi′k+1) |= Tϕ(q) ∧ Tϕ(r))
⇒ ((pi′j, pi′j+1) |= Tϕ(r) ∧ Tϕ(X(qR r)))
∨ ∃k : i ≤ k ≤ j ∧ ((pi′k, pi′k+1) |= Tϕ(q) ∧ Tϕ(r)).
This completes the induction proof for (A.14).
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From (A.14) we get
((pi′i, pi
′
i+1) |= Tϕ(qR r))
⇒ ∀j ≥ i : ((pi′j, pi′j+1) |= Tϕ(r) ∧ Tϕ(X(qR r)))
∨ ∃k : i ≤ k ≤ j ∧ ((pi′k, pi′k+1) |= Tϕ(q) ∧ Tϕ(r))
⇒ ∀j ≥ i : ((pi′j, pi′j+1) |= Tϕ(r))
∨ ∃k : i ≤ k ≤ j ∧ ((pi′k, pi′k+1) |= Tϕ(q) ∧ Tϕ(r))
⇒ ∀j ≥ i : ((pi′j, pi′j+1) |= Tϕ(r) ∨ Tϕ(q) ∧ Tϕ(r))
∨ ∃k : i ≤ k < j ∧ ((pi′k, pi′k+1) |= Tϕ(q) ∧ Tϕ(r))
⇒ ∀j ≥ i : ((pi′j, pi′j+1) |= Tϕ(r)) ∨ ∃k : i ≤ k < j ∧ ((pi′k, pi′k+1) |= Tϕ(q))
⇒ ∀j ≥ i : (M ′, pi′j |= r) ∨ ∃k : i ≤ k < j ∧ (M ′, pi′k |= q)
⇔ ∀j ≥ i : (∀k : i ≤ k < j ⇒ (M ′, pi′k 6|= q))⇒ (M ′, pi′j |= r)
⇔ (M ′, pi′i |= qR r).
• Case p ≡ Gq: first we prove
((pi′i, pi
′
i+1) |= Tϕ(Gq))⇒ ∀j ≥ i : ((pi′j, pi′j+1) |= Tϕ(q) ∧ Tϕ(X(Gq))) (A.15)
by induction on j. For j = i, the antecedent ((pi′i, pi
′
i+1) |= Tϕ(Gq)) gives us
((pi′j, pi
′
j+1) |= Tϕ(Gq))⇔ ((pi′j, pi′j+1) |= Tϕ(q) ∧ Tϕ(X(Gq))).
For j > i, the induction hypothesis gives us ((pi′j−1, pi
′
j) |= Tϕ(q)∧Tϕ(X(Gq))), thus
((pi′j−1, pi
′
j) |= Tϕ(q) ∧ Tϕ(X(Gq)))
⇒ ((pi′j, pi′j+1) |= Tϕ(Gq))
⇒ ((pi′j, pi′j+1) |= Tϕ(q) ∧ Tϕ(X(Gq))).
This completes the induction proof for (A.15).
From (A.15) we get
((pi′i, pi
′
i+1) |= Tϕ(Gq))
⇒ ∀j ≥ i : ((pi′j, pi′j+1) |= Tϕ(q) ∧ Tϕ(X(Gq)))
⇒ ∀j ≥ i : ((pi′j, pi′j+1) |= Tϕ(q))
⇒ ∀j ≥ i : (M ′, pi′j |= q)
⇔ (M ′, pi′i |= Gq).
• Case p ≡ Fq: first we prove
((pi′i, pi
′
i+1) |= Tϕ(Fq))
⇒ ∀j ≥ i : ((pi′j, pi′j+1) |= PFq ∧ Tϕ(X(Fq)))
∨ ∃k : i ≤ k ≤ j ∧ ((pi′k, pi′k+1) |= Tϕ(q))
(A.16)
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by induction on j. For j = i, the antecedent ((pi′i, pi
′
i+1) |= Tϕ(Fq)) gives us
((pi′j, pi
′
j+1) |= Tϕ(Fq))⇔ ((pi′j, pi′j+1) |= Tϕ(q) ∨ PFq ∧ Tϕ(X(Fq)))
⇔ ((pi′j, pi′j+1) |= PFq ∧ Tϕ(X(Fq))) ∨ ∃k : i ≤ k ≤ j ∧ ((pi′k, pi′k+1) |= Tϕ(q)).
For j > i, the induction hypothesis gives us two cases. In the first case, the induction
hypothesis gives us ((pi′j−1, pi
′
j) |= PFq ∧ Tϕ(X(Fq))), thus
((pi′j−1, pi
′
j) |= PFq ∧ Tϕ(X(Fq)))
⇒ ((pi′j, pi′j+1) |= Tϕ(Fq))
⇔ ((pi′j, pi′j+1) |= Tϕ(q) ∨ PFq ∧ Tϕ(X(Fq)))
⇒ ((pi′j, pi′j+1) |= PFq ∧ Tϕ(X(Fq))) ∨ ∃k : i ≤ k ≤ j ∧ ((pi′k, pi′k+1) |= Tϕ(q)).
For the second case we have ∃k : i ≤ k ≤ j − 1 ∧ ((pi′k, pi′k+1) |= Tϕ(q)), thus
∃k : i ≤ k ≤ j − 1 ∧ ((pi′k, pi′k+1) |= Tϕ(q))
⇒ ((pi′j, pi′j+1) |= PFq ∧ Tϕ(X(Fq))) ∨ ∃k : i ≤ k ≤ j ∧ ((pi′k, pi′k+1) |= Tϕ(q)).
This completes the induction proof for (A.16).
We now show that given ((pi′i, pi
′
i+1) |= Tϕ(Fq)), then ∃k ≥ i : ((pi′k, pi′k+1) |= Tϕ(q)).
Suppose not, then using (A.16) we get ∀j ≥ i : ((pi′j, pi′j+1) |= PFq ∧ Tϕ(X(Fq))).
However, the hypothesis ∀p ∈ el(ϕ), i ≥ 0 : (ec(p) 6≡ true)⇒ ∃j ≥ i : M ′, pi′j |= ¬Pp
in (A.12) gives us ∀i ≥ 0 : ∃j ≥ i : M ′, pi′j |= ¬PFq, thus we get a contradiction.
Thus we have
((pi′i, pi
′
i+1) |= Tϕ(Fq))⇒ ∃k ≥ i : ((pi′k, pi′k+1) |= Tϕ(q))
⇒ (∃k ≥ i : (M ′, pi′k |= q))⇔ (M ′, pi′i |= Fq).
• Case p ≡ GFq: first we prove
((pi′i, pi
′
i+1) |= Tϕ(GFq))⇒ ∀j ≥ i : ((pi′j, pi′j+1) |= Tϕ(GFq)) (A.17)
by induction on j. For j = i, the antecedent ((pi′i, pi
′
i+1) |= Tϕ(GFq)) gives us
((pi′j, pi
′
j+1) |= Tϕ(GFq)).
For j > i, the induction hypothesis gives us ((pi′j−1, pi
′
j) |= Tϕ(GFq)), thus
((pi′j−1, pi
′
j) |= Tϕ(GFq))
⇒ ((pi′j−1, pi′j) |= Tϕ(X(GFq)) ∧ (Tϕ(p) ∨ PGFq))
⇒ ((pi′j, pi′j+1) |= Tϕ(GFq)).
This completes the induction proof for (A.17).
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We now show that given ((pi′i, pi
′
i+1) |= Tϕ(GFq)), then ∀j ≥ i : ∃k ≥ j : ((pi′k, pi′k+1) |=
Tϕ(q)). Suppose not, then using (A.17) we get
((pi′i, pi
′
i+1) |= Tϕ(GFq))
⇒ ∀j ≥ i : ((pi′j, pi′j+1) |= Tϕ(GFq))
⇔ ((pi′j, pi′j+1) |= Tϕ(X(GFq)) ∧ (Tϕ(p) ∨ PGFq))
⇔ ((pi′j, pi′j+1) |= Tϕ(X(GFq)) ∧ PGFq).
However, the antecedent ∀p ∈ el(ϕ), i ≥ 0 : (ec(p) 6≡ true)⇒ ∃j ≥ i : M ′, pi′j |= ¬Pp
in (A.12) gives us ∀i ≥ 0 : ∃j ≥ i : M ′, pi′j |= ¬PGFq, thus we get a contradiction.
Thus we have
((pi′i, pi
′
i+1) |= Tϕ(GFq))
⇒ ∀j ≥ i : ∃k ≥ j : ((pi′k, pi′k+1) |= Tϕ(q))
⇒ (∀j ≥ i : ∃k ≥ j : (M ′, pi′k |= q))
⇔ (M ′, pi′i |= GFq).
The proof of (A.12) is complete. Combining (A.11) and (A.12) immediately gives us
(A.10), proving Lemma 6.5.
The proofs of Lemma 6.4 and Lemma 6.5 complete the proof of Theorem 6.3 within
the TGBA encoding scheme,
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